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Philosophy is, today, not a pastime. It is inescapable, because we no longer believe to know
what is good. … [We] are unable to sneak out of the moral point of view, yet there is nobody
who tells us what it is.
Ernst Tugendhat, in: Steve Pyke, Philosophers.
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1 The problem of axiological uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
We’re uncertain about most things. And yet we constantly have to act. So uncer-
tainty is the condition of almost any decision we make. Part of this uncertainty
concerns purely descriptive questions.Whenordering dinner at a restaurantwe’re
uncertainwhat precisely we’ll get. In starting a relationshipwe’re not certain how
it will end. And in fighting climate change we’re uncertain about the effects of dif-
ferent measures. This raises the question about what you ought to do if you’re un-
certain about purely descriptive facts. But often, we’re also uncertain about fun-
damental normative or evaluative questions. In response to climate change, say,
wemay be uncertain about whether wemorally ought to be impartial in weighing
different interests, or ought to give more weight to current than to future genera-
tions, to acquaintances than to strangers, or to human beings than to non-human
animals. And this may not just be because we’re uncertain about relevant empiri-
cal questions, such as what future generations, strangers or non-human animals
desire. It might be, at least partly, because we’re uncertain about the fundamen-
tal moral principles governing such decisions. So this raises the question about
what you ought to do if you’re uncertain about fundamental normative or evalua-
tive facts.
This book is about this latter kind of uncertainty. More precisely, it’s about
a specific kind of such uncertainty: axiological uncertainty—i. e., uncertainty
about fundamental axiological facts, or fundamental facts about moral value.
My core question is how you ought to evaluate your options if you’re uncertain
about which axiology is true. Plausibly, there are fundamental moral facts be-
yond those of axiology—such as deontic facts about what you ought to do. And
plausibly, there are fundamental normative or evaluative facts beyond those of
morality—such as facts of prudence, rationality or aesthetics. So the question
about how you ought to evaluate your options if you’re axiologically uncertain is
narrower than the general question about what you ought to do if you’re uncer-
tain about any fundamental normative or evaluative facts. For reasons that will
emerge, this narrower question is simpler. And yet much can be learnt from it
about the general problem too. So I’ll focus on axiological uncertainty only.1
1 Most of the relevant literature focuses on the general problems of moral or normative uncer-
tainty. For work on uncertainty concerning deontological morality specifically, see e. g. Tarsney
(2018b); for work on uncertainty about the norms of decision theory, see e. g. MacAskill (2016b).
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The concept of ‘m-value’
Letme clarifymy question. In one sense, there’s a trivial answer to how you ought
to evaluate your options if you’re axiologically uncertain. You ought to do so in
accordance with the axiology that is true. But that’s not the answer I’m concerned
with. To see that there might be a different one, consider
Purely descriptive uncertainty: Martha is suffering from a mild headache.
Raphael has a pill he could give her, but he’s uncertain about whether it’s a
pain reliever or a lethal form of poison. Actually, the pill is a pain reliever.
Is it better for Raphael to give his pill to Martha, or better not to? There’s an ex-
tensive debate about such cases, mostly concerning the concept of ‘ought’: about
whether there are twodistinct senses of ‘ought’ (‘subjective’ and ‘objective’) or just
a single one, about which one it would be, or which of the two ismore basic or im-
portant.2 I won’t go into the details of this debate. It seems undeniable that some-
thing has to be said, and can be said, in favour of both giving and not giving the
pill. On the one hand, we can evaluate Raphael’s options on the basis of their ac-
tual outcomes, without taking his uncertainty into account. We’ll then say giving
the pill is better. After all, Raphael will thereby relieveMartha’s pain, and nothing
else will happen. On the other hand, we can evaluate his options on the basis of
the prospects they represent, taking his uncertainty into account. We’ll then say
not giving the pill is better. After all, Raphael will otherwise risk Martha’s death
for the sake of a headache.Wemay be interested in either of these judgments, and
both uses of ‘good’ seem familiar. I’ll remain neutral about which of them is more
basic or important, or more in line with our common concept of goodness.
A parallel example can be given about axiological uncertainty:
Axiological uncertainty: Raphael has a pill, with which he can either relieve
Martha of a mild headache or a donkey, Baldwin, of a much greater pain.
He’s uncertain between a speciesist and a non-speciesist axiology. Accord-
ing to the speciesist view it would be better to benefit Martha, and according
to the non-speciesist view it would be better to benefit Baldwin. Actually, the
speciesist view is right.
Here too, we can evaluate Raphael’s options on the basis of their actual value,
without taking his uncertainty into account. We’ll then say it’s better for him
2 See e. g.Hudson (1989), Jackson (1991),Howard-Synder (1997),Wiland (2005), Feldman (2006),
Zimmerman (2008), Bykvist (2009b), Broome (2013, ch. 3) or Kolodny and MacFarlane (ms),
among many others.
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to benefit Martha. That’s what (we’re assuming) the true axiology says. How-
ever, we can again evaluate Raphael’s options on the basis of the prospects they
represent—now taking his axiological uncertainty into account. And if we do
that, it’s an open question which act is better, under his state of uncertainty. By
benefiting Martha he risks effecting something comparatively bad. So intuitively,
perhaps it’s better for him to benefit Baldwin. Judgments of this kind may be less
familiar from our ordinary practice, but they’re no less distinct than in the purely
descriptive case.
I’m concerned with judgments of this latter kind. To distinguish them con-
ceptually, I’ll use the term ‘meta-value’, or ‘m-value’ (or ‘m-goodness’), to denote
the goodness we refer to by taking into account both your descriptive and your
axiological uncertainty. I’ll use the simple term ‘value’ (or ‘goodness’) to denote
the goodness we refer to by taking into account your purely descriptive, but not
your axiological uncertainty. In the second example, I’ll thus say it’s better to ben-
efit Martha, but (so far) an open question which of the two options is m-better for
Raphael. And that’s my core question: which of your options are m-better than
which, if you’re uncertain about which are better than which? This question has
no trivial answer.
The importance of the phenomenon
It’s worth reflecting briefly on how widespread axiological uncertainty is, how
many of our decisions it affects, and how pressingly it does. Take questions of
population ethics. Is a sufficiently large population of people with lives barely
worth living better than a smaller population of people living wonderful lives?
More basically, is it good to bring people into existence?And are the values of pop-
ulations with different numbers of people even comparable? Philosophers have
wildly contrasting views on these matters, and good arguments on all sides.3 We
shouldn’t be certain of any answers. Yet these questions are crucial for very many
decisions affecting the number and identity of future people. Those include the
largest decisions of humanity—about global poverty, climate change, or (other)
3 See e. g. Huemer (2008) for an affirmative answer to the first question, Temkin (2012) or Parfit
(1984) for a negative one; Broome (2004, ch. 10) for objections to the intuition that bringing peo-
ple into existence isn’t positively good; Broome (2004, ch. 12) for the claim that there’s only some
vagueness in the comparisons, Bader (forthcoming) for an argument to the effect that such pop-
ulations are thoroughly incomparable, and Parfit (ms) for a middle ground. More generally, see
e. g. Arrhenius (forthcoming) for impossibility theorems, showing that a number of intuitively
plausible principles of population ethics are incompatible.
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catastrophic risks like pandemics, artificial intelligence or nuclear wars. They in-
clude national policies of public health, security or migration. And they include
very personal decisions—such as whether we use our resources to save other peo-
ple’s lives, thereby perhaps enabling them to have long chains of offsprings.4 In
all of these cases, we must make choices under axiological uncertainty. And we
must do so now.We can’t wait until we’re axiologically certain. Or more precisely,
even to ‘wait’ and figure out answers would be a decision, and just raise the ques-
tion whether that would be m-best.5 So, for very many decisions in the areas just
mentioned, it seems vital that we reflect on how to evaluate options under axio-
logical uncertainty.
But population ethics is just one example. Take the theory of welfare. Would
it be good for us to experience pleasure artificially stimulated in our brains, have
wonderful lives simulated in experience machines, or undergo enhancements
through drugs or genetic engineering? Consider discounting. Does the wellbeing
of future beings have the same value as that of currently existing ones, from our
perspective, or should we discount wellbeing over time? Take environmental axi-
ology. Does biodiversity, the intactness of ecosystems, or the flourishing of plants
have value? Consider questions of equality. Is it intrinsically bad if people are
unequally well off, through no fault of their own? Or consider animal welfare. Is
it bad that non-human animals suffer in the wild, are being eaten by predators or
die from starvation? Opinions on these matters diverge, each position has good
arguments in its favour,6 andwe can’t be certain about them. Yet all of these ques-
tions are crucial for momentous decisions we face as humanity and individuals.
And there’s no way of postponing any decisions until we’re certain about them.
Examples can be multiplied with ease. Decision-making under axiological
uncertainty is unavoidablywidespread. So it seems vital to have a theory of which
options are m-better than which in light of such uncertainty.7
4 For thepractical importanceof population ethics, seeparticularlyBroome (2004, ch. 1) orBeck-
stead (2013, ch. 1).
5 SeeMacAskill (2014, ch. 6) for a discussion of this question; alsoMacAskill et al. (2020a, ch. 9).
6 See e. g. Nozick (1974, 42 ff.) for a critical stance on pleasure simulations and the experience
machine, Ng (1997, 1849ff.) or Crisp (2006) for a positive one; Broome (2004, ch. 4) for arguments
against discounting, and Beckstead (2013) or Bostrom (2003) for the radical implications of this;
McShane (2017) for arguments and challenges for the idea that biodiversity has intrinsic value,
Callicott (1989) for the view that ecosystems, and Taylor (1986) for the view that plants intrin-
sically deserve moral consideration; Cohen (1989) for a view on which equality matters, Parfit
(1997) for a challenge; McMahan (2010) for the view that wild animal suffering matters.
7 For a further defence of this claim, see e. g. MacAskill et al. (2020a, ch. 1).
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1.2 This book
Let me outline what I’ll do in this book. My goal is to defend a specific theory of
axiological uncertainty—i. e., Expected ValueMaximisation, or EVM. According to
EVM, an option is m-better than another if and only if it has the greater expected
value—where the expected value of an option is a weighted sum of the values it’s
assigned by the axiologies, with weights representing the probabilities of these
axiologies.
EVM extends the standard theory of decision-making under purely descrip-
tive uncertainty to uncertainty about axiologies. So it’s a promising view. But it
raises two fundamental questions. The first is the question of meaning. It’s the
question about what EVM should even mean—or what it would be for an option
to have a higher expected value than another. That’s anything but clear. EVM fea-
tures a number of concepts that have no use in ordinary language and are in need
of explanation. One such concept is the quantitative notion of value. Whether an
option has a higher expected value than another depends not just on ordinal in-
tratheoretic value comparisons like
(A) according to axiology Ti, outcome x is better than outcome y.
It depends on cardinal intratheoretic value comparisons, or facts of the form
(B) according to axiology Ti, the value-difference between outcomes x and y is n
times as great as the value-difference between outcomes z and t.
To even understand EVM, we need to know what it is for such facts to hold. But
unless more is said, we arguably don’t. Suppose you claim that according to your
favourite axiology, saving Edward’s life is 3.7 times as good as saving Charlotte’s—
or that the value-differencebetween the status quoandEdward’s death is 3.7 times
as great as that between the status quo and Charlotte’s death. Unless you explain
what you mean by this, we don’t understand your assertion. We might think you
chose a swaggering way of expressing that according to your axiology, saving Ed-
ward is considerably better. But we’d think the same if your number was four, or
5.8. What is it for this factor to be 3.7? This isn’t to say you can’t explain what you
mean. Youmaymean that saving ten people whose lives are exactly like Edward’s
would be equally good as saving thirty-seven whose lives are exactly like Char-
lotte’s. And this may count as a proper explanation. The point is, you have to give
some such explanation, or else your statement remains unclear.
But such intratheoretic comparisons are only one kind of fact that EVM pre-
supposes, and that require explanation. Another, and even more problematic
kind are facts about how value-differences compare across axiologies. And again,
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whether an option has a higher expected value than another depends not just on
comparisons like
(C) the value-difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology Ti, is
greater than the value-difference between outcomes z and t, according to ax-
iology Tj.
It depends on cardinal intertheoretic value comparisons, or facts of the form
(D) the value-difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology Ti, is n
times as great as the value-difference between outcomes z and t, according to
axiology Tj.
What it is for such comparisons to hold across axiologies is even less clear. In-
deed, many people are sceptical that such comparisons can be meaningful. Ed-
ward Gracely says that intertheoretic comparisons are ‘essentially meaningless’
(1996, 330). James Hudson holds that there’s generally no ‘common measure’ be-
tween different axiologies and that they therefore ‘must be incomparable’ (1989,
224; emphasis added). John Broome similarly contends that for most axiologies
‘we cannot take a sensible average’ between their different units of value (2012,
185). And many others are similarly sceptic.8
And there’s a third problematic kind of fact. Whether an option has a higher
expected value than another depends not just on qualitative probability facts like
(E) axiology Ti is very plausible.
It depends on quantitative probability facts, or facts of the form
(F) the probability of axiology Ti is pi,
for some pi ∈ [0, 1]. To understand EVM, we need to knowwhat it is for such a fact
to hold. And again, such statements have no use in ordinary language, and are
in need of explanation. We understand what you mean in saying the speciesist
axiology is implausible. But unless you say more, we don’t understand what you
mean in claiming it has a probability of 0.05.
So it’s anything but clear what it is for an option to have a higher expected
value than another. But there’s a second question. Even assuming we understand
EVM, there’s still the question of truth. It’s the question about whether EVM is in-
deed the correct theory of m-value. For instance, even if we know what it would
be for intertheoretic comparisons to hold, there’s a question about whether any
8 See e. g. Gustafsson and Torpman (2014), Nissan-Rozen (2015) or Hedden (2016).
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of them do indeed hold. Perhaps as a matter of fact no intertheoretic compari-
son is true. So perhaps under axiological uncertainty, you simply ought to eval-
uate your options in accordance with the axiology that has the highest probabil-
ity, as the ‘My Favourite Theory’-approach suggests.9 Or perhaps intertheoretic
comparisons hold, but you ought to adopt some less formal meta-deontological
or meta-virtue-ethical principles under uncertainty.10 Or perhaps you ought to be
risk-averse about moral value. There are plenty of reasonable alternative views.11
To endorse EVM,we need an argument to deny them—and preferably a systematic
argument that goes beyond brute intuitions about cases.
In this book, I’ll adopt an axiomatic approach from standard decision the-
ory to answer the question of meaning and the question of truth about EVM. I’ll
introduce representation theorems for axiological uncertainty. In decision theory,
representation theoremswere devised for your preferences. They show that if your
preferences satisfy certain axioms, they have an expected utility representation in
terms of relevantly unique probability and utility functions. These theorems are
conditional and purely mathematical results, implying the existence of certain
functions under certain conditions. But they become philosophically significant
if two assumptions are added. The first is a conceptual one: that if your prefer-
ences have an expected utility representation in terms of relevantly unique prob-
ability and utility functions, these functions can be taken to represent your cre-
dences and values—i. e., you can be interpreted as maximising the expectation of
your values relative to your degrees of belief, rather than simply somemathemat-
ical measure. The second assumption is a normative one: that your preferences
are normatively appropriate in some sense only if (or indeed if and only if) they
satisfy these axioms. Together with these two assumptions, the formal theorems
imply that your preferences are normatively appropriate only if (or if and only if)
you maximise the expectation of your values, relative to your credences.12 And
this is a philosophically significant claim.
9 See e. g. Gracely (1996) or Gustafsson and Torpman (2014).
10 See e. g. Guerrero (2007) or Williams (2011).
11 For still other views, see e. g. Barry and Tomlin (2016), or (concerningmerely ordinal and non-
comparable theories) MacAskill (2016a), Tarsney (2019a) orMacAskill et al. (2020a). For a helpful
recent survey of the debate, see e. g. Bykvist (2017); also MacAskill et al. (2020a).
12 The biconditional will be true if the second additional assumption is put in terms of a bicondi-
tional. That’s because the result of the representation theorems, and the first additional assump-
tion, could also be stated as biconditionals: if your preferences have an expected utility represen-
tation, they also satisfy the axioms; and if you maximise the expectation of your values relative
to your degrees of belief, then your preferences also have an expected utility representation. The
three claims, stated as biconditionals, imply that your preferences are normatively appropriate if
and only if youmaximise the expectation of your values, relative to your credences. Since the two
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I’ll devise a similar argument for EVM in the context of axiological uncer-
tainty. But instead of your preferences, our theorems will concern the facts about
which options are m-better than which, relative to your state of uncertainty. So as
I’ll understand it, a pertinent representation theorem in our context shows that if
thesem-value facts satisfy certain axioms, they have an expected utility represen-
tation in terms of relevantly unique probability and utility functions. I’ll provide
such theorems, and add two similar assumptions. I’ll add the conceptual assump-
tion that if the m-value facts have such a representation, the relevant functions
can be taken to represent the probabilities and value functions of our axiologies.
And I’ll add the normative or meta-axiological assumption that (at least for an in-
terestingly large set of underlying axiologies) the m-value facts do indeed satisfy
these axioms. Given these two assumptions (and at least for the axiologies under
consideration), the theorems imply EVM.
In other words, I’ll argue that these representation theorems ground com-
pelling answers to our two questions. First and foremost, they afford us a clear
explication of what EVMmeans. In light of them, we can understand cardinal in-
tertheoretic comparisons, top-down, in terms of m-value facts. For axiologies to
compare in a certain way would just be for some such facts to hold. And some-
thing equivalent is true for cardinal intratheoretic comparisons and quantitative
probability facts. Moreover, once we explicate comparisons and probabilities in
this manner, the theorems provide a systematic argument to the effect that EVM
is true. If them-value facts satisfy the relevant conditions, EVMsimply follows. Ev-
ery other view—My Favourite Theory, or meta-deontological principles, or forms
of risk-aversion—must be false. So the axiomatic approach can compellingly ex-
plicate and vindicate EVM. Or at any rate, it can do so for an interestingly large set
of underlying axiologies. Our axioms aren’t trivial. There are certain axiologies for
which they don’t hold. And we arguably can’t be certain that these axiologies are
false. So the axiomatic approach can’t ground EVM as a fully general theory of
axiological uncertainty. It can ground EVM, at most, as a theory about a certain
range of axiologies. But I’ll suggest that this range is interestingly large, and that
our result thus remains highly significant.
This extension of standard decision theory to the case of axiological uncer-
tainty raises a number of new issues. First, the theorems raise novel formal ques-
tions. Axiological uncertainty is structurally different from purely descriptive un-
certainty, as commonly understood. Under axiological uncertainty, the proposi-
tions you’re uncertain about don’t determine the outcomes your choices result in.
conditionals just mentioned are rather trivial, for simplicity, I’ll henceforth state the argument in
the form in which I’ve stated it in the main text.
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They determine the utilities or values of these outcomes. This adds complexity.
In particular, it raises questions about how to separate probabilities and values—
or cases where an axiology has a low probability but an inflated value function
from cases where it has a high probability but a deflated value function. Also,
in decision theory the standard assumption is that there are only coherence con-
straints on your preferences, such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Un-
der axiological uncertainty, there are arguably further constraints on the m-value
facts, on how they relate to the underlying axiologies. So this raises a question
about what these constraints plausibly are. All of this requires novel technical
machinery. Second, the two extra assumptions raise novel philosophical ques-
tions. The meta-axiological assumption raises the question whether the axioms
are plausible constraints on m-value—e. g., in light of the problem of intertheo-
retic comparisons—and on the underlying axiologies, or on moral theories gener-
ally. And the conceptual assumption raises the questionwhether we can interpret
the relevant functions as denoting actual axiological probabilities and values. So
if I’m right, the results not only compellingly ground a theory of axiological un-
certainty, but also provide a cogent substantive extension of decision theory.
In short, EVM raises the questions of meaning and truth. Both require sub-
stantive arguments to be resolved. Representation theorems promise to ground
such arguments. But it requires novel technical and philosophical work to pro-
vide and apply such theorems. This work is the object of this book. Let me spell
out in more detail how it will proceed. After this introductory chapter, the book
will feature five main chapters, plus an appendix. In the remainder of the present
chapter, I’ll answer objections against the importance of m-value, and thus clar-
ify why our inquiry is important. In Chapter 2, I’ll state the most basic theorem
of this book, and the assumptions needed to turn this into a vindication of EVM.
This will introduce the argument of the axiomatic approach in its simplest form.
In Chapter 3, I’ll discuss whether this argument is convincing. I highlight three
potential problems for it, specific to the context of axiological uncertainty: the
problem of intertheoretic comparisons, the meaning of axiological probabilities,
and the existence of incommensurabilities in value.
The remaining three chapters address theseproblems in turn. InChapter 4, I’ll
discuss the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. I argue that existing propos-
als of such comparisons are unsatisfactory. I provide an argument for why at least
some such comparisons must nonetheless hold. And I then introduce a construc-
tivist explanation of why they do, and suggest this account can ground our overall
argument. In Chapter 5, I’ll focus on the notion of a probability distribution over
axiologies. I introduce a more complex representation theorem, which provides a
formal separation of credences and values. I then argue against various strands
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of recent scepticism about such theorems, and suggest they provide the best ac-
count of probabilities, at least in our context. This has important implications for
the normative structure of EVM. In Chapter 6, I’ll relax the least plausible sub-
stantive condition of our theorem—the Completeness axiom. I state a representa-
tion theoremwithout this axiom, which allows our theory to cover axiologies that
feature intra- or intertheoretic incommensurabilities, and grounds the most com-
prehensive argument of the book. I end the chapter with a discussion of whether
the approach can be extended beyond axiological to moral uncertainty generally,
and raise concerns about this extension.
As this indicates, there’s a range of issues related to axiological uncertainty
that I won’t address in this book. Let me flag three of them, just to set them aside.
First, I won’t address any questions of applied axiological uncertainty: the im-
plications of EVM for population ethics, future discounting, the welfare of non-
human animals, or whatever. My discussion remains purely abstract and gen-
eral.13 Second, I won’t say much more about the normative import of m-value. In
particular, I won’t discuss the existence of a form of overall-(meta-)goodness. Sup-
pose your best option is a, and your m-best option is b. And suppose you’re also
uncertain about theories of axiological uncertainty, and that according to the true
theory of uncertainty about m-value, yourm2-best option (as wemight call it) is c.
There’s a question about whether some option is overall-best, besides being best,
m-best, orm2-best. I think there’s no such form of goodness. But I won’t enter this
debate here.14 Relatedly, I won’t discuss the deontic status of your m-best option.
There’s a question about whether there are any deontic meta-norms, and if there
are, about what they say, and whether they’re norms of morality, rationality, or
some other source of requirements. I think there’s at least a requirement of ratio-
nality to the effect that you ought, if one of your options is m-best, ceteris paribus
choose it.15 But nothing hinges on this here.16 I’ll just present a theory of m-value.
Third, I’ll largely set aside metaethical issues underlying the problem of norma-
tive uncertainty. My framework presupposes some notion of axiological ‘truth’,
and a notion of an agent’s ‘credences’ in an axiology. There’s a question about
whether the problem arises, or can be made sense of, within non-cognitivist or
13 For implications of normative uncertainty for practical ethics, see e. g. Pfeiffer (1985), Oddie
(1994), Guerrero (2007), Moller (2011), Williams (2011), Broome (2012, 183 ff.), Bykvist (2013),
Greaves and Ord (2017), Barry and Tomlin (2019), MacAskill (2019), Tarsney (2019b), Koplin and
Wilkinson (2019) or MacAskill et al. (2020a, ch. 8).
14 See Sepielli (2013b, 13 ff.) for a defence of a related view.
15 In other words, I think there’s a wide-scope requirement of rationality. See e. g. Broome (2013,
ch. 7) for the distinction between ‘wide-’ and ‘narrow-scope’ requirements.
16 For a helpful survey and discussion of such questions, see Bykvist (2017).
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anti-realist views. Somepeople think non-cognitivists cannot account for the phe-
nomenon of normative uncertainty;17 others think they can.18 But in any case, the
ability to make sense of normative or evaluative uncertainty is generally treated
as a desideratum on metaethical views. If such a view cannot account for such
uncertainty, that’s standardly seen as a problem for this view, rather than for the
project of devising a theory of normative or evaluative uncertainty.19 I think this is
a plausible view of the dialectic. So I’ll set general metaethical questions aside.20
1.3 Objections
One might think that even if we’re uncertain about many axiological questions
relevant to many of our decisions, we don’t need a theory of m-value. So before I
defend such a theory, let me address the three most prominent objections to the
importance of that enterprise. This will clarify why it matters.
Fetishism
Some people have argued that we don’t need a theory of m-value (or of moral
uncertainty more generally) because concern with m-value is fetishistic. Suppose
you have a choice between a vegan meal and a steak, and are uncertain between
a speciesist and a non-speciesist axiology. You find it more plausible that the
speciesist view is right, and that it’s better to choose the steak. However, you be-
lieve that if the non-speciesist view is right, killing non-humananimals is terrible,
and that it’s thusm-better to turn vegan. So you do that, because you think it is m-
better. Thenyour vegandiet doesn’t spring fromagenuine concern for non-human
animals, it seems. Rather, you seem to care about m-value as such—about what-
ever turns out to be m-valuable, simply because it’s m-valuable. And as Michael
Smith pointed out in a similar context, that might seem inappropriate:
17 See e. g. Smith (2002), Bykvist and Olson (2009), Bykvist and Olson (2012), Bykvist and Olson
(2017) or Björkholm et al. (forthcoming).
18 See e. g. Sepielli (2012), Eriksson and Francén Olinder (2016), Beddor (2020) or Ridge (2020).
19 See e. g. Smith (2002).
20 I’ll defend constructivism about intertheoretic comparisons in Chapter 4. But most of my ar-
guments in the other chapters don’t hinge on this. And constructivism about intertheoretic com-
parisons doesn’t imply constructivism about axiology ormoralitymore generally. So I’m not com-
mitted to any general metaethical view.
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Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children and
friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice, equality,
and the like, not just one thing: doingwhat theybelieve to be right,where this is readdedicto
and not de re. Indeed, commonsense tells us that being somotivated is a fetish ormoral vice.
(1994, 75)
Similar considerations arise for m-value. Concern with m-value might seem inap-
propriately fetishistic. Brian Weatherson, among others, concluded for this rea-
son (concerning the case just described) that ‘it would be perverse for [you] to
turn down the steak’, or more generally, that ‘a mere probability that meat eating
is immoral should not change one’s actions, or one’s evaluations of meat eaters’
(2014, 2).21
It’s not entirely clear what the inappropriateness of being motivated by m-
value should consist in. I see three interpretations of this fetishism-worry. On the
first interpretation, the inappropriateness of beingmotivated bym-value is a mat-
ter of first-order value. It’s better to help non-human animals, say, out of unmedi-
ated concern with their wellbeing rather than out of a belief that it’s m-best. Ac-
cording to the true axiology, concern with m-value is comparatively bad. If this is
the idea, I don’t deny it. It’s a first-order axiological claim, and nothing I say con-
tradicts it. In fact, it can be accommodated in the theory I outline. If an action can
be done with different motives, we can treat thesemotives as different options, on
a par with doing something altogether different. So if being motivated bym-value
is bad, EVMwill imply it’s comparativelym-bad. This is perfectly consistent.What
I’ll defend is a criterion of m-betterness, not a decision procedure, or an account
of how to make decisions in practice.22 So it may well be comparatively m-bad
to consciously act on considerations of m-value. Now of course, if it’s plausible
that de dicto concern with m-value is terrible, EVM might become self-effacing.23
It might imply we should never consciously act on it, or indeed should forget it
altogether in practice. And although that would still be consistent, it might raise
the question why we should spend much time thinking about it. But it doesn’t
seem plausible that such concern with m-value is so bad as to dominate all other
possible badness. And in any case, to find out whether it does, or how it weighs
against other forms of disvalue under uncertainty,weneed a theory ofm-value. So
if the inappropriateness is understood as a first-order claim about value, it doesn’t
establish that we don’t need a theory of axiological uncertainty.
21 The fetishism objection is also raised in Hedden (2016).
22 For the classic distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure in utili-
tarianism, see e. g. Bales (1971), Mill (1861, ch. 2, par.19) or Sidgwick (1907, 413).
23 For the notion and problem of ‘self-effacingness’, see Parfit (1984, ch. 1).
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On a second interpretation, this inappropriateness takes a different form. In
the above quote, Smith says that ‘good people’ are motivated by what’s valuable
de re. Perhaps this doesn’tmean that de dictomotivation is bad. Itmight justmean
that we aren’t ideal moral agents if we’re guided by m-value. Moral philosophy
doesn’t need a theory of m-value because ideal agents aren’t motivated by such
value. And again, perhaps this is true. Perhaps an ideal agent is motivated de re
bywhat’s valuable. But the entire project of normative uncertainty is based on the
fact that we aren’t ideal agents. We’re inescapably uncertain about what’s valu-
able; and our project is to determine how we fallen creatures should evaluate our
options. The question about what ideal versions of ourselves would do is simply
different from the one we’re addressing. And it can’t show that we don’t need a
theory of m-value. For all that this second interpretation says, given our human
limitations, it still seems m-value is important for us.
Here’s a third interpretation. Perhaps the objection is not just that ideal agents
aren’t motivated by m-value. Perhaps the objection is that even non-ideal agents
shouldn’t be. Understood thus, the objection isn’t that we don’t need any theory
of what to do under normative uncertainty. Instead, it advocates a specific such
theory, according to which under uncertainty we should always intuitively follow
something we care about de re. This claim addresses the question of this book,
and contradicts the theory I outline. But it doesn’t seem very plausible. To begin
with, this theory will often fail to guide us. If we’re axiologically uncertain, there
will often not be anythingweunqualifiedly care about de re.We’ll be torn between
different values, both doxastically and emotionally. In such cases, the present the-
ory won’t tell us what to do. But more importantly, when it does offer guidance,
this guidance often seems rather dubious. As I indicated, we have to make enor-
mously important decisions under uncertainty—about climate change, artificial
intelligence, global poverty, and so on. Making a bad decision concerning any of
these issues might have enormous ramifications, involving vast numbers of be-
ings until some very far future. It seems very implausible that we should run the
risk of incurring such astronomical badness, just to avoid a particular motive.
I can’t think of any other plausible interpretation of the fetishism worry. So
as far as I see, although being motivated de re by the good may in some ways be
preferable to beingmotivated de dicto bym-value, this doesn’t imply that we don’t
need a theory of the latter.24
24 For other responses to the fetishism objection, see Sepielli (2016), Aboodi (2017), Hicks (2019)
or MacAskill et al. (2020a, ch. 2).
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Blamelessness
Here’s another objection against the importance ofm-value, due to Elizabeth Har-
man (2015).25 Harman claims that your moral uncertainty is irrelevant for what
you subjectively ought to do. In a nutshell, her argument is this:
(G) Suppose your moral uncertainty was relevant to what you subjectively ought
to do. Then, if youwere certain of a falsemoral theory andacted in accordance
with it, you wouldn’t be blameworthy.
(H) However, if you’re certain of a false moral theory and act in accordance with
it (and objectively morally wrongly), you are blameworthy.
(I) Therefore, yourmoral uncertainty is irrelevant towhat you subjectively ought
to do.
Why should we believe these premises? Harman thinks premise (G) follows from
a very general fact about blameworthiness and subjective obligation—viz., that
(J) an agent is blameworthy for her behaviour only if she acted as she subjectively
ought not have acted. (2015, 56)
Being certain of false moral theory is just a limiting case of being morally uncer-
tain. So given (J), if moral uncertainty was relevant towhat you subjectively ought
to do, such false certaintywould exculpate. To illustrate premise (H),Harmancon-
siders aMafia familymember, who’s certain they’re obliged to kill innocentswhen
necessary for the interests of the family. Harman claims that they’re blameworthy
if they kill innocents on the basis of their belief. That’s because
(K) a person is blameworthy for her wrongful behaviour just in case it resulted
from her failure to care de re about what is morally important—that is, from
her failure to care adequately about the non-moral features of the world that
in fact matter morally. (2015, 67)
Clearly, our mafia member doesn’t care adequately about the lives of innocents.
So they’re blameworthy, quite regardless of their beliefs.
However, both of these premises seemdubious. Startwith the second. Accord-
ing to (H) andHarman’s viewof blameworthiness, it’s irrelevant howyouacquired
your false moral beliefs, and how difficult it would have been for you to have cor-
rect ones. You’re culpable whenever you do something objectively wrong, on the
basis of falsemoral beliefs or concerns. There’s a large literature on responsibility,
25 Hedden (2016) tentatively raises the same objection.
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and this isn’t the place to discuss it.26 But suffice it to note that, intuitively, this
seems very implausible. It can be extremely difficult for us to have correct moral
beliefs. That’s in part because we’re thoroughly social. It’s highly dependent on
the society we live in not only which moral arguments and views we encounter,
but also what intuitions we have. If everyone around us is convinced of a falsity, it
can arguably require outstanding sensitivity to access the truth. So we can end up
withwrong beliefs evenwhen, intuitively, we’ve done all that’s required byway of
epistemic caution. And in such caseswe intuitively aren’t blameworthy for our be-
liefs, or for acting upon them. I take it this can be true even for the conviction that
honour can require the killing of innocents.27 But it seems clearly true for beliefs
about more nuanced moral matters like those outlined above—population axiol-
ogy, the theory of welfare, or future discounting. It seems bizarre to suggest that,
regardless of the sincerity and care you devote to your moral inquiry about these
difficult questions, you’re blameworthy if you end up in the wrong. Whatever the
correct theory of responsibility, Harman’s uncompromising view of blameworthi-
ness seems false. (H) is wrong.
That’s enough to block her argument. But we can also reject premise (G). Har-
man doesn’t argue for her supporting assumption (J). In fact, if I understand her
correctly, she simply identifies the relevant subjective ‘ought’ as the ‘ought’ for
which this assumption holds. So (J) isn’t a substantive claim about the subjec-
tive ‘ought’. It’s simply a suggestion about whywe should be interested in such an
‘ought’ in thefirst place.We’re interested in the ‘subjective ought’ insofar as it’s the
ought that determines blameworthiness. But that’s dubious. Suppose arguendo
that her view of blameworthiness was right, and that your blameworthiness was
fully determined by your non-moral beliefs. Then consider your first-person per-
spective. If you’remorally uncertain, it’s singularly unhelpful for you to know you
avoid being blameworthy only if you act in accordance with the true moral view.
You don’t know what that is. So even insofar as you care about blameworthiness,
you still face a question—about whether it’s reasonable to prefer a low risk of be-
ing very blameworthy to a large risk of being onlymildly to blame. The answerwill
pick out a subjective ‘ought’. And even if this ‘ought’ doesn’t determine blamewor-
thiness, it’s important from your perspective. Butmore fundamentally, yourmoti-
vation arguably shouldn’t be to avoid blameworthiness in the first place. It should
quite simply be to do or try to do good (or do the right or the virtuous). And so you
26 See particularly Rosen (2003; 2004) or FitzPatrick (2017) for criticism of (H) and (K). For a col-
lection of essays on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility, see Robichaud andWieland
(2017).
27 For a vivid description of a culturewith such a code, and of the difficulty of rejecting it if you’re
born into such a culture, see e. g. Thesiger (2008).
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face a more fundamental question—about whether it’s reasonable to prefer a low
risk of doing something very bad to a large risk of doing something slightly bad.
Insofar as you care about doing good, and quite regardless of blame, m-value is
important for you. So it’s false thatwe’re interested in suchanought just because it
determines blameworthiness. At least from the perspective of agents, rather than
third-party blamers, itwould remain important even if it didn’t. By the same token,
it’s false that the connection betweenmoral uncertainty and blameworthiness ex-
pressed in (G) holds. Moral uncertainty would be relevant to the subjective ought
even if it didn’t determine blameworthiness.
In sum, Harman’s view of blameworthiness seems false. And even if true, it
can’t establish the ‘irrelevance of moral [or axiological] uncertainty’ (2015, 53).
From the first-person perspective, the importance of m-value doesn’t hinge on
questions of praise and blame at all.28
Regress
Here’s a third worry. Suppose we say we need a theory of m-value because we
aren’t in a position to know the true axiology, and thus first-order axiologies aren’t
action-guiding for us.29 This claim seems to run into a regress. Just as we’re not
in a position to know the true theory of value, we’re arguably not in a position
to know the true theory of m-value. So if axiologies aren’t action-guiding, due to
our uncertainty, then theories of m-value won’t be action-guiding either. So why
should we be interested in m-value (or anymn-value) in the first place?
There’s an answer to this worry, even if indeed we aren’t in a position to know
the true theory of m-value.30 Note first that, in a standard sense of that term, we
can be ‘guided’ by norms even if we aren’t certain about them. Consider the norm
that it’s best to get 0.8 grams of protein per day and kilogram of body weight. Pre-
sumably, we can’t be entirely certain about that norm. The best amount of protein
might well be 0.7 or 0.9 grams. But the norm seems perfectly action-guiding, in
any standard sense of that term. It’s not that, without some extra algorithm about
how to deal with our uncertainty, we’d be utterly paralysed, or that any deliberate
protein consumption would be a random stab in the dark. Presumably, if we act
in the face of such uncertainty without explicitly considering meta-norms about
doing so, we act on an implicit acceptance of some such higher-order norms. Or
28 For other discussions of Harman’s worry, see Sepielli (2018) or Geyer (2018).
29 See e. g. Hudson (1989).
30 The main idea behind this answer was sketched in Sepielli (2014).
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more precisely, we act on the basis of intuitions about what to do in the face of our
uncertainty. We can do that. We have such intuitions, it seems. So similarly, even
if we’re axiologically uncertain, we needn’t be totally dumbstruck by this unless
we have a theory of m-value. Our axiologies can still guide us in some sense.
Why then do we need to reflect about m-value? The reason isn’t to overcome
paralysis or absolute crapshoots. Instead, it’s simply to make better decisions
in light of uncertainty. Reflecting about m-value is a form of gathering evidence
about what to do in the face of our uncertainty. And it’s, quite simply, almost al-
ways better to act on the basis of more evidence.
Or at any rate, that seems plausible. It would take some argument to establish
it firmly. In his classic paper ‘On the Principle of Total Evidence’ (1967) Irving John
Good showed that it’s always better to act on more evidence. More precisely, he
proved that the expected value of the action that has the highest expected value
after taking into account more evidence is always greater than that of the action
with the highest expected value before we take this evidence into account—if the
cost of taking it into account is neglected, and unless the action with the high-
est expected value would be the same for whatever piece of evidence we gather.
So if reflection on m-value is like gathering evidence, then the expected value of
acting after reflection about m-value will be greater than that of acting without
that reflection, if the cost of the reflection is neglected and unless the action with
the highest expected value would be the same for all pieces of evidence. Now our
argument can’t be so straightforward. Good assumed that whatever evidence we
receive, we’ll do what maximises expected value, given that evidence. But if we
receive good evidence for a theory of m-value that says we shouldn’t maximise
expected value, this assumption is dubious. Moreover, one would clearly have to
characterise formally what acting ‘without further reflection’ would amount to.
One would have to argue more fully for the parallel between evidence-gathering
and moral reflection. One would ultimately have to take into account the cost of
moral reflection too, and thus say something about the efficacy of moral reason-
ing. And of course, we would also have to argue that EVM is the correct theory of
m2-value. It would take some argument to establish this firmly. But it does seem
very plausible that acting after serious reflection about m-value will bem2-better
than acting unreflectedly—just like it seems plausible that acting after reflection
about value will be m-better than acting unreflectedly.31
Now there’s a next worry that the objectormight raise. To show that reflecting
about m-value is good, we have to assume some form of EVM aboutm2-value—or
perhaps some other normative theory with the same implication. The proponent
31 This last claim is defended in MacAskill (2014, ch. 7).
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of the regress objection might claim that we’re begging the question against her:
thatwe aren’t entitled to assumeEVM, or any other theory, but insteadwould have
to take into account uncertainty about that again, and so on. In other words, she
might demand that we show not only that reflection about m-value will plausibly
be m2-better, but also that it’s m3-better, and perhaps mn-better all the way up.
But note what the objector is now demanding. She’s in effect asking us to prove
beyond any doubt that our project is ex ante worth pursuing. I don’t see how we
could do that. But it seems an unreasonable demand. It would question not only
why we should reflect about what’s m-valuable, but also why we should reflect
about what’s valuable—or indeed why we should reflect on anything, or do any-
thing else that seems prima facie worthwhile. It’s a most radical normative scep-
ticism. This may be an interesting philosophical problem. But it’s not a problem I
can address in this book, and not one I need to answer before moving forward.
So themainmotivation for reflection onm-value isn’t that we’ll always be in a
position to knowwhat’sm-best, or can’t be guided in anyways by normswe’re not
certain about. It’s that it’s plausibly ex ante better to reflect aboutm-value and act
on that reflection rather than to act in the face of uncertainty without any further
reflection. Or at any rate, that’s the assumption on which I’ll proceed.32
32 For other illuminating discussions of (related) regress-problems, see e. g. Sepielli (2013b),
Trammell (forthcoming) or Tarsney (ms). For an argument that objective norms aren’t action-
guiding, see Fox (2019); for a challenge to this, see Barnett (forthcoming).
2 The basic argument
Let me now state the basic argument of the axiomatic approach in detail. To that
end, I first outline my formal framework (Section 2.1). I then introduce the most
basic representation theorem of this book (Section 2.2), the conceptual assump-
tions needed to turn this into a philosophically relevant result (Section 2.3), and
the argument that this result can ground (Section 2.4). This argument will be in-
teresting in itself. But it will also be helpful for introducing some general features
ofmy approach, and as a starting point for the extensions in subsequent chapters.
2.1 The terminological framework
Background: state-dependent utility theory
Before I introduce my framework, let me provide some background. We’ll need
novel formal theorems for our arguments. But we don’t have to start completely
from scratch.We can apply, extend and vary existing results from decision theory,
and that’s what I’ll do throughout. The formal details of this application needn’t
concern us here. I provide the derivations of my theorems in the appendix. But
it’s worth introducing the branch of decision theory I’ll rely upon, as this will in-
dicate the core formal peculiarity of axiological uncertainty. This branch is best
illustrated by how it departed from Leonard Savage’s Foundations of Statistics
(1954). On Savage’s framework there’s a set of ‘states of nature’ and a set of ‘out-
comes’. An ‘act’ is a mapping from states to outcomes: to each state, it associates
an outcome, which that act brings about if this state is actual. An agent is un-
certain about which state is actual, and thus about the ultimate outcomes of her
acts. Savage providednecessary and sufficient conditions for a preference relation
over acts to be representable by a utility function over outcomes and a probability
distribution over (sets of33) states. To illustrate, suppose one afternoon you must
choose between going on a hike and reading at home, and are uncertain whether
it’ll be rainy or sunny. We can distinguish two states—rain and sunshine—and
four outcomes—your reading or hiking, both either while it’s rainy or sunny. Your
choice is between an act (hiking) which leads either to ‘hiking in the rain’ or ‘hik-
ing while the sun shines’, and one (reading) that leads either to ‘reading while it
rains’ or ‘reading while the sun shines’, depending on the state of nature that is
33 In Savage’s framework, the set of states is infinite, and the probability distribution thus actu-
ally ranges over subsets of it (‘events’).
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actual. If your preferences over these and other acts satisfy Savage’s conditions,
there’ll be utility and probability functions such that you prefer one act to another
if and only if it has the greater expected utility according to these functions.
However, there’s a problem for Savage’s framework. His result required that
you have preferences about acts leading to any arbitrary outcome in any state.
And note that having distinguished states and outcomes in this way, we can de-
fine an ‘act’ that leads to ‘hiking in the rain’ under both states of nature. So in
order for your choices to be representable, you must have a preference between
other acts and this one—ahike that’s rain-swept even if it’s sunny. This is certainly
unnatural.34 And in principle, it seems avoidable. We could distinguish not four
outcomes, but only ‘hiking’ and ‘reading’. Thesemore coarsely individuated out-
comes can take place in any weather. Yet on Savage’s framework, this would raise
another problem. Savage takes utility to be a function of outcomes alone. But the
value of your afternoon doesn’t just depend on whether you’re ‘hiking’ or ‘read-
ing’. It also depends on the weather. So this individuation would be too coarse to
give a proper representation of the value of your options.
This led decision theorists to revise Savage’s latter assumption, and develop
state-dependent utility theory. That’s a framework in which the utility of an out-
come candependon the state inwhich it arises. So the role of Savage’s utility func-
tions is played by state-dependent utility functions: two-placemappings u(⋅, ⋅), as-
signing utilities to state-outcome pairs. In such a framework, we can individuate
outcomes coarsely, and distinguish u(rain, hiking) from u(sunshine, hiking), as
seems natural. So state-dependent utility theory promises to give a more intuitive
interpretation of your choice, without requiring you to contemplate a rainy hike
in a sunny state of nature.
This development in decision-theory is interesting for the theory of axiologi-
cal uncertainty. On a natural application of Savage’s framework to our problem,
the ‘states of nature’ amongwhichwe’re uncertain are our axiologies. And instead
of the desirability of outcomes, we’re concernedwith their moral value. But differ-
ent axiologies assign different values to outcomes. So the ‘utility’ of an outcome
depends on the ‘state’ inwhich it arises: itsmoral value depends on the true axiol-
ogy. So state-dependent utility theory is a useful tool for the theory of axiological
uncertainty. On a natural interpretation, the problem of axiological uncertainty is
one of state-dependent utility. So this is the branch of decision theory I’ll implic-
itly be relying upon (in a manner made explicit in the appendix).
34 See e. g. Joyce (1999, 107 ff.) for a discussion of this problem. For Savage’s own unapologetic
stance on it, see Drèze (1987, 78).
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The framework of this book
Here’s our framework. I’ll assume all uncertainty is either axiological or purely
descriptive.35 To represent purely descriptive uncertainty, let X be a finite set of
basic outcomes—i. e., non-normative, non-evaluative state of affairs that do not
feature any probabilities or uncertainty. So an outcome in X may be that a non-
human animal suffers, or that a person suffers, or whatever purely descriptive
fact. Let O be the set of prospects over these outcomes. A prospect in O may be,
say, that with probability 1/2 respectively either a non-human animal or a per-
son will suffer. I’ll use lower-case letters a, b, c . . . to refer to such prospects. For-
mally, they can be represented as the set of probability distributions on X—i. e.,
O = {a : X → ℝ⋇ ℘ ∑x∈X a(x) = 1}, for ℝ⋇ being the nonnegative reals. The just-
mentioned prospect, say, will thus be represented as the function a in O that as-
signs 0.5 to both the fact that the non-human animal suffers and the fact that the
person suffers, and0 to all other outcomes. For anya andb inO, andanyp ∈ [0, 1],
let pa ⋇ (1 − p)b in O be the prospect that leads to a and b with probability p and
(1 − p) respectively—defined by (pa ⋇ (1 − p)b)(x) = pa(x) ⋇ (1 − p)b(x) for all x in
X. And let ax be the prospect that certainly leads to x, with ax(x) = 1.
An axiology Ti is a transitive binary relation on O, whose reflexive part is the
‘at least as good as’ relation. Let ‘a ⪰i b’ denote that a is at least as good as b
according to Ti. The relations of strict betterness and equality in goodness are in-
duced as usual: a is better than b on Ti (‘a ≻i b’) if a ⪰i b but not b ⪰i a, and a
is equally as good as b on Ti (‘a ∼i b’) if a ⪰i b and b ⪰i a. Let T = {T1,T2, . . .Tn}
be the finite set of axiologies under consideration, and denote its index set by
I = {1, 2, . . . n}. To refer to specific axiologies in prose, I’ll speak of a ‘pleasure-
theory’, a ‘human-welfare-theory’, a ‘virtue/beauty-theory’, and so on, to denote
axiologies on which only pleasure, or only human welfare, or only virtue and
beauty, and so on, have value.
If we’re both descriptively and axiologically uncertain, we face more com-
plexprospects: prospects that lead to certain theory-outcomepairswithparticular
probabilities—or more intuitively, acts that have certain probabilities of yielding
different outcomes, and certain probabilities of being performed under different
axiologies. LetQ be the set of such prospects. Intuitively, a prospect inQmay be,
say, that with probability 1/2 respectively either T2 or T3 is true, and that condi-
tional on either theory there’s a probability of 1/2 respectively that either a non-
human animal or a person will suffer—so that there’s a probability of 1/4 of each
35 In linewithmuch philosophical literature, I use ‘uncertainty’ for what economists and formal
decision theorists call ‘risk’. My formal definitions clarify what I mean.
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theory-outcome pair being the case. I’ll use bold letters a,b, c . . . to refer to such
prospects. Formally, these prospects can be represented as the set of probability
distributions on theory-outcome pairs—i. e.,Q = {a : I⇝X → ℝ⋇ ℘ ∑i∈I ,x∈X a(i, x) =
1}. The just-mentioned prospect, say, will thus be represented as the function a
in Q that assigns 0.25 to all four pairs of theories T2 or T3 and the facts that the
non-human animal or the person suffers, and 0 to all other theory-outcome pairs.
The probability assigned to an axiology Ti under a is thus∑x∈X a(i, x). And again,
pa⋇ (1−p)b inQ is the prospect that leads to a and bwith probability p and (1−p)
respectively—defined by (pa ⋇ (1 − p)b)(i, x) = pa(i, x) ⋇ (1 − p)b(i, x) for all i in I
and x in X.
The m-value relation is a transitive binary relation onQ. I’ll denote its reflex-
ive part—the ‘at least asm-good’ relation—by ‘⪰m’. The strictm-betterness relation
(‘≻m’) and the ‘equally as m-good’ relation (‘∼m’) are induced equivalently to the
respective value relations.
Another piece of terminologywill be helpful. Although prospects inQ are for-
mally distinct from prospects in O, and I said that axiologies order the latter, I’ll
sometimes say that a (inQ) is at least as good as b (inQ) according to an axiology
Ti. By this I’ll mean, intuitively, that the prospect represented by a, given Ti, is at
least as good according to Ti as the prospect represented by b, given Ti. To define
this formally, let Qi ⊂ Q be the set of prospects in which Ti has a strictly positive
probability, i. e. Qi = {a ∈ Q ℘ ∑x∈X a(i, x) > 0}. For each i in I, define a function
Hi : Qi → O; a 󳨃→ Hi(a), such that for all x in X,
Hi(a)(x) = a(i, x)/∑
y∈X
a(i, y). (2.1)
The mappingHi thus turns a prospect a into the prospect that a represents, given
Ti (if there is such an prospect, i. e. if the probability of Ti under a is positive). So
for somea andb, witha andb inQi, I’ll say thata is at least as good asb according
to Ti if Hi(a) ⪰i Hi(b)—and similarly for ‘better’ and ‘equally good’.
Four features of this framework are noteworthy. First, the assumption that our
set of outcomes X and our set of axiologies T are finite is an unnatural simplifi-
cation. As a matter of fact, there are infinitely many outcomes, or infinitely many
different purely descriptive states of affairs. For instance, if our non-human ani-
mal dies one particular day, its final heartbeat could be at 1 pm, or at 2 pm, or at
infinitely many points in time in between. Equally, there are infinitely many axi-
ologies. On an extreme speciesist axiology, animal welfare has no value at all. On
a somewhatmoremoderate speciesist axiology, the value of animalwelfare is half
as great as the value of human welfare. And there are infinitely many scpeciesist
axiologies on which the value of animal welfare is somewhere in between. Infi-
nite sets of outcomes or states give rise to certain problems in standard decision
2.1 The terminological framework | 23
theory, such as the St. Petersburgparadox.36 Theseproblems carry over to the con-
text of axiological uncertainty. However, as far as I see, there aren’t any problems
specific to this latter context, arising with infinite sets of outcomes or theories. My
main concern is with the peculiarities of axiological uncertainty, rather than with
problems and questions of expected utility theory in general. So for simplicity, I’ll
just assume that the relevant sets are finite.
Second, our frameworkpresupposes aquantitativenotionof probabilities.My
very definition of prospects in O and Q presupposes that we understand what it
is for an outcome to have a particular probability of arising, and for an axiology
to have a particular probability of being true. I assume this only for simplicity, to
focus on other problems first. I’ll provide an explication of axiological probabili-
ties in Chapter 5. These probabilities, and thus the notion ofm-value and themain
claim of EVM, can be understood in different ways. On amore subjective interpre-
tation of m-value, a prospect is m-better than another if it’s better in light of your
credences. On a more objective interpretation of m-value, a prospect is m-better
than another if it’s better in light of the credences that your evidence warrants.
For now, this difference needn’t concern us. All I say applies equally to either in-
terpretation. I’ll come back to the difference in Chapter 5.
Third, my definition of the set Q has an implication similar to the one we
encountered with Savage. Q includes all probability distributions over theory-
outcome pairs. In particular, it includes prospects that lead to different (probabil-
ity distributions over) outcomes, depending on which axiology is true. That is, for
somea inQ, witha inQi andQj for some Ti and Tj,Hi(a) ̸= Hj(a). These prospects
won’t represent any natural, practical options. For example, there’s no natural act
which leads to benefiting anon-humananimal if awelfare-theory is true, andben-
36 The St. Petersburg paradox is this. Suppose you’re offered a gamble, in which a coin is tossed
until it first lands heads. If it lands heads in the first toss, you’ll gain £2; if it first lands heads
in the second toss, you’ll gain £4; if it first lands heads in the third toss, you’ll gain £8, and so
on. The expected monetary payoff of this game is infinite. So if you ought to maximise the ex-
pected monetary payoff of your actions, you ought to pay infinite sums to play this gamble. This
seems implausible. For the first published statement of and reply to the paradox, see Bernoulli
(1954, 31). For other vexing problems involving infinite sets of outcomes or states, see e. g. Nover
and Hájek (2004). There are also problems arising from standard probability distributions over
infinite sets of outcomes, or probability zero events. Suppose you throw a point-sized dart at a
dartboard. Classical probability theory countenances cases where it has probability 0 of hitting
any particular point. So suppose you’re offered to win £100 if the dart hits the board at its exact
center, and nothing otherwise. If the probability of this is zero, the expected value of the offer
is zero. So if you ought to prefer an option if and only if it has the greatest expected value, you
ought to be indifferent between accepting and refusing this offer. This seems implausible (see
e. g. Skyrms 1980, 74; Briggs 2019, sec. 3.2.3.).
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efiting a human being if a human-welfare-theory is true. Such a prospect will be
definable in the framework I adopt. And indeed,my resultswill require that them-
value relation ranges over all prospects inQ—such unnatural prospects included.
However, unlike (arguably) the ones in Savage’s framework, such prospects aren’t
conceptually impossible. Consider the prospect I justmentioned. Suppose a trust-
worthy demonwho knows about the true axiology constructed a button for you. It
tells you that if you push it, then if thewelfare-theory is true, a non-human animal
will be benefited, and if the human-welfare-theory is true, a human being will be
benefited. On the adequate representation of pushing the button, the probability
with which a non-human animal or a person will be benefited by doing so should
depend on the true axiology. This story may be unnatural. But since it’s concep-
tually possible, it seems plausible that m-value facts hold even among such un-
usual prospects. So this doesn’t seem to be a problem for our framework. On the
contrary, since such prospects are conceptually possible, it would be a drawback
if our theory of m-value didn’t apply to them.
Fourth and finally, the framework allows the m-value relation to range over
prospects that involve different probability distributions over axiologies. That is,
for some prospectsa andb inQ, and some theory Ti,∑x∈X a(i, x) ̸= ∑x∈X b(i, x). In-
deed,my results will require that them-value relation ranges over such prospects.
And although they may be perfectly natural in themselves, you can’t face choices
between them. For example, you can’t face a choice between benefiting a non-
human animal if a welfare-theory is true, and doing so if a human-welfare-theory
is true. But again, it seems plausible that m-value facts hold even among such
prospects. If benefiting a non-human animal is better on the welfare-theory than
on the human-welfare-theory, it seems adequate to claim that it hasmorem-value
if the former is certain than if the latter is. So again, this impractical aspect of
our framework doesn’t seem to be a problem. It would be a drawback if our the-
ory didn’t apply to such comparisons. In fact, even from a practical point of view,
these features of our framework are advantageous. They make it easier to apply
our theory in practice. But I can only show this after much further argument. It
will have to wait until Section 5.2.
2.2 Three substantive conditions
Within this framework, we can now state the relevant theorem. We want an
expected utility representation of the m-value relation in which the utilities cor-
respond to our axiologies’ value functions. To that end, we need three substan-
tive conditions. The first is that the m-value relation ⪰m satisfies the standard
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von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.37 For a reflexive binary relation ⪰ on Q,
these are
TransitivityQ: for all a,b and c inQ, if a ⪰ b and b ⪰ c, then a ⪰ c;
CompletenessQ: for all a and b inQ, a ⪰ b or b ⪰ a;
IndependenceQ: for all a,b and c inQ and p ∈]0, 1[, if a ≻ b, then pa⋇(1−p)c ≻
pb ⋇ (1 − p)c; and
ContinuityQ: for all a,b and c in Q, if a ≻ b and b ≻ c, then there exist p, q ∈
]0, 1[, such that pa ⋇ (1 − p)c ≻ b and b ≻ qa ⋇ (1 − q)c.
If a reflexive relation ⪰ on Q satisfies these conditions, I’ll say it’s ‘vNM-con-
formable’. These conditions are by no means trivial. I’ll discuss their plausibility
in the next chapter. For now, what matters is that they guarantee a kind of rep-
resentability. That is, it can be shown38 that if ⪰m is vNM-conformable, there’s a
function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive affine transformation,39 such that
for all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (2.2)
So there’s a representation of ⪰m in terms of state- or theory-dependent utilities.
However, (2.2) isn’t enough for our purposes. For all we know, the function umight
be a random utility function without any relation to our axiologies. We need to
ensure that every function u(i, ⋅) in (2.2) represents the underlying axiology Ti. We
can do that by adding two further conditions. The first is that all axiologies satisfy
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms as well. For a reflexive binary relation ⪰
onO, these are
TransitivityO: for all a, b and c inO, if a ⪰ b and b ⪰ c, then a ⪰ c;
CompletenessO: for all a and b inO, a ⪰ b or b ⪰ a;
IndependenceO: for all a, b and c inO and p ∈]0, 1[, if a ≻ b, then pa⋇ (1−p)c ≻
pb ⋇ (1 − p)c; and
ContinuityO: for alla, b and c inO, ifa ≻ b andb ≻ c, then there existp, q ∈]0, 1[,
such that pa ⋇ (1 − p)c ≻ b and b ≻ qa ⋇ (1 − q)c.
Since no confusion will arise, I’ll often leave out the subscripts ‘Q’ and ‘O’ when
referring to these conditions. As with Q, if a reflexive relation ⪰ on O satisfies
37 See originally von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
38 See Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 8) or Karni (1985, 14). Basically, this result is Fishburn’s
(1970) Theorem 8.2, applied to state-outcome pairs rather than outcomes.
39 For two functions u : I × X → ℝ and v : I × X → ℝ, v is a positive affine transformation of u if
there are s, t ∈ ℝ, s > 0, such that v(i, x) = su(i, x) ⋇ t for all i in I and x in X.
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these conditions, I’ll say it’s ‘vNM-conformable’. Again, these conditions aren’t
trivial, and I’ll discuss their plausibility in the next chapter. What matters for
now is that they guarantee a kind of representability. It can be shown40 that if a
relation ⪰i onO is vNM-conformable, there’s a function ui : X → ℝ, unique up to
positive affine transformation,41 such that for all a and b inO,





However, even if them-value relationandall our axiologies are vNM-conformable,
this doesn’t ensure that each function u(i, ⋅) (from 2.2) represents the underlying
axiology Ti, or is a positive affine transformation of the respective function ui
(from 2.3). For all we know, u(i, ⋅) might still have nothing to do with ui, or might
be related to it in some inappropriate way—for instance, by being its negation
(such that u(i, x) = −ui(x) for all x). We need a condition about how the m-value
facts relate to the axiologies. What will do is a simple Pareto Condition—to the
effect that if two prospects are equally good on all axiologies with nonzero prob-
ability, they’re equally m-good, and if one of them is at least as good as another
on all axiologies with nonzero probability and strictly better on some, it’s strictly
m-better. To state this formally, define for any probability distribution P on I the
set QP ⊂ Q of prospects in which P is the underlying probability distribution on
I, QP = {a ∈ Q ℘∑x∈X a(i, x) = P(i) ∀i ∈ I}. For a set of binary relations {⪰i ℘ i ∈ I}
onO and a binary relation ⪰ onQ, define the
Pareto Condition: For any probability distribution P on I, and for all a and b in
Q
P, ifHi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all i in I with P(i) > 0, then a ∼ b; and ifHi(a) ⪰i Hi(b)
for all i in I with P(i) > 0 and Hj(a) ≻j Hj(b) for some j in I with P(j) > 0, then
a ≻ b.
Again, this condition isn’t trivial, and I’ll discuss its plausibility in the next chap-
ter. For now, what matters is that if ⪰m and all ⪰i satisfy these three conditions,
they have the kind of representation we need. I’ll call this the
Basic Representation Theorem: Suppose that all our ⪰i are vNM-conformable. If
⪰m is vNM-conformable and satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to our ⪰i,
40 SinceO is equivalent toQ on the assumption that ℘I℘ = 1, this follows from the results men-
tioned in footnote 38 (Karni and Schmeidler 1980, 8; Karni 1985, 14). See also Fishburn’s (1970)
Theorem 8.2.
41 For two functions u : X → ℝ and v : X → ℝ, v is a positive affine transformation of u if there
are s, t ∈ ℝ, s > 0, such that v(x) = su(x) ⋇ t for all x in X.
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there’s a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive affine transformation, such
that for all a and b inQ, all a and b inO and all i in I,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x), and (2.4)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x).42 (2.5)
In other words, if all axiologies are vNM-conformable, and the m-value facts
are vNM-conformable and satisfy the Pareto Condition, then there’s a theory-
dependent utility function, unique up to positive affine transformation, that
simultaneously represents all of our axiologies and the m-value facts. This is still
a purely mathematical theorem. It says that if the relations ⪰i and ⪰m satisfy these
conditions, there are mathematical functions that represent these relations. For
all we know, these functionsmight not have any extra-mathematical significance,
or stand for actual values. But we can now add the conceptual assumption I men-
tioned in Chapter 1, and turn this into a philosophically significant result—to the
effect that if ⪰i and ⪰m satisfy these conditions, EVM is true. So let me now state
this assumption.
2.3 The prospect-explications
The assumption is twofold. It concerns the meaning of cardinal intra- and in-
tertheoretic comparisons. As I said in Section 1.2, we don’t use statements like (B)
and (D) (from page 5 f.) in ordinary language. So I take it we can’t find out what it
really is for such comparisons to hold. There isn’t anything to discover. Instead,we
have to choose explications of our pre-theoretic concept of value, and decidewhat
we’ll mean by such statements. The following assumptions thus aren’t meant to
be analyses of existing concepts, but useful explicative definitions.
Intratheoretic comparisons
To statemy explication of intratheoretic comparisons, suppose that for some func-
tion u : X → ℝ and some axiology Ti, and for all a and b inO,





42 See the appendix (Section A.1) for a proof.
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I’ll then say that u represents ⪰i ordinally. Furthermore, suppose that for some
function u : X → ℝ, and some axiology Ti, the cardinal intratheoretic compar-
isons between all outcomes, according to Ti, are the same as the ratios among the
utility differences between these outcomes according to u—that is, for all x, y, z, t
in X and n ∈ ℝ, the value-difference between outcomes x and y is n times as
great as the value-difference between z and t, according to Ti, if and only if (u(x)−
u(y))/(u(z) − u(t)) = n. I’ll then say that u represents Ti cardinally. The prospect-
explication of intratheoretic comparisons says that if there’s a function u : X → ℝ,
unique up to positive affine transformation, which represents ⪰i ordinally, then u
represents ⪰i cardinally. Or in other words, for such a utility function to represent
⪰i cardinally just is for it to be such that it represents ⪰i ordinally and is unique
up to positive affine transformation in doing so.43
If a utility function u represents an axiology Ti cardinally, we can represent
that axiology with a value function Gi that determines the goodness of outcomes
according to Ti quantitatively. As long as we consider that axiology in isolation,
we can pick any function v among the family of utility functions that represent
Ti cardinally—or among the positive affine transformations of u—and take it to be
Ti’s value function Gi. Which one we choose is irrelevant. The absolute heights
of value-levels or sizes of value-differences don’t matter in determining which
prospects are better than which according to our theory. All that matters are the
ratios of value-differences. And these are the same for all positive affine transfor-
mations of u. For instance, for any x and y where y has a greater utility than x, we
could pick the utility function v on which v(x) = 0 and v(y) = 1, and suppose that
Gi = v. This would amount to picking a particular scale. So in what follows, if an
axiology can be represented cardinally by a utility function, I’ll often represent it
with a value function. And since the choice of a scale would be arbitrary, I’ll do
that without specifying a scale.
Note what the prospect-explication does. Suppose someone says that accord-
ing to axiology Ti, the best prospect is the one thatmaximises the expected square
root of the value of outcomes:





The square root function is concave. So a given increase in the argument of that
function will produce a greater increase in the value of the function the lower
43 See Broome (2004, 89 ff.) for a similar assumption about ‘personal goodness’, and a helpful
discussion of the nature of this assumption. Other illuminating discussions of the issue of cardi-
nalising goodness are provided in Broome (1991, 142 ff., chs. 10–11) or Greaves (2015; 2017).
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the argument is. This will manifest in our axiology. Consider the following three
prospects, which all lead to two different outcomes with probability 0.5 (where
the numbers in the table refer to the values of these outcomes, according to Ti):
Tab. 2.1: Example to illustrate expected square root of value.
a b c
0.5 1 1 4
0.5 0 1 0
Both b and c differ from a in that one of their outcomes is better than in a. In b, the
relevant outcome is 1 unit better than that in a; in c, it’s 3 units better. However,
since
0.5 ⋅ √1 ⋇ 0.5 ⋅ √1 = 0.5 ⋅ √4, (2.8)
we have b ∼i c. Hence according to this axiology, the relevant increases in the
value of outcomes (by 1 and 3 respectively) count the same in determining the
value of prospects, even though they aren’t the same. This is ruled out by the
prospect-explication. If a relation ⪰ onO is vNM-conformable, then ‘utility’ is de-
fined as that quantity of which ⪰maximises the expectation, in the sense of (2.6).
So by definition, increases in the utility of outcomes always count the same in
determining the utility of the prospect. According to the prospect-explication, we
can use utility to represent goodness. So the explication assumes that if two dif-
ferences in value count the same in determining the goodness of prospects, they
are the same. It assumes that goodness is expectational, like utility. Thus it rules
out views like (2.7).
As I emphasised, we should treat this as an explication, not as a substantive
assumption or faithful analysis of our pretheoretic notion of value. It’s not the
only possible explication of cardinal intratheoretic comparisons. According to our
explication, goodness acquires its cardinal significance in the context of weigh-
ing goods in prospects under uncertainty. That’s why I called it the ‘prospect-
explication’. But there are other possible contexts. For example, we could assume
a ‘time-explication’, on which if two differences in value coming at different times
count the same in determining the goodness of the history of the world over time,
they necessarily are the same.44 And there may be still other possibilities. When
44 See Broome (2004, ch. 15) for a cardinalisation of personal goodness by time.
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we come to precise axiological theorising, we have to choose some explication.
The assumption that goodness is expectational is one possibility. It’s the one by
which we can turn the Basic Representation Theorem into a philosophical result.
So it’s the one I choose.
Intertheoretic comparisons
I said that if a utility function represents an axiology Ti cardinally, we can sim-
ply pick one among the family of utility functions that represent it and take it to
be Ti’s value function Gi. But that’s only true if we consider axiologies in isola-
tion. It’s not so when we consider multiple axiologies jointly. Suppose we assume
that Ti’s value function is Gi. If we then simultaneously represent another axiol-
ogy Tj by some value function Gj, this implies claims about how values compare
intertheoretically among them. For example, if Gi(x) > Gj(x), then the value of x
is greater according to Ti than according to Tj.45 If we consider axiologies jointly,
then once we picked a global scale for representing axiologies (or once we picked
a scale for some Ti) it will not be true that we can arbitrarily pick a scale for some
other axiology Tj.
So we also need an explication of intertheoretic comparisons, or of what it is
for twoaxiologies to be jointly representable by value functions. Before I introduce
this, a comment is in order. Our question is which prospects are better thanwhich
if you’re axiologically uncertain. If EVM is correct, then in practice, the answer de-
pends only on intertheoretic unit comparisons—or facts like ‘the value-difference
between x and y, according to Ti, is n times as great as the value-difference be-
tween z and t, according to Tj’. It doesn’t depend on level comparisons—or facts
like ‘the value of x, according to Ti, is greater than the value of y, according to Tj’.
The reason is that in practice we don’t face choices between prospects with dif-
ferent underlying probability distributions over axiologies. And if the underlying
probability distribution over axiologies is the same for two prospects, then which
of them has the higher expected value depends on the sizes of value-differences,
but not on the heights of value-levels.46 In that sense, we wouldn’t need to expli-
cate intertheoretic level comparisons. However, the Basic Representation Theo-
rem ranges over prospectswith different underlying probability distributions over
45 At least, this is how I’ll understand it. Of course, one might use the same notation (i. e., rep-
resent Ti and Tj simultaneously by Gi and Gj) but assume that the implied intertheoretic compar-
isons have no significance. I assume they have.
46 Formally, if ∑x∈X a(i, x) = ∑x∈X b(i, x) for all i in I, then for any set of ti ∈ ℝ, ∑i∈I ,x∈X a(i, x)
[u(i, x) ⋇ ti] ≥ ∑i∈I ,x∈X b(i, x)[u(i, x) ⋇ ti] iff ∑i∈I ,x∈X a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑i∈I ,x∈X b(i, x)u(i, x).
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axiologies. Thus it implies a utility function that’s unique up to positive affine
transformation, not just unique up to the multiplication with a joint scalar and
state-wise addition of a constant (s ⋅ u(i, x)⋇ ti). And thus we can use this theorem
to explicate intertheoretic comparisons of value-levels as well. We get level com-
parisons for free, as it were. So I’ll provide an explication covering both unit and
level comparisons. More precisely, I’ll provide an explication not just for what I
called ‘cardinal intertheoretic comparisons’ on page 6. I’ll provide one for cross-
cutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons, or facts of the form
(L) the difference between the value of x, according to Ti, and the value of y, ac-
cording to Tj, is n times as great as the difference between the value of z, ac-
cording to Th, and the value of t, according to Tk .
Crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons combine unit and level compar-
isons; the latter are limiting cases of the former.
To state my explication of such comparisons, suppose that for some function
u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, and for all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (2.9)
I’ll then say that u represents the m-value relation ordinally. Suppose that for some
utility function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, and for each axiology Ti, the function u(i, ⋅) repre-
sents that axiology cardinally. I’ll then say that u represents each axiology cardi-
nally. Furthermore, suppose that for some function u : I ⇝X → ℝ, the crosscutting
cardinal intertheoretic comparisons between all outcomes and all theories are the
same as the ratios among the utility differences between these outcomes accord-
ing to u—that is, for all x, y, z, t in X, all i, j, h, k in I and n ∈ ℝ, the difference be-
tween the value of x, according to Ti, and the value of y, according to Tj, is n times
as great as the difference between the value of z, according to Th, and the value of
t, according to Tk, if and only if (u(i, x) − u(j, y))/(u(h, z) − u(k, t)) = n. I’ll then say
that u jointly represents all axiologies cardinally. Now the prospect-explication of
intertheoretic comparisons says that if there’s a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up
to positive affine transformation, that represents the m-value relation ordinally
and represents each axiology cardinally, then u jointly represents all axiologies
cardinally. In other words, for such a function to jointly represent all axiologies
cardinally just is for it to be such that it represents the m-value relation ordinally
and each axiology cardinally, and is unique up to positive affine transformation
in doing so. If there’s such a function u, the crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic
comparisons between our axiologies are the same as the respective intertheoretic
utility difference ratios according to u. So we can interpret all utility functions
u(i, ⋅), jointly, as value functions Gi.
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Again, I treat this as an explication, not as a substantive claim. It parallels
the prospect-explication of intratheoretic comparisons. The latter assumed that
intratheoretic comparisons acquire their cardinal significance in the context of
weighing goods under uncertainty. This explication now assumes that interthe-
oretic comparisons acquire their cardinal significance in the context of weigh-
ing axiologies under axiological uncertainty. It assumes that if two crosscutting
intertheoretic value-differences count the same in determining the m-value of
prospects, they necessarily are the same. I’ll rely on this explication through-
out the book. But before discussing it in more detail, let me state the theorem it
implies.
2.4 The theorem, the argument and our questions
The argument
The Basic Representation Theoremwas a purelymathematical result, to the effect
that if the relations ⪰i and ⪰m satisfy certain conditions, there’s a function u :
I ⇝ X → ℝ that represents ⪰m ordinally, such that u(i, ⋅) represents ⪰i ordinally for
all i in I. But given our conceptual assumptions, or the prospect-explications, this
implies a philosophically significant theorem. I’ll call it the
Expected Value Theorem: Suppose that all our ⪰i are vNM-conformable. If ⪰m is
vNM-conformable and satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to our ⪰i, then for
all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)Gi(x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)Gi(x).47 (2.10)
The functions Gi are value functions. So (2.10) is EVM. Now importantly, this
theorem is still a conditional. It says that if m-value satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axiomsand theParetoCondition, EVM is true. Butwe canderiveEVM
from it by adding the normative or meta-axiological assumption I mentioned. We
can assume that (at least if all our axiologies are vNM-conformable) the m-value
factsare indeed vNM-conformable and satisfy the Pareto Conditionwith respect to
our axiologies. Given this assumption, EVM follows. So the Basic Representation
Theorem, together with our conceptual assumptions and this meta-axiological
assumption, implies EVM. This is the basic argument of this chapter.
47 See the appendix (SectionA.1) for thederivationof this theorem from theBasicRepresentation
Theorem and the prospect-explications.
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I’ve pointed out that it parallels arguments in standard decision theory. It
has another parallel worth noting, to an argument for utilitarianism based on
John Harsanyi’s (1955) ‘utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem’. Harsanyi showed,
roughly, that if in a society, each individual’s preferences (or the facts aboutwhat’s
better for them) satisfy a set of decision-theoretic axioms, and if ‘social prefer-
ences’ (or the facts about what’s impersonally better) also satisfy these axioms as
well as something like a Pareto condition, then there are utility functions repre-
senting these preferences such that the social utility function is a weighted sum
of the individuals’ utility functions. In itself, this is a purely formal result. But
suppose utility can be taken to represent welfare. And suppose the relevant pref-
erences should (or the relevant facts do) satisfy Harsanyi’s axioms. Then his argu-
ment implies that a form of weighted utilitarianism must be true. And if we also
suppose that no one’s welfare is given more weight than anyone else’s in deter-
mining what’s socially best (as Harsanyi takes to be a conceptual matter48), his
theorem implies utilitarianism. Also, we can then read off interpersonal compar-
isons of welfare from the social preference relation, just as, I claimed, we can read
off intertheoretic comparisons of value from the m-value facts. My formal frame-
work had to bemore complex than Harsanyi’s. But structurally our arguments are
similar.
Now the Basic Representation Theorem can’t be denied. It’s a mathematical
fact. But one can object to the conceptual and normative assumptions required
to make it imply EVM. One can dispute that the prospect-explications are viable
explications of value comparisons, or that the m-value facts indeed satisfy our
conditions. I’ll turn to such worries in the next chapter. But let me elaborate first
on how, given our assumptions, the Basic Representation Theorem serves the two
purposes I suggested—or answers the questions ofmeaning and truth about EVM.
The question of meaning
First, the theorem allows us to explain what EVM even says. More precisely, it
guarantees that there are conditions under which our explications can be used.
These explications were conditionals (‘if there’s a function...’). The Basic Repre-
sentation Theorem shows that if ⪰m satisfies our conditions, the antecedents of
these conditionals hold, and we can employ them to define cardinal value.
This is particularly significant with respect to cardinal intertheoretic compar-
isons. Many standard explications of cardinal value seem inadequate for them.
48 See Harsanyi (1955, 314 ff.).
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Consider time. As mentioned, that’s a context for explicating intratheoretic com-
parisons. We can assume that if two differences in value at different times count
the same in determining the goodness of the history of the world, they are the
same. For intertheoretic comparisons, however, this seems impossible, or at best
very unsatisfying. We’d have to imagine that different axiologies are true at dif-
ferent periods of time; and we’d then have to consider how valuable the over-
all empirical-cum-axiological history is. That may be technically feasible. But the
truthof axiologies is (arguably) a timelessmatter. So it’s dubious that there are any
facts about which empirical-cum-axiological histories are better than which. And
even if there are, we don’t seem to have a very good grasp of them. Similar con-
siderations apply to many other candidate explications. Consider space. That’s
another context for explicating intratheoretic comparisons. We can assume that
if two differences in value at different places count the same in determining the
goodness of the world, they are the same. But again, the related explication of in-
tertheoretic comparisons seems inadequate. We’d have to imagine that different
axiologies are true at different places in space; and we’d then have to consider
how valuable the world overall is. But the truth of axiologies is (arguably) a spa-
tially universal matter. So it’s again dubious that there are any facts about which
spatially axiologically partitioned worlds are better than which, or that we have a
good grasp of them.
In Chapter 4, I’ll consider some other possible explications of intertheoretic
comparisons. But I’ll raise various problems for them. So as far as I see, the
prospect-explication is ultimately the best explication of cardinal intertheoretic
comparisons. And if this is true, the Basic Representation Theorem is a very im-
portant result. It provides us with the best means of even understanding what it
is for one prospect to have a greater expected value than another.
The question of truth
Secondly and equally importantly, the Basic Representation Theorem can ground
a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true. Given our assumptions, it
rules out all alternative theories of m-value at once. Let’s see with some examples
how it does that. Take the view that under axiological uncertainty, we ought to be
strictly risk-averse about value. To express this view, let pai be the probability of Ti
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and
Vai = { ∑x∈X a(i, x)Gi(x)/p
a
i if pai > 0
0 if pai = 0. (2.12)
Say thatm-value is risk-averse if there’s an increasing strictly concave function ρ,
such that for all a and b inQ,









The inputs of ρ are the values of our prospects on given axiologies. Since the func-
tion is concave, increases in these values count for more in determining m-value
the lower these values are. This is a standard interpretation of risk-aversion.49 And
prima facie, this view seems perfectly reasonable. We need an argument to rule it
out. And our theorem may provide one. (2.13) is inconsistent with the assump-
tion that ⪰m is vNM-conformable. In particular, it’s inconsistent with the Inde-
pendence axiom for ⪰m. To see this, let ρ be the square root function, ρ(x) = √x,
and consider the following example. Suppose there are two outcomes x and y, and
two theories T1 and T2 with p1 = p2 = 0.5, and G1(x) = G2(y) = 0, G1(y) = 30 and
G2(x) = 31. Prospect a leads to either x or y with a probability of 0.5 each, while b
and c lead to x and y respectively (with certainty):
Tab. 2.2: Example to illustrate risk-aversion.
a b c
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2
p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5
0.5 0 31 0 31 30 0
0.5 30 0 0 31 30 0
According to (2.13), b ≻m c. So Independence would require that b (or 1/2 b ⋇ 1/2 b)
is m-better than 1/2 c ⋇ 1/2 b—which is equivalent to a. However, since
3.9 ≈ 0.5 ⋅√0.5 ⋅ 30 ⋇ 0.5 ⋅√0.5 ⋅ 31 > 0.5 ⋅√31 ≈ 2.8, (2.14)
(2.13) implies that 1/2 c ⋇ 1/2 b ⪰m b. Similar examples could be given for any other
increasing strictly concave ρ. If the conditions of our theorem hold, the utility
49 See e. g. Buchak (2013) for a slightly different one.
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functions that enter the m-value relation are those that represent our axiologies
ordinally. If we assume that goodness is expectational at the level of first-order
value, the axioms—and Independence in particular—guarantee that the utility
functions that determine m-value represent our axiologies cardinally. They rule
out views like (2.13). Now of course, the argument could run bothways: views and
examples like this can, and have been, used to cast doubt on Independence.50
Still, the axiom provides a certain argument against such views. It expresses a
thought that undeniably has strong intuitive appeal: if one prospect is m-better
than another, then lotteries involving the first prospect are m-better than lotteries
involving the second, if they’re otherwise exactly the same. If we make appar-
ent how prima facie plausible judgments contradict this thought, this casts doubt
on these judgments.51 Whether or not this argument is ultimately successful is
a complex matter. I’ll say more about it in the next chapter, where I discuss our
axioms. But in any case, the intuitive plausibility of our axioms provides an argu-
ment against views like (2.13).
Consider next ‘My Favourite Theory’—the view that under axiological uncer-
tainty, you simply ought to evaluate prospects in accordance with the theory you
findmost plausible. On this view, a prospect is at least asm-good as another if and
only if it’s at least as good according to the axiology with the highest probability
(if there is such an axiology; if more than one axiology has maximal probability,
there’s some rule for breaking ties). Some people have endorsed this view with
regards tomoral uncertainty generally.52 It contradicts the Pareto Condition. Sup-
pose the probabilities of T1 and T2 are 0.6 and 0.4 respectively, so that T1 deter-
mines ⪰m. And suppose two prospects d and e are equally good according to T1,
but d is strictly better according to T2. Then, according to My Favourite Theory, d
is equally as m-good as e, which violates the Pareto Condition. So this condition
can provide an argument against My Favourite Theory.
Our theorem also shows that there’s no straightforward way for My Favourite
Theory to remedy this flaw (if it’s a flaw). In light of the just-mentioned exam-
ple, one may want to say you ought to evaluate prospects in accordance with the
most plausible theory—except if two prospects are equally good on that theory,
and one is at least as good as the other on all axiologies with nonzero probability
and strictly better on some, in which case the former is m-better than the latter.
50 Themost famous (alleged) counterexamples to Independencemay be due to Allais (1953) and
Ellsberg (1961).
51 With respect to the example by Allais (1953), this has been done—quite compellingly, I think—
e. g. by Savage (1954, 101 ff.) and Raiffa (1968, 80 ff.).
52 See Gracely (1996).
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Views along these lines have also been suggested.53 Yet our theorem shows that if
⪰m is vNM-conformable, the Pareto Condition implies that m-value is a weighted
sumof first-order value. There simply is no consistent intermediate view, onwhich
m-value is vNM-conformable and Paretian, and yet doesn’t reduce to a weighted
sum of first-order value, somehow retaining the spirit of My Favourite Theory. If
⪰m is vNM-conformable, the project of making My Favourite Theory satisfy the
Pareto Condition is doomed.
Finally, one might worry that EVM isn’t ecumenical enough as a view of nor-
mative or axiological uncertainty. People sympathetic to virtue ethics, say, may
want to deny that m-value is a matter of strict computation, and endorse a non-
codifiable meta-virtue-ethical view of m-value. On such a view, under axiological
uncertainty, you simply ought to act virtuously—be circumspective but not over-
cautious, neither reckless nor overly anxious, and so on. Similarly, some people
have suggested meta-deontological principles for how to determine one’s m-best
prospect.54 Prima facie, such views seemperfectly sensible.We need an argument
to deny them. And our theorem provides one. If they’re to be distinct theories,
these meta-virtue-ethical or -deontological views must deny that m-value satis-
fies our conditions.55
In short, various views that seem reasonable and have been defended in the
literature contradict one of the conditions of our theorem. To the extent these con-
ditions are plausible, the theoremprovides not only away of explicating EVM, but
also a systematic argument for its truth.
53 With regards to moral uncertainty generally, Gustafsson and Torpman (2014, 169 ff.) are at
least steering towards such a position. They revise My Favourite Theory so as to make it compati-
blewith aPareto (or ‘Dominance’) condition.Unfortunately, theydon’t discuss the vonNeumann-
Morgenstern axioms; and they exploreuncertainty about theories that ‘require’ or ‘permit’ certain
options, which may involve disanalogies to our case. But at least within the theory of axiological
uncertainty, making My Favourite Theory satisfy the Pareto Condition forces one to deny that ⪰m
is vNM-conformable.
54 E. g., Guerrero (2007, 94) endorses the following principle: ‘Don’t Know, Don’t Destroy: If one
knows that one doesn’t know whether some entity has moral value, then it’s morally blamewor-
thy to destroy that entity, unless one believes that something of substantial moral significance
compels one to do so.’
55 For other arguments in defence of EVM—or more generally, expectational reasoning under
normative uncertainty—see MacAskill and Ord (2020).
3 Evaluating the argument
Are our two additional assumptions—the meta-axiological assumption that the
relevant (m-)value facts satisfy our axioms, and the conceptual assumption con-
stituted by the prospect-explications—plausible? That is, do our axiologies and
the m-value facts satisfy the conditions of the Expected Value Theorem? And are
theprospect-explications viable definitions of cardinal value comparisons? In this
chapter, I’ll begin to answer these questions.
A conclusive answer, especially to the first question, is beyond the scope of
this book. Each of the theorem’s conditions is disputed, at least in standard de-
cision theory and social choice theory. I can’t defend any of them conclusively.
So what I’ll mostly do is compare their plausibility in the context of axiologi-
cal uncertainty with their plausibility in other contexts—specifically, that of de-
cision theory or first-order axiology, and (in the case of the Pareto Condition) that
of social choice theory. I’ll start with the Pareto Condition (Section 3.1) and the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (Section 3.2), and then discuss the prospect-
explications (Section 3.3). I’ll end the chapter by highlighting two interesting im-
plications of this discussion for decision theory as a general theory of preferences,
and for EVM as a higher-order theory of uncertainty about theories of axiological
uncertainty (Section 3.4).
3.1 The Pareto Condition
Recall what the Pareto Condition says: for any two prospects with the same under-
lying probability distribution over axiologies, if they’re equally good on all the-
ories with nonzero probability, they’re equally m-good, and if one of them is at
least as good as the other on all theories with nonzero probability and strictly bet-
ter on some, it’s strictly m-better. Intuitively, this sounds very plausible. However,
it’s an ex ante Pareto requirement. It’s concerned not with the betterness of out-
comes, but with the betterness of prospects. For this reason especially, one may
have doubts about it. Pareto conditions are rarely discussed in decision theory.
But as mentioned (with respect to Harsanyi), there’s an analogy between the the-
ory of axiological uncertainty and social choice theory. We’re concerned with an
overallm-value ordering that depends on the value-orderings of axiologies; social
choice theory is concerned with a ‘general betterness’ ordering that depends on
the ‘individual betterness’ orderings of people.56 And it’s controversial whether,
56 Or at any rate, that is one interpretation of it. See particularly Broome (1991).
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if one prospect is ex ante at least as good for all individuals as another and strictly
better for some, it’s ceteris paribus generally better. So we must be careful to as-
sume such a condition in our context.
Themost important argument against the ex antePareto condition for individ-
ual goodness is due to Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve (2013). It shows that
this condition is in tension with (ex post) egalitarianism, the view that it’s good
if people fare equally well. Suppose we can either let both Antonio and Leonore
end upwith 20 units of good (prospect f ), or conduct a lottery yielding, with equal
probability, 31 units of good forAntonio and 10 suchunits for Leonore or vice versa
(prospect g):
Tab. 3.1: Example to illustrate ex ante Pareto condition for individual goodness.
f g
Antonio Leonore Antonio Leonore
0.5 20 20 10 31
0.5 20 20 31 10
Suppose that individual goodness is expectational. Then g is ex ante better than
f for both Antonio and Leonore. So if general goodness satisfies an ex ante Pareto
condition with respect to personal goodness, g is ex ante better than f . However,
according to (a relevant form of) egalitarianism, a state in which both Antonio
and Leonore have 20 units of good is better than a state in which one has 31 and
the other 10. So if it was certain that g would lead to 31 for Antonio and 10 for
Leonore, f would ex ante be better. And if it was certain that g would lead to 10
for Antonio and 31 for Leonore, f would also be better. In other words, whatever
the outcome of g will be, if it was certain, f would ex ante be better. Therefore,
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve claim, f is ex ante better even if g’s outcome is uncer-
tain. This is because of the ‘Principle of Full Information’ (or basically Savage’s
‘Sure-Thing Principle’57): ‘When one knows that, in every state of the world with
positive probability, one would rightly rank two alternatives in a particular way,
then one should so rank them’ (2013, 120).
This may be a good reason to reject the ex ante Pareto condition concern-
ing individual goodness. I won’t explore this. What matters for our purposes is
that there doesn’t seem to be a plausible parallel reasoning about m-value. Fleur-
baey and Voorhoeve’s argument depends on the egalitarian claim that f would
57 See Savage (1954, 21 ff.).
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be better than g if g’s outcome was certain. But it’s not clear why an analogous
premise should hold in the context of axiological uncertainty. Consider the fol-
lowing choice between f and g:
Tab. 3.2: Example to illustrate Pareto Condition.
f g
T1 T2 T1 T2
p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5
20 20 31 10
Why should f bem-better?What immediately comes tomind is risk-aversion—the
view I expressed as









For some suitable increasing, strictly concave function ρ (e. g., ρ(x) = √x), this
view indeed implies that f ⪰m g. However, we can’t use it to argue against the
Pareto Condition. As is easily verified, (3.1) actually satisfies this condition.
To argue against the Pareto Condition,we’d have to endorse a different formof
risk-aversion. Say thatm-value is ex post risk-averse if there’s an increasing strictly
concave function ρ, such that
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)ρ(Gi(x)) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)ρ(Gi(x)). (3.2)
In (3.2), ρ is applied not to the prospects that our options represent on given axi-
ologies, but to outcomes. If m-value is ex post risk-averse, it doesn’t violate Inde-
pendence, as the theory defined in (3.1) does. On the other hand, as is again easily
verified, it does violate the Pareto Condition, and imply that f ⪰m g (for some ρ).
So (3.2) might be used in an argument against the Pareto Condition. However, it’s
a very dubious view. Note what it implies if you’re certain of one theory. Suppose
you’re certain of T1, and face k and l: k leads to an outcome of value 20 (according
to T1), and l with equal probability either to an outcome of value 10, or to one of
value 31 (according to T1). Since you’re certain of T1, if goodness is expectational
at the level of axiologies, you’re certain that l is better than k. Yet, (for the rele-
vant ρ) (3.2) implies that k is m-better. So it says that a prospect can be m-better
than another, even if it’s certainly worse. This is very implausible. Surely, if we’re
certain that one axiology is true, we ought to rank prospects in accordance with
it.
3.2 vNM-conformability | 41
Perhaps there are other reasons, apart from these forms of risk-aversion, for
believing that f is m-better than g, and for denying the Pareto Condition on that
basis. But I can’t think of any plausible candidate. So I tentatively conclude there’s
no analogue to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s objection in the context of axiological
uncertainty. As far as their objection is concerned, the condition seems plausible
for m-value. Similarly, perhaps there are other kinds of objections to our Pareto
Condition, other than reasons that parallel the egalitarian objection. But I can’t
see any I find remotely convincing.58 So as far as I see, in our context the ex ante
Pareto Condition is indeed very plausible. It’s a major drawback for a theory to
violate it.
3.2 vNM-conformability
The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms as conditions on value
Let’s turn to the other part of our (meta-)axiological assumption, the von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern axioms. There are two levels at which these appear in our the-
orem: as conditions on our axiologies, and as conditions on m-value. Consider
first the assumption that all axiologies are vNM-conformable. Is this plausible? As
a claim about all possible axiologies, or even all axiologies we should have some
nonzero credence in, it’s clearly false. There are non-vNM-conformable axiolo-
gies, and in some of them we should have at least some nonzero credence. How-
ever, this doesn’t undermine the relevance of our theorem altogether. We should
58 There’s a second standard objection against ex ante Pareto conditions in social choice the-
ory. Some authors find ex ante Pareto improvements problematic when they depend on differ-
ences in people’s beliefs (see e. g. Gilboa et al. 2014 or Mongin and D’Aspremont 1998, 442). Sup-
pose Leonore and Antonio have an apple and an orange each, but Leonore doesn’t like apples at
all, and Antonio doesn’t like oranges at all. In this case, there’s a Pareto superior state in which
Leonore gets both oranges and Antonio gets both apples. This state is possible because the two
have different tastes, and it seems clearly preferable from the point of view of general goodness.
But now suppose Felix is certain that it will rain tomorrow, and Mariane is certain that it will
snow, and they both own £100 (which they cherish). Relative to their beliefs, it’s ex ante better
for both of them to agree to the bet in which Felix will receive Mariane’s £100 if it rains, and
Mariane will receive Felix’s £100 if it snows. However, since one of them clearly has false beliefs,
there’s something problematic about that agreement. That’s especially true, say, if one of them
was intentionally deceived. However, this objection doesn’t carry over to our context either. I do
allow that the probability distribution over outcomes in a prospect in Q may differ from theory
to theory. But that’s not because axiologies themselves somehow assign different probabilities
to outcomes. I’m simply stipulating these probabilities. So whatever exactly we find problematic
about belief-relative Pareto improvements, this won’t apply to our condition.
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simply see this condition as restricting its scope. Our result isn’t a fully general
theorem of axiological uncertainty. It’s a theorem concerning uncertainty about
vNM-conformable axiologies only. That’s why I haven’t stated this as part of the
main conditional of the theorem, but as an antecedent supposition (‘Suppose that
all our ⪰i are vNM-conformable’). It’s not surprising that our theorem isn’t fully
general. The biconditional (2.10) is a theory of both axiological and descriptive
uncertainty. It says you should maximise expected value across axiologies and
descriptive states of nature, in a vNM-conformable manner. But that’s implausi-
ble if one of our axiologies isn’t vNM-conformable. If you were certain of such an
axiology, you should arguably judge a prospect m-better than another if and only
if it’s better according to that axiology. So if that axiology isn’t vNM-conformable,
the m-value relation isn’t vNM-conformable either.59 As a general theory of both
axiological and descriptive uncertainty, a vNM-conformable theory of m-value is
plausible at best for vNM-conformable axiologies.
How significant a restriction is this, or how common and plausible are non-
vNM-conformable axiologies? For three of our four axioms, the relevant restric-
tions don’t seem all too serious. It’s been disputed that the betterness relation
even satisfies Transitivity.60 I won’t enter this debate here. But I think it’s an an-
alytic fact that ‘better than’ and ‘at least as good as’ are transitive. ‘Better’ is the
comparative of ‘good’, and all comparatives are transitive.61 So I’ve been assum-
ing as a matter of definition that an axiology is a transitive binary relation.
I take it that there are axiologies that strictly violate Independence. For in-
stance, some views are risk-averse in a way that’s strictly inconsistent with this
axiom. And plausibly, we should have some nonzero credence in some such axi-
ologies.62 So the assumption that all axiologies satisfy this axiom is a nontrivial
restriction of our framework. Also, it’s an essential aspect of it. There are alterna-
tive frameworks allowing for other risk-attitudes, potentially grounding theories
other than Expected Value Maximisation, and certainly well worth exploring.63
But Independence is key for the framework and argument in this book.
59 In fact, given a suitable Pareto condition,⪰m then can’t be vNM-conformable. The Pareto Con-
dition onpage 26 is slightly tooweak to guarantee this. It doesn’t rule out that them-value relation
may represent a complete sharpening of an underlying axiology that is incomplete. But a slightly
stronger condition (like the one on page 115) would do.
60 See most prominently Temkin (2012); also Rachels (1998).
61 This view is defended in Broome (2004, ch. 4); see e. g. Binmore and Voorhoeve (2003) or
Voorhoeve (2013) for further defences of the transitivity of betterness.
62 See e. g. Buchak (2013) for a defence of risk-sensitivity in decision theory.
63 See most prominently Buchak (2013); also Dietrich and Jabarian (2018; 2021) for the theory of
normative uncertainty.
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However, my sense is that axiologies that strictly violate Independence are
comparatively implausible. That’s for two reasons. First, as indicated in Sec-
tion 2.4 (on page 36), Independence seems to express a compelling thought. If
one prospect is better than another, then lotteries involving the former are better
than lotteries involving the latter, if they’re otherwise exactly the same. Alleged
counterexamples to this axiom can be presented in amanner thatmakes apparent
how the relevant judgments contradict this thought. And this often reduces the
intuitive plausibility of these judgments significantly.64 Second, there’s a general
strategy to render axiologies that prima facie violate Independence consistent
with this axiom. Standard prima facie violations of Independence arise when the
value of some state of affairs depends on modal facts—such as facts about what
could have happened, or about the probability with which something happened.
If this is so, we can take these modal facts to be part of our outcomes. And once
we do so, Independence is standardly no longer violated. In other words, we can
individuate outcomes in a more fine-grained manner, and thus make axiologies
that prima facie violate Independence consistent with this axiom.65 This isn’t the
place to elaborate on this strategy. I’ll discuss it in some depth in Section 6.2.
There, I mention an important problem for the strategy when we apply it to stan-
dard deontic (especially deontological) moral theories. But I argue that this isn’t
a problem when we apply it to axiologies. As far as I see, the strategy is indeed
convincing for standard axiologies.66 This isn’t to say it works for all possible
axiologies. As I’ll point out, there are possible axiologies that violate Indepen-
dence, but not because on these axiologies, the value of outcomes depends on
any relevant fine-grained features of states of affairs. And our strategy won’t work
for these theories. But my sense is that these axiologies are comparatively rare
and implausible. So in sum, I think there are axiologies that strictly violate In-
dependence, and to which we should assign some nonzero credence. Hence the
axiom is a nontrivial restriction of our framework, or of the plausibility of (2.10)
as a general theory of axiological uncertainty. However, since these axiologies
are rare and implausible, Independence doesn’t seem to diminish the relevance
of our argument all too much. Even though it rules out axiologies that strictly
violate Independence, the argument still applies to an interestingly large class of
theories.
64 As indicated in footnote 51, this has been done e. g. by Savage (1954, 101 ff.) and Raiffa (1968,
80ff.) with respect to the example by Allais (1953).
65 For famous applications and defences of this strategy, with respect to the example by Allais
(1953), see e. g. Weirich (1986) and Broome (1991, ch. 5).
66 For recent contributions to the debate about the Independence axiom in decision theory and
first-order value, see e. g. McClennen (2009), Temkin (2012, 237 ff.) or Buchak (2013, 157 ff.).
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In a similar manner, there are axiologies that strictly violate Continuity. If a
theory assigns infinite value to some outcome and finite values to others it will
violate Continuity. If we don’t put any restrictions on the set of outcomes X, then
many plausible axiologies are of this form. Take the welfare-theory. On this view,
a world that contains beings whose lives are worth living, and only such beings,
for an infinite stretch of time, will be infinitely valuable. But there are other ways
inwhich axiologies violate Continuity. An axiologymay say that one kind of value
lexically dominates another. Consider an axiology on which the value of wellbe-
ing lexically dominates that of beauty—in that a prospect is better than another
whenever it expectably leads to more wellbeing, but ceteris paribus better if it ex-
pectably leads tomorebeauty. Thiswelfare/beauty-theorydoesn’t satisfy Continu-
ity.67 More straightforwardly, an axiology may imply a discontinuous behaviour
of value with respect to probabilities. Consider an axiology on which, for some
p0 ∈]0, 1[, outcomes that arise with a probability of less than p0 are irrelevant for
the evaluation of prospects. This axiology will not be continuous. Again, plausi-
bly, we should have somenonzero credence in such axiologies. So the assumption
that all axiologies are continuous is a nontrivial restriction. And again, it’s an es-
sential aspect of the argument in this book.
But here too, my sense is that at least for finite worlds, axiologies that strictly
violate Continuity are comparatively implausible. That’s for the same two reasons
as with Independence. First, at least for finite worlds, Continuity expresses a very
compelling thought.Nothing is infinitely better thananything else; andbetterness
strictly is a graded and continuous matter. This in itself casts doubt on axiologies
that violate this axiom. Second, the strategy of reindividuating outcomes again
helps to render standard axiologies that prima facie violate Continuity consistent
with it. So again, I think this is a restriction that doesn’t diminish the relevance of
our argument all too much.
Themost problematic axiom is Completeness. And Completeness is problem-
atic indeed. To assume that the value facts are complete is to assume that all
prospects are fully commensurable—i. e., that their values are representable by
a single value function. But on many axiologies, there’s some intratheoretic in-
commensurability. Someprospects aren’t fully commensurable, but compare only
roughly. On these axiologies, there are prospects a and b, where a isn’t determi-
nately at least as good as b, and b isn’t determinately at least as good as a. In-
deed, many such axiologies are plausible, and have been prominently defended
67 See e. g. Vallentyne (1993) for a view with this structure. Temkin (2012, 245 ff.) also mentions
that some outcomes may be ‘good enough’, or very significantly better than others, so that Conti-
nuity fails. I’m not sure whether he’d regard those as instances of the kind of ‘lexical betterness’
I mentioned.
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by philosophers.68 To take a classic example,69 suppose that welfare has value,
and consider lives of successful musicians and of successful lawyers. It’s plau-
sible that for some such pair of lives, it’s neither true that the life of the musi-
cian is determinately better than that of the lawyer, nor that it’s determinately
worse, nor that they’re precisely equally good. The standard argument for this is
the ‘small improvement argument’.70 Consider some such pair of lives, where it’s
plausible that neither is determinately better than the other. Now add a small im-
provement to the life of the musician—an additional successful serenade in place
of a bored evening with migraine, say. This new life of the musician is determi-
nately (slightly) better than the former life of the musician. But plausibly, it still
needn’t be determinately better than the life of the lawyer. So our original lives
aren’t exactly equally good either. No ‘at least as good as’-relation determinately
holds between them.
I don’t think that Completeness somehow expresses a thought that’s indepen-
dently compelling. Andwith this axiom, the strategy of reindividuating outcomes
won’t help. So Completeness at the level of axiologies is a major restriction of the
argument from Chapter 2. Fortunately, however, it’s a restrictionwe can overcome
within the axiomatic approach, and the broader idea of ExpectedValueMaximisa-
tion. Completeness isn’t essential for ourmain argument. There are representation
theorems without the Completeness axiom. These theorems allow our argument
to cover axiologies featuring incommensurability. So the plausibility of such axi-
ologies is onemajor reason to explore such theorems. I’ll turn to this in Chapter 6.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms as conditions on m-value
Consider the assumption that them-value facts are vNM-conformable. Is this plau-
sible, given the presupposition that all axiologies are vNM-conformable? Inmany
respects, the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms seem just as plausible with re-
spect to m-value as with respect to first-order value. Some people may question
whether ⪰m is even transitive. But since I take m-betterness to be a form of better-
ness, I again think the transitivity of ⪰m is analytic. In principle, m-valuemay also
violate Independence, even if all axiologies are vNM-conformable. In particular,
it’s possible that m-value is risk-neutral with respect to purely descriptive uncer-
tainty, but risk-sensitive with respect to axiological uncertainty. But as far as I see,
68 See e. g. Raz (1986, ch. 13) or Broome (1997).
69 See Raz (1986, ch. 13).
70 For early instances of the argument, see e. g. Sinnott-Armstrong (1985) or Raz (1986, ch. 13).
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there’s no reason why that should be the case—at least none that’s somehow spe-
cific to the problem of axiological uncertainty. So I think Independence is a plau-
sible axiom about m-value. As with ordinary value, m-value would violate Con-
tinuity if it displayed a discontinuous behaviour with respect to probabilities—if
there were probability thresholds p0 ∈]0, 1[ below which an axiology became ir-
relevant for determining m-value, say. This could be true even if all axiologies are
vNM-conformable. But such thresholds seem implausible, in the context of axi-
ological as in that of purely descriptive uncertainty. So in this regard, Continuity
seems plausible too.
However, there’s at least one specific reason for why them-value relationmay
not be vNM-conformable, even if all axiologies are. That’s facts about intertheo-
retic comparisons. The most problematic assumption in this regard is again Com-
pleteness. To assume that ⪰m is complete is to assume that all axiologies are fully
commensurable—i. e., that they’re all jointly representable by single value func-
tions. But as with intratheoretic comparisons, and even if all axiologies them-
selves are complete, it might be that there’s some intertheoretic incommensura-
bility. It might be that some axiologies aren’t fully commensurable, but compare
only roughly. If so, there are prospectsa andb, wherea isn’t determinately at least
asm-good as b, and b isn’t determinately at least asm-good as a. And indeed, this
again seems plausible. Suppose that Ti is a beauty-theory, and Tj awelfare-theory.
Even if bothTi andTj are completewith respect toO, intuitively, it seemsplausible
that the value of beauty, according to Ti, isn’t fully commensurable to the value of
wellbeing, according to Tj. For some increase in beauty and some increase in wel-
fare, the value of the former, according to Ti, is neither determinately greater than
that of the latter, according to Tj, nor determinately smaller, nor precisely equally
great. A small improvement argument again seems pertinent. It’s implausible that
any slight additional beauty, say, would have to tip the balance. No positive ‘at
least as m-good as’-relationmay hold between prospects leading to value-beauty-
tradeoffs, in light of uncertainty about these theories. So the plausibility of such
intertheoretic incommensurability is another major reason to explore theorems
without the Completeness axiom. Such theorems allow our argument to cover ax-
iologies that aren’t fully intertheoretically commensurable.
However, here the problem runs even deeper than with Completeness about
axiologies. At the level of first-order value, some prospects on some axiologies
maynot be fully commensurable. But there doesn’t seem to be anythingmetaphys-
ically problematic about value comparisons, per se. At least some intratheoretic
comparisons plausibly do in fact hold. It’s not that all plausible axiologies are rad-
ically incomplete—or such that a is at least as good as b, according to them, only if
it’s in no respect worse. That’s different at the level ofm-value. Intertheoretic com-
parisons seemmetaphysically problematic. Onemight think that no such compar-
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isons hold—that there just aren’t any facts, say, about how good certain outcomes
would be if some axiologies were true which actually are false. The universe may
contain nontrivial value facts about which purely descriptive prospects are better
than which. But it just doesn’t contain any nontrivial m-value facts, or nontrivial
facts about which outcomes onwhich theories are better thanwhich outcomes on
which other theories, say. So onemight endorse radical scepticism about interthe-
oretic comparisons, or hold that them-value relation is radically incomplete—that
a is at least as m-good as b only when it’s at least as good on all axiologies with
nonzero probability. If this is true, the prospect-explication might tell us what it
would be for an intertheoretic comparison to be the case. But as amatter of fact, no
such comparison holds. Some people have defended this. If they’re right, it’s little
use to have representation theorems allowing for some incompleteness. The idea
of Expected Value Maximisation is more fundamentally flawed. The only positive
m-value facts are trivial cases, where all axiologies agree. So we need to address
the problem of intertheoretic comparisons: provide a positive reason to think that
some such comparisons actually hold, and a story aboutwhat could ground them.
I’ll turn to this in the next chapter. To anticipate: I’ll argue that intertheoretic com-
parisons are possible, or that ⪰m isn’t radically incomplete. But it isn’t fully com-
plete either, even if all axiologies are. Some plausible axiologies are indeed less
than fully commensurable.
The problem of intertheoretic comparisons affects the Continuity axiom as
well. One might hold that there are axiologies that compare in a lexical way—
axiologies Ti and Tj such that any positive value-difference between prospects ac-
cording to Ti is greater than any positive value-difference between prospects ac-
cording to Tj. Thismay be so, onemight hold, because although there are grounds
for intertheoretic comparisons, they’re somehowspecial, or peculiar, and give rise
to lexical intertheoretic comparisons. And if two theories compare in thismanner,
the m-value facts won’t satisfy Continuity with respect to them. So to assess Con-
tinuity about m-value, again, we have to address the problem of intertheoretic
comparisons. To anticipate: on the view of intertheoretic comparisons for which
I’ll argue, it’s implausible that two axiologies compare in a lexical way. So I think
(at least for finite worlds) Continuity is a plausible assumption about m-value.
3.3 The prospect-explications
Consider our conceptual assumption, the prospect-explications. Are these viable
explications of cardinal value? Start with the most fundamental concern. One
might think the prospect-explication of intertheoretic comparisons makes the ar-
gument from our representation theorem to EVM circular. Onemight think the ex-
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plication simply defines quantities of value in a way that renders EVM true: that
in assuming that intertheoretic comparisons acquire their cardinal significance in
the context of axiological uncertainty, Imust alreadyassume that EVM is correct.71
But this suspicion is misguided. To see this, it may help to distinguish two
assumptions involved in the explication. The first assumption is that if there’s
a theory-dependent utility function, unique up to positive affine transformation,
which represents the m-value relation ordinally and each axiology cardinally—
and in particular, if ⪰m thus satisfies Completeness—all axiologies are somehow
fully commensurable, and can somehow jointly be represented by single value
functions. This claim doesn’t say anything about which value functions jointly
represent our theories, or how they compare. It merely says that axiologies are
somehow fully commensurable. The second assumption is that the specific value
functions that can figure in a representation are then determined by the m-value
facts. In my explication, I’ve joined those two assumptions together. I could have
stated them separately. Doing so makes more vivid how weak a presupposition
the prospect-explication of intertheoretic comparisons really is.
Consider the first assumption first. This is simply a claim aboutwhat (perhaps
among else) itmeans that two theories are comparable. And though it is necessary
for EVM, it certainly doesn’t presuppose EVM. Moreover, the assumption doesn’t
seem very problematic. If there’s a theory-dependent utility function, unique up
to positive affine transformation, which represents m-value ordinally and each
axiology cardinally, there’s a unique way in which axiologies weigh against each
other to determine complete m-value facts. In any sense that’s relevant for the
problem of axiological uncertainty, this means all axiologies are ‘comparable’ in
some way. So grant this first assumption. Then, if there is such a function, the
respective state-wise utility functions must be positive affine transformations of
the value functions of our theories. That is, if Gi are our value functions, there
must be si and ti ∈ ℝ, si > 0, such that for all prospects a and b,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)[siGi(x) ⋇ ti] ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)[siGi(x) ⋇ ti]. (3.3)
Hence the only alternative way in which our value functions could determine the
m-value relation would be if, apart from their probabilities, one theory had sys-
tematically and constantly more weight in determining m-value than another (in
71 This objection seems to be raised by Andrew Sepielli (2009, 27): ‘The main problem with [the
prospect-explication of intertheoretic comparisons] is that it simply assumes the rationality of
maximizing [expected value] under normative uncertainty. But this is a position that should be
argued for independently of one’s solution to the [problem of intertheoretic comparisons], not
merely assumed as a means to solving the problem.’
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that ti ̸= tj or si ̸= sj for some i and j). So the second assumption—that intertheo-
retic comparisons acquire their specific cardinal significance in the context of axi-
ological uncertainty—doesn’t rule out risk-aversion, or the quasi-deontological or
virtue-ethical accounts sketched in Section 2.4. It only rules out such constant un-
equal weighing. And although EVMpresupposes thatm-value isn’t determined by
such unequal weighing, to turn this final step into a matter of definition is again
by no means to assume EVM. What may be questioned is whether there is a util-
ity function that represents ⪰m in the relevant way—i. e., whether ⪰m satisfies the
conditions of our theorem, and particularly Completeness. These conditions are
doing the main work guaranteeing intertheoretic comparability. Once they’re in
place, the explication of intertheoretic comparisons doesn’t add much, and cer-
tainly not enough to warrant a charge of circularity.
Here’s a second objection against our explications. I suggested in Section 1.2
that we don’t use cardinal comparisons in ordinary language, that we thus can’t
find out what they really mean, or that there’s no uniquely privileged definition
of them. Instead, we should pick a useful explication. One might object to this.
One might claim that there is a privileged derivation of cardinal comparisons. In
particular, one might say we have a pretheoretic understanding of (ordinal) com-
parisons of value-differences, or facts like
(M) according toTi, the value-difference between x and y is greater than the value-
difference between z and t.
Now a comparative ranking of value-differences among a set X of outcomes
doesn’t always entail a cardinal concept of value. Suppose X has only three mem-
bers, and that according to Ti, the difference between the best and the second
best outcome is greater than the difference between the second best and the
third. Clearly, this isn’t enough to determine cardinally how much greater the
first difference is than the second.72 However, under some conditions, difference
comparability is enough to imply cardinal measurability: if X is rich enough,
facts like (M) determine a utility function unique up to positive affine transforma-
tion representing Ti. For instance, on one condition introduced by Kaushik Basu
(1983, 197), intuitively, if you’re able to compare value-differences in a set as rich
as the rational numbers, then such ordinal comparability of value-differences
implies cardinal measurability.73 So then an understanding of value-difference
72 See e. g. Bossert (1991, 212) for such an example.
73 More precisely, Basu (1983, 197) proved the following. Let X be a set of outcomes, u a real-
valued utility function on X, and Ω a set of real-valued functions on u(X). Think of functions
in Ω as permissible transformations of u—transformations, say, that also represent the relevant
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comparisons is enough to provide a cardinal concept of value. And since facts
like (M) must be accepted by everyone as primitives (the objection goes) this is
the privileged explication of cardinal value.74
I’m not convinced by this proposal. For one thing, it seems dubious that we
understand statements like (M). They might be unproblematic as long as value-
differences count the samenomatter inwhat time andplace, and inwhat prospect
they appear. Then these contexts helpusunderstand them.But theybecomeprob-
lematicwhen these contexts vanish. Suppose you say that for you the expost value
of money increases linearly: that the value-difference between £n and £(n ⋇ 100)
is the same for any n ∈ ℕ. And suppose you say you are risk-averse about this
value: that a certain prospect of £n is always better than a 50% chance of getting
£2n or nothing. Then you arguably need to tell us in what sense you value money
linearly, ex post, instead of assigning it diminishing marginal value. Our grasp of
value-difference comparisons isn’t robust enough to make this clear. Or in short,
we don’t just lack an unmediated understanding of cardinal comparisons like (B)
(from page 5). We also lack an unmediated understanding of facts like (M).
But we can even grant that we understand intratheoretic value-difference
comparisons. This still doesn’t get us very far. Whether a prospect has a higher
expected value than another also depends on intertheoretic value-difference
comparisons, or facts like
(N) the value-difference between x and y, according to Ti, is greater than the
value-difference between z and t, according to Tj.
And it seems uncontroversial that we have no direct grasp of such facts. So primi-
tivismabout (M)will anywaybe insufficient to formulate EVM. In the next chapter,
as a possible solution to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, I’ll introduce
fitting attitude accounts of value. I’ll consider whether an ordering of the strength
of attitudes corresponding to value-differences might provide a cardinally signif-
icant concept of value. But I’ll argue that (at least with respect to intertheoretic
ordering of X that u represents. Say that (u℘Ω) has cardinality if for all f in Ω there are s and t ∈ ℝ,
s > 0, such that for all a in u(X), f (a) = sa ⋇ t. In other words, (u℘Ω) has cardinality if only
positive affine transformations are permissible transformations of u. Say that (u℘Ω) has difference
comparability if for all f inΩ and for all a, b, c and d in u(X), a−b ≥ c−d⇔ f (a)−f (b) ≥ f (c)−f (d).
In other words, (u℘Ω) has difference comparability if only transformations that preserve ordinal
difference-comparisons are permissible transformations of u. Now if u(X) is dense in a connected
subset of ℝ, (u℘Ω) has cardinality if and only if it has difference comparability. (The connected
subsets ofℝ are just the intervals onℝ, andℚ is dense onℝ. Thus the intuitive formulation above
approximates this result.) See e. g. Bossert and Stehling (1994) for another condition; e. g. Bossert
(1991), Bossert andWeymark (2004, 1126 ff.) or Bossert et al. (2005, 34 f.) for a general discussion.
74 I thank Ralf Bader for mentioning this worry to me.
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comparisons) that’s ultimately dubious. So ultimately, I don’t think we can find
any better—let alone a uniquely privileged and ‘correct’—explication of cardinal
value in terms of value-differences.
There’s a third worry about the prospect-explications. One might think these
explications get the order of explanation wrong. Consider intratheoretic compar-
isons, and take two prospects a and b, where (according to the true axiology) a is
better than b. Intuitively, it’s not that outcomes compare in a certain way because,
as a brute matter of fact, a is better than b. Rather, a is better than b precisely be-
cause outcomes compare in some way. So my explication seems to put the cart
before the horse. It explains comparisons in terms of betterness facts, whereas
actually such facts seem explained by comparisons. And the same worry arises
in the intertheoretic case. Intuitively, it’s not that axiologies compare in a certain
way because certain m-value facts hold. Rather, such facts hold because axiolo-
gies compare in that way.75
Let me say three things in reply to this objection. For simplicity, I’ll only dis-
cuss the intratheoretic case. But what I say appliesmutatis mutandis to intertheo-
retic comparisons. First, a point of clarification. The prospect-explication doesn’t
entail that cardinal comparisons are grounded in value facts, or that it’s value
facts that explain these comparisons. It assumes that for a cardinal comparison to
hold just is for a certain value fact to be the case. It assumes an identity rather than
a grounding relation between comparisons and value facts. So to the extent that
one finds the alleged grounding relation objectionable, the worry simply misses
our explication.
Second, nothing in the prospect-explication implies that the value facts them-
selves must be fundamental, or not grounded in anything. They may well have
grounds. Suppose according to the true axiology, both natural beauty and well-
being have value, that prospect a leads to the destruction of some natural beauty
with a probability of 0.4, and to some benefits for Antonio with a probability of
0.6, and that prospect b represents the status quo:
Tab. 3.3: Example to illustrate prospect-explications.
a b
0.4 destruction of natural beauty status quo
0.6 benefits for Antonio status quo
75 This objection is made in MacAskill (2014, 146); it’s often raised against similar explications
in slightly different contexts (see e. g. Eriksson and Hájek 2007, 207).
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Now suppose that a and b are equally good. This fact needn’t be brute. It may have
grounds.What these arewill depend partly on the correctmetaethics. Perhaps the
fact that a and b are equally good is grounded (in the manner of something like a
divine command theory) in the fact that God would be indifferent between them.
Or perhaps it’s grounded (in a constructivist way) in the fact that the best sys-
tematisation of our axiological intuitions implies that a is equally as good as b.
Or perhaps this fact is simply grounded (in a realist manner) in the fact that a,
while having a good probability of leading to something mind-independently in-
trinsically valuable, also has a decent probability of destroying something mind-
independently intrinsically valuable. And so on.What the explication rules out is
only that our comparison is grounded in the cardinal fact that the value of bene-
fiting Antonio is 2/3 of the disvalue of destroying that natural beauty. And that’s,
again, because it assumes an identity relation between value relations and car-
dinal comparisons. Something similar holds for intertheoretic comparisons. The
prospect-explications don’t presuppose that the m-value facts are brute. It’s com-
patible with their having grounds, as long as these grounds aren’t themselves car-
dinal comparisons. To show that there are suchgrounds, orwhat they canbe,we’ll
have to address the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. But it’s important to
note that the explication itself is neutral on this.
Thirdly and most importantly, the objector’s claim that value facts are ex-
plained by cardinal value comparisons presupposes an independent cardinal no-
tion of value. So if her objection is to get off the ground, she needs an alterna-
tive understanding of cardinal value comparisons. And if my reply to the previous
objection is sound, this understanding is only to be had via some alternative ex-
plication. There are alternative explications. The objector could assume, say, that
value acquires its cardinal significance in the context ofweighing goods over time.
But presumably, all these explications will stipulate an identity where the objec-
tor wants to see a grounding relation. On the time-explication, say, the fact that
two value-differences coming at different times count the same in determining the
goodness of the history of the world isn’t explained by the fact that these differ-
ences are the same. Rather, for the former fact to hold just is for the latter to do
so. And to the objector’s ear this will presumably sound as objectionable as our
equivalent claim about prospects. So by her own lights, nothing is gainedwith the
move from one explication to the other. But this tu quoque-response doesn’t imply
that the entire project of getting a cardinal concept of value is doomed. It reveals
that the alleged order of explanation that the objector stipulates is deceptive. It’s
just not true that there are primitive cardinal comparison facts that ground value
facts concerning prospects or times.
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If all of this is right, there doesn’t seem to be anything wrong with the gen-
eral approach embodied in the prospect-explications.76 But there’s a final worry,
internal to this approach. It doesn’t challenge the very idea of explicating value
comparisons in terms ofm-value facts. But it suggests the specific explications I’ve
given still leave important questions unanswered. For one thing, even if they’re
viable as far as they go, they only explicate what precise comparisons mean. But
if it’s right that many plausible axiologies allow for intratheoretic incommensu-
rability, we also need an explication of what rough intratheoretic comparisons
mean. And if it’s right that many axiologies give rise to intertheoretic incom-
mensurability, we need an explication of what rough intertheoretic comparisons
mean. For another thing, these explications don’t yet tell us the meaning of axio-
logical probabilities. As indicated, these probabilities require explication as well.
And the problem of explicating probabilities isn’t separate from that of explicat-
ing comparisons. If we don’t take probabilities as primitives (as I’ve done), we
need to separate probabilities and values—or cases where an axiology has a low
probability but an inflated value function from cases where it has a high proba-
bility but a deflated value function. If we can’t get this separation, we ultimately
can’t get a viable explication of either probabilities or interthereotic comparisons.
So we have to refine these explications further.
I think these are important worries. They show that the Basic Representation
Theorem is still too simple. Itmust be extended to allow for an explication of prob-
abilities, and for one of incommensurabilities. I’ll turn to this in Chapters 5 and 6
respectively.
3.4 Conclusion: decision theory andm2-value
In sum, there are three issues we need to address to validate the argument from
the Basic Representation Theorem. First and most fundamentally, we need to
show that intertheoretic comparisons aren’t metaphysically dubious—that there
can be facts that ground such comparisons, or that such comparisons can hold.
76 Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2015) raised a specific objection related to the axiomatic approach. He
suggests that if we adopt the decision-theoretic explication of intratheoretic comparisons for our
orderings ⪰i, we’re forced to conclude that intertheoretic comparisons are impossible—because
the utility functions representing our theories will be unique only up to positive affine transfor-
mation, and so intertheoretic comparisons aren’t fixed. But that’s simply false. Nissan-Rozen is
right insofar as an ordering ⪰i in itself can’t provide the information for intertheoretic compar-
isons. But this doesn’t rule out the possibility that other facts could provide it—e. g., facts about
how this theory weighs against other theories under axiological uncertainty.
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This is to confirm that the m-value relation isn’t radically incomplete, and the
idea of EVM not fundamentally flawed. And it’s to underpin that the prospect-
explications don’t presuppose a dubious order of explanation, or fundamentality
of the m-value facts. Second, we need to provide a representation theorem that
doesn’t take axiological probabilities as primitives. This is to show that we can
explicate the equally problematic notion of quantitative probabilities, and sepa-
rate probabilities and values effectively. Third, we need to devise a representation
theorem without the Completeness axiom, either at the level of ⪰i or ⪰m. That’s
to allow for axiologies that feature some intratheoretic incommensurability, and
for axiologies that yield some intertheoretic incommensurability. And it’s to ex-
tend our definitions to explicate rough comparisons too. In the remainder of the
book—Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively—I’ll address these three issues in turn.
To end this chapter, let me note two negative upshots of our discussion for the
project of extending EVMbeyond a theory of uncertainty about vNM-conformable
axiologies. Both of them follow from the fact that if one of our axiologies isn’t
vNM-conformable, our m-value facts arguably aren’t vNM-conformable either—
or more generally, from the fact that if one of our normative assumptions isn’t
vNM-conformable, the meta-facts about what you ought to do under uncertainty
about it arguably aren’t so either. First, this has an implication for how plausible
the axioms are as axioms of decision theory, or the theory of rational preferences.
If m-value isn’t generally vNM-conformable, but is so only when restricted to
vNM-conformable axiologies, then your preferences arguably needn’t be gener-
ally vNM-conformable either. You can care about m-value in your preferences.
So the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms aren’t fully general constraints on
your preferences. Indeed, I suggested that it’s reasonable to have nonzero cre-
dences in some non-vNM-conformable axiologies. So it’s reasonable to violate
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms in your preferences. We can generalise
this gloomy upshot beyond axiological uncertainty. Any uncertainty about the
axioms at the level of first-order value or preferences implies that they’re false
as general, or higher-order constraints on decision-making in the face of uncer-
tainty. Their mere doubtfulness implies their strict falsity. This may be the most
straightforward way to criticise the axioms of decision theory. It’s enough to show
we can’t be certain about them. And this seems almost indisputable.77
Second, the abovementioned fact has an implication for how general the ax-
iomatic argument for EVM can be. As mentioned in Chapter 1, we might not be
77 For an interesting general exploration of ‘uncertain preferences’ (though not of the specific
problem I mention), see e. g. Schulz (2020).
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certain about the true theory of axiological uncertainty. So we might need a the-
ory of uncertainty about theories of axiological uncertainty—a theory ofm2-value,
and so on. Now one might think if EVM is a plausible theory of m-value, it’s also
a plausible theory ofm2-value. And one might think the axiomatic argument I’ve
provided for EVMas a theory ofm-value can straightforwardly be extended toEVM
as a theory of m2-value—using theories of axiological uncertainty instead of axi-
ologies, and them2-value relation instead of the m-value relation. Unfortunately,
however, this is true only to a very restricted extent. TheBasic RepresentationThe-
orem presupposes that all first-order theories are vNM-conformable. And it shows
that in this case EVM is the only meta-theory that’s vNM-conformable and satis-
fies thePareto Condition. Accordingly, on the level ofm2-value, a similar argument
will presuppose that all theories of m-value are vNM-conformable. But as the the-
orem itself shows, apart from theories that violate the Pareto Condition, EVM is
the only theory of this kind. And we saw that the Pareto Condition is very plau-
sible. So the set of theories of m-value that are vNM-conformable but violate the
Pareto Condition is not a very interesting set. The more interesting set of theories
are those that aren’t vNM-conformable. And to those the argument doesn’t apply.
It follows that my argument, applied tom2-value instead of m-value, is extremely
severely limited. More generally, we can’t simply assume that the same kind of ar-
gument will in principle be available, and of the same importance, on each level
of value. If representation theorems are as important as I’m arguing in this book—
not only in defending, but in evendefining our views—thenhigher-order problems
of uncertainty may be even more serious than it might have seemed. We may not
even be able, in any interesting sense, to define our views of uncertainty about
theories of axiological uncertainty.
4 The problem of intertheoretic comparisons
Let’s start to address the issues that our argument fromChapter 2 raised. Themost
important such issue was the problem of intertheoretic comparisons—the ques-
tion whether value can be compared across axiologies. Many people are sceptical
about this. EdwardGracely considers a formof person-affectingutilitarianismand
total utilitarianism. He asks:
is a small loss of utility as seen by a [person-affecting utilitarian] more or less important
under that theory than a large loss of utility (involving lives not created) under total utilitar-
ianism? I don’t quite see how this question could be answered. (I’ll refrain from saying that it
is like comparing apples andoranges, but it is!) [...] There is no abstract scale of “wrongness”
outside of the rank provided within a theory. (1996, 331)
Similarly, John Broome is concerned with the fact that total and average utilitar-
ianism have different ‘units of value’ (2012, 185): wellbeing, and wellbeing per
person respectively. He says:
We cannot take a sensible average of some amount of well-being and some amount of well-
being per person. It would be like trying to take an average of a distance, whose unit is kilo-
metres, and a speed, whose unit is kilometres per hour. Most theories of value will be in-
comparable in this way. (2012, 185)
And in a similar vein, James Hudson imagines a person who has some credence
in the pleasure-theory (its units being ‘hedons’) and in the self-realization-theory
(its units being ‘reals’). He argues:
What is the commonmeasure between hedons and reals? Note that the agent, for all her un-
certainty, believes with complete confidence that there’s no common measure: she is sure
that one or the other—pleasure or self-realization—is intrinsically worthless. Under the cir-
cumstances, the two units must be incomparable by the agent, and so there can be no way
for her uncertainty to be taken into account in a reasonable decision procedure. (1989, 224)
Other people have expressed similar doubts.78 In this chapter, I’ll address these
sceptics.
Let’s recapitulate what the problem of intertheoretic comparisons is. In Chap-
ter 1, I defined ordinal and cardinal intertheoretic comparisons respectively as
facts of the form
78 See Gustafsson and Torpman (2014) or Hedden (2016).
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(C) the value-difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology Ti, is
greater than the value-difference between outcomes z and t, according to ax-
iology Tj; and
(D) the value-difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology Ti, is n
times as great as the value-difference between outcomes z and t, according to
axiology Tj.
Formost ofwhat I’ll say in this chapter, the difference between these kinds of facts
doesn’tmatter. So to have a general term, let an intertheoretic comparison be a fact
of either form. The problem of intertheoretic comparisons comprises three ques-
tions about these facts. First, there’s a question about themeaning or criterion of
identification of intertheoretic comparisons: what is it—or what would it be—for
an intertheoretic comparison to hold? I’ve emphasised that this is unclear, both
with respect to cardinal and ordinal comparisons. We might understand what it
is for the value of a certain increase in wellbeing to be greater than the value
of a certain increase in beauty, according to a welfare/beauty-theory. But unless
more is said, it seems unclear what such comparisons across theories amount to.
Yet suppose we know what it would be for intertheoretic comparisons to hold.
There’s then a second, object-level question about the actual intertheoretic com-
parison facts: do any intertheoretic comparisons hold; and if so, which of them
do? Is the value of enjoying a bottle of Château Mouton Rothschild, according to
a welfare-theory, say, as great as the value of a certain Paul Klee sketch, accord-
ing to a beauty-theory—or as great as the value of a mediocre child painting, or of
Leonardo’s Lady with an Ermine? It seems unclear which such comparisons hold,
or indeed whether any of them do. Yet suppose we know that some intertheoretic
comparisons do hold, perhaps in some simple cases. There’s then a third question
about the grounds of these facts: what is it that grounds intertheoretic compar-
isons? It seems that axiologies themselves don’t say how valuable certain things
would be if certain other theories were true. So one might wonder what the basis
of such comparisons can be.79
The sceptical challenge is to answer all of these questions. I’ve given an an-
swer to the first question. I’ve provided an explication about what it would be for
intertheoretic comparisons to hold. For such facts to holdwould just be for certain
m-value facts to be the case.We arguably understandwhat it is form-value facts to
be the case. And as the Basic Representation Theorem shows, given certain con-
ditions, we can explicate cardinal comparisons in this manner. So this provides
an answer to the question about meaning or identification.
79 I thank Adam Lovett for helping me see these three questions.
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However, for one thing, there are other accounts of intertheoretic compar-
isons. So beforewe can know that the prospect-explication provides the best reply
to the question about what it is for intertheoretic comparisons to hold, we need to
discuss these proposals. For another thing, even if the explication provides a suf-
ficient answer to this particular question, the worries about truth and grounding
still remain. They now simply arise for the m-value facts. A sceptic might agree
that comparisons between the welfare- and the beauty-theory could in principle
be understood in terms of m-value facts. But are there any nontrivial facts about
which prospects are m-better than which in light of uncertainty about these theo-
ries? Or is them-value relation radically incomplete, and a is at least asm-good as
b only in the trivial case when it’s at least as good on all axiologies with nonzero
probability? And if there are nontrivialm-value facts,what are they? If there are no
m-value facts, then no intertheoretic comparisons actually hold. And if we don’t
knowwhichm-value facts hold, we don’t knowwhich intertheoretic comparisons
do. So the prospect-explication only defers the questions about the truth of in-
tertheoretic comparisons. Similarly, a sceptic might even concede that some m-
value facts seem plausible. But what is it that grounds them? If we don’t know
what grounds them-value facts, we don’t knowwhat ultimately grounds interthe-
oretic comparisons. The prospect-explication only defers the questions about the
grounds of such comparisons. In order to have a more complete reply to scepti-
cism, wemust saymore than the simple explication of such comparisons in terms
of m-value facts.
So in the remainder of the chapter, I’ll first discuss existing accounts of in-
tertheoretic comparisons (Section 4.1). I’ll argue that they’re all unsatisfactory in
one way or another, and that this corroborates the importance of the prospect-
explication as an account of the meaning of intertheoretic comparisons. I then
provide aminimal argument for the truth of some such comparisons (Section 4.2).
This argument doesn’t tell us which intertheoretic comparisons hold, or why they
do. But if sound, it establishes that at least some such comparisons are true. I’ll
then introduce a novel account about what grounds these truths: constructivism
about intertheoretic comparisons (Section 4.3). I argue that this view provides a
compelling answer to the truth and grounding problems, or more generally to
scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons. I’ll end the chapter by discussing
the implications of constructivism for the framework of this book (Section 4.4).
4.1 Existing proposals
Here are some existing proposals about intertheoretic comparisons. These ac-
counts weren’t explicitly proposed as theories of how axiologies compare. They
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were intended to account for comparisons between moral theories generally. But
we can apply them to axiologies.
Subjectivism
Consider first a proposal that may seem particularly congenial to the decision-
theoretic approach of this book.Wemay call it ‘subjectivism’. According to subjec-
tivism, there are no objective facts about which prospects arem-better thanwhich
when you’re axiologically uncertain. Rather, it all depends on you. Youmust have
beliefs not only about the plausibility of axiological orderings, but also about the
possible relative sizes of value-differences. You might have credence in the view
that the pleasure-theory is true and that pleasure is comparatively valuable—i. e.,
that you ought to give a lot of weight to the pleasure- vis-à-vis the beauty-theory
under uncertainty. Or you might have credence in the view that the pleasure-
theory is true and that pleasure is of comparatively little value—i. e., that you
ought to give little weight to the pleasure- vis-à-vis the beauty-theory. We might
say you must believe in one or another version of the pleasure-theory, relative
to the beauty-theory. If you have no such beliefs, there are no facts about which
of your prospects are m-best relative to your state of uncertainty. And if you have
such beliefs, these beliefswill ground yourm-value facts. For example, if youhave
credence in the view that the pleasure-theory is true and that pleasure is compara-
tively valuable, then you ought to give the pleasure-theory a lot of weight vis-à-vis
the beauty-theory in light of your uncertainty. Sowhichof your prospects ism-best
depends, radically, on which prospects you believe are m-best. If I understand
her correctly, this is roughly the line that Amelia Hicks (2018) is taking. She says:
‘there’s no meaningful way of determining the “expected moral value” of an ac-
tion. [...] However, [...] the decision-maker can still ordinally rank lotteries [...] and
can assign utilities to the possible outcomes of their choice. It’s those utilities—not
the evaluations of actions provided by the competing moral theories—that deter-
mine which action has the highest expected utility for the decision-maker.’ (2018,
172) As far as I see, she understands the utilities ‘assigned [...] by the decision-
maker’ as thoroughly subjective.
What’s nice about subjectivism is that it parallels a standard, Humean in-
terpretation of decision theory. A standard assumption in decision theory is that
there are no substantive constraints on your preferences. Youmay prefer apples to
oranges, pushpin to poetry, the destruction of the world to the scratching of your
finger. Your preferences are fully rational as long as they satisfy the axioms. And
plausibly, there’s something to some extent parallel to this in the theory of axio-
logical uncertainty. When we ask which of your prospects is ‘m-best’, we might
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be interested in (at least) two things. We might ask how you ought to evaluate
your prospects given the credences your evidence warrants, and the intertheo-
retic comparisons that are in fact correct. Thus understood, EVM would figure as
a substantive constraint on what credences you ought to have in which theories,
howyouought to compare them, andhowyouought to evaluate your prospects on
the basis of these credences and comparisons. However, we might also ask how
you ought to evaluate your prospects given the credences you happen to have,
and the intertheoretic comparisons you personally make. Thus understood, EVM
would be something like a coherence constraint on you. Both of these questions
are interesting in distinct ways, as I’ll elaborate in the next chapter.
What matters for now is that subjectivism can’t be the whole story about in-
tertheoretic comparisons. We may be interested in your beliefs about such com-
parisons. But there must also be an objectivist story about which of these beliefs
are correct, or which comparisons actually hold. Most fundamentally, if there are
no objective standards to distinguish reasonable m-value beliefs from unreason-
able ones, we arguably can’t speak of ‘beliefs’ in the first place. Belief presup-
poses a standard of correctness. So if subjectivism is the whole story, this reduces
the question of intertheoretic comparisons to something like arational personal
preference. The fact of an intertheoretic comparison holding between your the-
ories would be a merely psychological fact about you. This would imply that if
you have no such preference, the theory of axiological uncertainty can’t possibly
be action-guiding for you. And it would also imply that you could permissibly as-
sume out of pure caprice that the value of pleasurewould be 113.27 times greater if
beauty also had value (i. e., that if you have 50%credence in the pleasure- and the
pleasure/beauty-theories, you ought to ‘judge’ it equally m-good to bring about a
certain pleasure while the pluralist theory is true and to bring about 113.27 plea-
sures of the same sort while the monistic theory is true). Indeed, it would mean
that whenever you can permissibly have some nonzero credence in a theory on
which one of your prospects is best, there’s no basis for criticising you if you co-
herently ‘judge’ it to be m-best in light of your uncertainty. If you may have some
nonzero credence in the Nietzschean view that you’re an Übermensch for whom
it’s best to do what they please, there are no grounds for criticising your coher-
ent ‘judgment’ that it’s m-best for you to do what you please. But these are surely
unfortunate results. Wemay ultimately be interested in your subjective credences
and comparisons, and in whether you satisfy coherence constraints given them.
But to assume that there aren’t any objective criteria for evaluating your credences
and comparisons seems very unsatisfying.We need a ground for saying that some
intertheoretic comparisons are more reasonable than others.
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Structural accounts
Sowhat objective criteria can there be for rendering some of your beliefs about in-
tertheoretic comparisons plausible or true, and others implausible or false? Con-
sider ‘structural accounts’. According to these proposals, intertheoretic compar-
isons are grounded in general principles of rationality about how to normalize
axiologies for evaluating prospects under axiological uncertainty. And these prin-
ciples take into account only structural features of the theories—i. e., features of
the theories’ (ordinal or cardinal) betterness-ranking. Various principles of this
kind have been proposed. For instance, Ted Lockhart (2000, 84) suggested the
‘Principle of Equity among Moral Theories’, according to which, in every choice-
situation, the value-difference between the best and the worst prospect should be
considered equally large according to all theories. Andrew Sepielli (2013a, 588)
discussed (but didn’t endorse) a variation of this principle, according to which
the difference between the best and theworst conceivable prospect should be con-
sidered equally large according to all theories. Will MacAskill (2014, 89 ff.; also
MacAskill et al. 2020a, ch. 4) suggested that the varianceof theories shouldbe con-
sidered equal, where the variance of a theory is a measure of how value is spread
out over different prospects—viz., the average of the squared value-differences
from the mean value of prospects. And infinitely many other structural propos-
als can be imagined beyond these.
If a structural comparison principle holds, your beliefs about intertheoretic
comparisons can be false. They’re false if they contradict the relevant principle.
What’s nice about these accounts is that they’re metaphysically parsimonious.
They ground intertheoretic comparisons fully in principles of rationality, and
don’t assume that there’s an antecedent fact of the matter about how axiologies
compare. Certainly, all of the above proposals have their specific problems. A
problem of Lockhart’s principle is that in making comparisons relative to choice-
situations, it can rank a prospect as best even if it’s worse than some available al-
ternative on every axiology inwhich you have credence.80 Aproblem for Sepielli’s
proposal (as he notes) is that onmany axiologies there are no best and worst con-
ceivable prospects. And variance-normalisation faces some technical challenges
in order to be well-defined.81 So it remains to be seen what the most plausible
principle would be.
80 See Sepielli (2013a).
81 See e. g. MacAskill (2014, 104, fn. 94) for an indication of a challenge, and MacAskill (2014,
76 ff.) or MacAskill et al. (2020b) for a suggestion about how to address it.
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However, these accounts also face a general problem (at least if they’re un-
derstood as fully general accounts of intertheoretic comparisons82). Insofar as
we have intuitions about intertheoretic comparisons, they’re sensitive to the con-
tent of axiologies. Suppose you’re certain that pleasure has value, but uncertain
whether beauty also has value, and that this is the only axiological uncertainty
you have. We can then describe you as being uncertain between two axiologies,
a monistic pleasure-theory and a pluralist pleasure/beauty-theory. Intuitively, it
seems reasonable to compare your two theories in such a way that the value of
pleasure is the same on both theories. After all, you’re not uncertain about that
value. You’re only uncertain about the additional value of beauty. Purely struc-
turalist accounts can’t capture this content-based intuition. More specifically, the
guiding idea of standard structural principles is that the axiological stakes should
somehow be considered equal according to all theories. But insofar as we have
intuitions about intertheoretic comparisons, it seems the stakes may be higher
on some theories than on others. For instance, it seems that if both pleasure and
beauty have value, the axiological stakes (overall, or in some choice-situations)
are higher than if only pleasure has value. Again, purely structuralist accounts
can’t capture this intuition.83 So the cost of their parsimony, it seems, is that they
have implausible implications. Other things equal, we should prefer accounts on
which intertheoretic comparisons are content-sensitive.
Metaphysical accounts
A range of accounts that are content-sensitive is what I’ll call ‘metaphysical ac-
counts’. On these accounts, intertheoretic comparisons are not grounded in any
facts about axiologically uncertain agents—i. e., in criteria of rationality for eval-
uation under uncertainty, or in epistemic principles, or actual beliefs of such
agents. Rather, they’re grounded in facts about values themselves, and are in this
sense ‘metaphysical facts’ out there. The most explicit such account has been de-
fended by Christian Tarsney (2017; 2018a). So let me consider his version. Tarsney
starts from the comparison between the pleasure- and the pleasure/beauty-theory
82 MacAskill (2014) andMacAskill et al. (2020a) understand variance normalisation as applying
only to a restricted class of theories, and hold that there are other grounds for intertheoretic com-
parisons besides this structural principle. I’ll discuss such a hybrid approach in the context of
‘metaphysical accounts’ below. For now I’m considering whether structural accounts are plausi-
ble as general accounts of intertheoretic comparisons.
83 The same has been argued by MacAskill (2014, 134 ff.).
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I’ve just considered. To account for the intuitive intertheoretic comparisons be-
tween these theories, he suggests there are facts like
Value-Independence: the degree of value borne by a given unit of hedonic ex-
perience is independent of whether aesthetic goods are non-derivative value-
bearers. (2017, 312)
Put more simply, Value-Independence says that the value of pleasure is indepen-
dent of whether beauty also has value. Tarsney understands this as holding inde-
pendently of any facts about morally uncertain agents. As he understands it, it’s
a fact about value, quite like the fact that pleasure is valuable (if this is a fact). It’s
simply a counterfactual axiological fact, about how valuable pleasure would be if
beauty also had value.84 I’ll call a statement of this kind a value-counterfactual.
If such counterfactuals hold, they straightforwardly ground intertheoretic
comparisons, and can thus render your beliefs about such comparisons false.
This proposal can also straightforwardly account for our content-based intu-
itions. Value-Independence implies that the value of pleasure is the same on
the pleasure- and the pleasure/beauty-theories. However, Tarsney’s proposal
also faces problems. To begin with, it seems unclear what value-counterfactuals
should mean. Suppose the pleasure-theory is correct. What should it mean, say,
that if beauty had value, the value of pleasure would be less than it actually is?
And what should it mean, for that matter, that if beauty had value, the value of
pleasure would still be exactly the same? Intuitively, we don’t understand these
counterfactual claims unless some further explication is given for them. And
that’s especially true concerning cardinal intertheoretic comparisons. We cer-
tainly have no unmediated understanding of the claim that if beauty had value,
the value of pleasure would be half as great as it actually is, say. So it seems that
the sceptical challenge of explaining what intertheoretic comparisons amount
to really still remains—or has now simply been pushed back to the facts that
allegedly ground them.
But suppose we have a sufficient intuitive grasp, or some helpful explication,
of what statements like Value-Independence mean. There are then still worries
about the object-level facts and their grounds. It’s controversial that the universe
contains anymind-independent axiological facts. But it seems quite an ontologi-
cal burden to assume it should contain such counterfactuals. Suppose again that
the pleasure-theory is true. Why should there be any fact of the matter about how
the values implied by a false axiology compare to actual values? Why should the
fabric of the universe contain not just standard axiological facts, but also counter-
84 See Tarsney (2017, 338 ff.).
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factuals about how valuable certain things would be if they were valuable—when
in fact they aren’t?
Tarsney gives an argument for the case of Value-Independence. He points out
that even in expectational reasoning under purely descriptive uncertainty, we’re
commonly assuming that the value of certain facts is independent of certain other
facts. To use his own example (2017, 314): suppose you can press a button, and are
uncertain about whether doing so will save five people or kill ten, but certain that
the only valuable thing is pleasure. If you decide not to press this button, this will
be because you assume the value of pleasure doesn’t depend on whether the but-
ton saves five or kills ten. You’ll assume something like ‘the value of pleasure is
independent of whether the buttonwill save five or kill ten’. And this latter propo-
sition seems true. And Tarsney says ‘there’s no reason to expect that whatever
story we tell about the truth of these propositions [in the context of purely de-
scriptive uncertainty] will not extend straightforwardly’ to value-counterfactuals
(2017, 338). However, there is a story about these propositions that doesn’t extend
to value-counterfactuals. It’s a standard story about value. Suppose the pleasure-
theory is true, and that the value of an instance of pleasure depends only on its
intensity and duration. And suppose these are necessary truths. Then the value of
pleasurewill be the same in all worlds inwhich the buttonwill save five or kill ten.
So the propositions relevant for empirical uncertainty can simply be grounded in
standard first-order axiological facts. But this story doesn’t even begin to explain
why the value of pleasure would be equally strong in worlds in which beauty also
had value. This is simply a different type of fact, which requires a different story
about grounding.85
But let’s even grant the truth of some value-counterfactuals like Value-
Independence—counterfactuals to the effect that the value of certain things
wouldn’t change if other things beyond themwere valuable too. These are only the
simplest counterfactuals, grounding comparisons between theories that share a
common range of values, like our monistic and pluralist views. The existence of
counterfactuals seems less and less plausible in more complex cases, or for axi-
ologies that are more distinct. Take the comparison between the pleasure-theory,
and a quasi-deontological theory on which there’s value and disvalue only in
85 Tarsney might counter that there must be something that grounds the first-order axiological
fact that the valueof a certain instanceof pleasuredependsonlyon its intensity andduration, and
that thiswill in turn also ground the value-counterfactual. But this needn’t be so. This fact about
pleasuremight be a fundamental factwith no further grounds. Or itmight be ultimately grounded
in a fact that doesn’t also ground value-counterfactuals—such as the fact that all sentient beings
are morally equal. Again, objective mind-independent value-counterfactuals are a peculiar kind
of fact, and require a distinct story about grounding.
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the following and contradicting of deontological reasons respectively—value in
promises being kept or acts of beneficence being done, and disvalue in killings
and robberies and lies. Suppose the pleasure-theory is correct. And consider a
fact like ‘if the quasi-deontological theory was true, the disvalue of breaking this
promisewould be as great as the actual disvalue of 25 hangnails’. The assumption
that the world is populated by suchmore complexmind-independent counterfac-
tuals quite definitely comes at considerable cost. And unless we have a positive
story about what could ground them, or why we should assume them, we’re now
basically just asserting what the sceptics deny.
Tarsney acknowledges this last difficulty. He defends his metaphysical ac-
count only for theories with ‘common content’ (2018a, 327) or ‘shared assump-
tions’ (2018a, 332). So he concedes that ‘comparability classes of normative theo-
ries may turn out to be few, small, and far between’ (2018a, 336). But if this is the
most we can hope for in terms of value-counterfactuals, metaphysical accounts
are at best rather weak. They only explain intertheoretic comparisons for a rela-
tively small subset of theories. To remedy this shortcoming, proponents of such
an account might combine their approach with other methods of comparisons
or alternative theories of uncertainty. They might hold that where metaphysical
grounds are lacking, you ought to use a structural normalisation principle, or that
in such cases you simply ought to evaluate your prospects in accordancewith your
favourite theory.86 But these extensions seemadhoc. Suppose some intertheoretic
comparisons are grounded in value-counterfactuals. Then, when no such coun-
terfactuals hold, the theories are in an important sense incomparable. And this
should arguably mean that no nontrivial m-value facts hold between prospects
involving these theories. Why should we ignore this fundamental incomparabil-
ity, and compare the theories through some convenient normalisation principle
in decision-making? Or why should EVM then fail to apply, andMy Favourite The-
ory suddenly come to be correct? Such claims don’t seem to have any independent
plausibility. They seem ad hoc manoeuvres, just designed to avoid the resulting
widespread incommensurabilities suggested by metaphysical accounts of com-
parisons. Other things equal, we should prefer an account that delivers interthe-
oretic comparisons for a broader range of theories.
Absolutist accounts
Here’s a fourth approach. I’ll refer to proposals of this kind as ‘absolutist ac-
counts’. On these accounts, axiologies make statements about the absolute sizes
86 See Tarsney (2017, 338 ff.) or MacAskill et al. (2020a).
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of value-differences or heights of value-levels, and intertheoretic comparisons are
grounded in these claims. Themost prominent version of this idea employs fitting
attitudes. On this proposal, there’s an attitude or set of attitudes such that the
fact that x is better than ymeans it’s fitting to have these attitudes. For instance, it
might mean it’s fitting to be disappointed if you chose y. Furthermore, these atti-
tudes come in degrees, and the greater the value-difference between x and y, the
stronger the attitudes that are fitting. A complete axiology must tell us not only
which prospects are better than which, but also what absolute degrees of such
attitudes are fitting. So it must tell you not only that x is better than y, say, but also
whether you ought to be slightly, or quite, or extremely disappointed, if you chose
y. Consequently, there are infinitely many versions of any axiological ordering.
There’s the Keyed Up Pleasure-Theory, say, according to which only pleasure is
valuable, and you ought to be extremely disappointed if youmade someone suffer
a hangnail. And there’s the Calmed Down Pleasure-Theory, according to which
only pleasure is valuable, but you ought to be only mildly disenchanted if you
causedmasses of people to be tortured. In this sense, axiologies make statements
about the absolute sizes of value-differences or heights of value-levels. This has
been suggested by Jacob Ross, who said: ‘The scale of a value function can mat-
ter [...] quite apart from issues raised by evaluative uncertainty. [...] Two linearly
evaluative theories can disagree [...] concerning the degree of disappointment
that is warranted.’ (2006, 765)87 If all of this is true, intertheoretic comparisons
can be grounded in axiologies’ claims about attitudes. So for it to be the case
that the value-difference between x and y, according to Ti, is greater than the
value-difference between z and t, according to Tj, is for the attitude it would be
fitting to have towards x and y if Ti is true to be stronger than the attitude it would
be fitting to have towards z and t if Tj is true. And whether or not this is so will
depend on the theories we consider.
If absolutism is true, your m-value judgments can also be unreasonable.
They’re unreasonable if you have credences in implausible versions of axiologies.
Moreover, absolutism might be able to ground a cardinal concept of value. As
mentioned in Section 3.3 (on page 49), if X is rich enough, an ordinal ranking of
value-differences among outcomes in X is enough to determine a utility function
unique up to positive affine transformation representing that ordering.88 So sup-
pose our set of outcomes X is relevantly rich. And suppose we understand what it
is for one attitude about the value-difference between x and y to be stronger than
87 Sepielli (2010, 181 ff.) discusses a related view.
88 See e. g. footnote 73.
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another about the difference between z and t, for all outcomes in X. Then these
rankings of attitudes imply a cardinal concept of value.
What’s nice about absolutism is that it doesn’t presuppose any extra facts,
like value-counterfactuals, beyond the facts implied by our theories. It’s facts im-
plied by the axiologies themselves that ground comparisons. However, the ac-
count faces problems as well. To begin with, there’s a general question about
whether fitting attitude accounts of value are plausible—or whether it’s plausi-
ble that for x to be better than y just is for a certain attitude to be fitting. There are
worries about this. For instance, there’s the ‘wrongkinds of reasons’ problem—the
problemof demarcating the facts that render an attitude fitting from facts that per-
haps speak in favour of having it, but don’t render it fitting (such as amillionaire’s
offering you £100 for being pleased about a cup of mud).89 There’s the ‘circularity
problem’—the problem of finding a relevant set of attitudes that are indeed fitting
to have towardswhat’s valuable, and that aren’t themselves evaluative judgments
(on pain of circularity).90 And there’s what we may call the ‘fetishism problem’—
the worry that normative ethics and value theory should primarily be about what
we ought to do, rather than about when we ought to be saddened or pleased, as
thefitting attitude account suggests.91 The jury is still openonwhether these prob-
lems can be solved.
But even if a fitting attitude account of value is plausible in general, there’s a
specific problem with the absolutist proposal, I think. To me at least, the core ab-
solutist assumption seems dubious. There don’t seem to be any facts about fitting
absolute degrees of attitudes. If you’re certain that the pleasure-theory provides
the correct ordering, say, it seems meaningless to wonder whether everything is
(linearly) more, or less, valuable than you thought, or whether it would be fit-
ting for you to care (proportionally) more, or less, about everything. Suppose one
person has Keyed Up Pleasure-Theory-attitudes and another has Calmed Down
Pleasure-Theory-attitudes. They agree on all the kinds and relative strengths of
attitudes. So whenever one of them is disappointed about x rather than y happen-
ing, then so is the other, and whenever one of them is five times as disappointed
about this than about z rather than t happening, so is the other. But all of the first
person’s attitudes are stronger in absolute terms. On the absolutist proposal, at
least one of themmust bemaking amistake, andmisjudge the value of everything.
But this seems implausible to me. It seems that the first person is more emotional
than the second. And that’s that.
89 This example is due to Crisp (2000, 459); see also D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).
90 See Bykvist (2009a) for this objection.
91 John Broome raised this objection in conversation.
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This isn’t to say people’s attitudes aren’t criticisable. Usually, if you’re devas-
tated about someone’s suffering a hangnail or feel only a slight disenchantment
about an earthquakewith 100’000 casualties, your attitudes are unfitting. But this
is only because you’ll usually have other attitudes that show you’re getting the ax-
iological ranking of outcomes wrong—considering a hangnail as on a par with a
death, or a huge earthquake as on a par with a mosquito bite. If you had one of
these attitudes, but had proportionally strong or weak attitudes about everything
else, you wouldn’t be misjudging anything. You’d be an exceptionally impassion-
ate or equanimous person. And since your life might be better if you cooled down
or warmed up, you might have prudential reasons to work on your mental states.
But you wouldn’t be getting any fact wrong. Or so it seems to me.92
4.2 The Minimal Argument
In short, none of these existing proposals seems to offer a convincing general an-
swer to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons—or the questions about what
intertheoretic comparisons mean, whether any of them are true or which of them
are, and what grounds them.93 So let’s turn back to the prospect-explication.
Again, the prospect-explication (unlike arguably metaphysical accounts) pro-
vides a satisfying answer to the question of what it would be for an intertheoretic
comparison to hold. But it doesn’t yet tell us whether any such comparisons do in
fact hold or which of them do, or what grounds them. So much of the challenge
still remains: are there any nontrivial facts to the effect that some prospects are
m-better than others? And what could ground these facts? I’ll start with the first
question (about truth) in the present section, and will turn to the second (about
grounding) in the next.
Are there any nontrivial m-value facts? There’s an analogue in social choice
theory to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons—the problem of interper-
sonal comparisons of wellbeing. That’s the question whether, or how, the well-
being of one person compares to that of another. It’s not a trivial question what
the basis for such comparisons is, or what precisely they mean. But it’s helpful to
begin discussions in social choice theory with the observation that in everyday
life we frequently make such comparisons. We say that healthy Silva is better off
than sick Alba, that our money would benefit the latter more than the former, and
92 For a more thorough defence of this, and a more detailed exploration of the importance of
things and of the limitations you face and the liberties you enjoy in adopting fitting attitudes
towards everything, see e. g. Lovett and Riedener (2019).
93 For a further existing proposal, see e. g. Carr (forthcoming).
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so on. And in everyday contexts, such claims seem perfectly unproblematic.94
This doesn’t prove that interpersonal comparisons are possible, nor does it tell us
which comparisons hold, orwhat their basis is. But it strongly suggests something
has gone awry if we deny their possibility altogether. It’s helpful to begin a discus-
sion of intertheoretic comparisons with a similar observation. It’s very plausible
that some nontrivial m-value facts, and intertheoretic comparisons, hold. Let’s
spell this out more precisely.
I’ve argued in the last chapter that (given our axiologies are vNM-con-
formable) m-value plausibly satisfies Transitivity, Independence and the Pareto
Condition. I mentioned that Continuity is false if some axiologies compare in a
lexical way. But if there are such axiologies, then intertheoretic comparisons are
in any case possible. And barring such axiologies, Continuity seemed plausible
too. So for present purposes, let’s assume that the m-value facts satisfy Transitiv-
ity, Independence, Continuity and the Pareto Condition. If they do, we can give
theMinimal Argument:
(O) The m-value facts aren’t radically incomplete;
(P) if the m-value facts aren’t radically incomplete (and satisfy Transitivity, Inde-
pendence, Continuity and the Pareto Condition), some intertheoretic compar-
isons hold; therefore
(Q) some intertheoretic comparisons hold.
Here’s what I mean by this. Say that two prospects a and b in Q are in the same
possibility-space if they assign non-zero probability to the same axiologies, i. e., if
for all i in I, a is inQi if and only if b is inQi. And say that a binary relation ⪰ on
Q is radically incomplete if for all a and b in the same possibility space,
a ⪰ b only if Hi(a) ⪰i Hi(b) for all i in I with a and b inQi. (4.1)
Intuitively, if the m-value relation is radically incomplete, then whenever there’s
one theory with nonzero probability according to which b is better than a, a isn’t
at least as m-good as b. (O) says this is not so. It says that sometimes a prospect
a is at least as m-good as another prospect b even if, according to some axiology
with nonzero probability, it’s worse.
This is very plausible. First of all, it simply seems highly intuitive. Take a
standard welfare-theory, and a human-welfare-theory, according to which one
prospect is better than another if and only if it leads to more human wellbeing,
while the wellbeing of non-human animals is irrelevant. Suppose the anthro-
pocentrism of the latter theory makes it very implausible, or that these theories
94 This is observed e. g. by List (2003, 229).
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have probabilities of 99% and 1% respectively. And consider two prospects that
differ in terms of the welfare of a million non-human mammals and one human
being:
a all the non-human mammals live very long, happy and painless lives but the
person suffers from a hangnail; and
b all the non-humanmammals live very long lives full of torture and agony, but
the person doesn’t suffer from the hangnail (and lives otherwise as in a).95
The welfare-theory says that a is better than b; the human-welfare-theory says
the opposite. Intuitively, a is clearly m-better than b. If you faced these options,
under the abovementioned state of uncertainty, surely you’d judge it m-better to
choose a in light of your uncertainty. But if a is m-better than b, that’s enough
to establish that the m-value facts aren’t radically incomplete. Similar intuitions
hold also for less closely related views. Take the pleasure-theory and the beauty-
theory. Suppose the aestheticism of the latter makes it very implausible, or that
these theories have probabilities of 99% and 1% respectively. Now consider two
prospects that differ in terms of the welfare of a million human beings and the
existence of a little Paul Klee sketch:
c all the people live very long, happy and painless lives but the Klee sketch is
destroyed; and
d all the people live very long lives full of torture and agony, but the sketch isn’t
destroyed.
The pleasure-theory says that c is better than d; the beauty-theory says the oppo-
site. Again, intuitively c is clearly m-better than d. Denying (O), or holding that
even in such extreme cases no positive m-value fact holds, seems very counterin-
tuitive.
But it’s not just that. Accepting radical incompleteness would arguably in-
volve a considerable theoretical cost. In Chapter 1 I’ve argued thatm-value is prac-
tically very important. Basically all of our decisions are decisions in the face of
axiological uncertainty. If according to the correct theory of m-value, the m-value
facts are radically incomplete, this suggests that in few of our decisions it’s bet-
ter to do one thing rather than another in light of our uncertainty. Denying (O)
amounts to a very radical normative or evaluative scepticism in practice. Conse-
quently, it’s in fact something that even many sceptics want to avoid. Few scep-
tics simply concede that them-value relation is radically incomplete. Instead, they
95 I thank William MacAskill for suggesting this example to me.
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generally endorse alternative theories ofm-value that satisfy Completeness—such
as My Favourite Theory.96 A denial of (O) seemed unattractive even to sceptics.
What these sceptics may want to deny is (P). The general idea behind this
premise is that intertheoretic incomparability should give rise to incomplete-
ness in the m-value relation. The just-mentioned sceptics deny this. They think
that if no intertheoretic comparisons hold, the m-value relation might still be
complete—e. g. as according to My Favourite Theory. This inference from scepti-
cism toMy Favourite Theory is in fact questionable.Whenwe determine the value
of a prospect, absent any incomparability, it’s very implausible that we can focus
on probabilities only and ignore the values of outcomes. Both probabilities and
values determine the goodness of prospects. That’s the basic tenet of decision the-
ory, in its simplest form. So if there is incomparability in values, there’s no reason
why we could ignore that, and just focus on probabilities. My Favourite Theory
seems like an ad hoc solution for sceptics to avoid the radical incompleteness of
⪰m. That’s another drawback of this view.
However, for present purposes, we needn’t rely on this general argument. I’ve
presupposed that them-value facts satisfy Transitivity, Independence, Continuity
and the Pareto Condition. And at least if that is true, (P) can plausibly be treated
as a matter of explication, parallel to the prospect-explications of the last chap-
ter. If these conditions hold, and the m-value facts aren’t radically incomplete,
there are relevantly unique sets of utility functions representing our axiologies,
such that a prospect is m-better than another if and only it has a greater expected
utility according to all functions in this set. So again, our axiologies will weigh
in a particular way against each other to determine the m-value facts. And in the
sense that’s relevant for us, this means they are comparable. We can say that the
value-difference between x and y, according to Ti, is at least n times as great as the
value-difference between z and t, according to Tj, if that is true on all utility func-
tions in our set. The technical details of this needn’t concern us now. I’ll explore
them in Chapter 6. What matters for now is that, given the other axioms, the weak
andmundane fact that the m-value relation isn’t radically incomplete already im-
plies that our axiologies weigh in a particular constant way against each other to
determine m-value. It means some intertheoretic comparisons hold.
So, at least given Transitivity, Independence, Continuity and the Pareto Con-
dition, theMinimal Argument seems sound. Again, it establishes a veryweak con-
clusion. The argument doesn’t say which comparisons hold, or why they do. Nor
does it imply that all or even most axiologies are comparable. (Q) only says that
96 See e. g. Gracely (1996) or Gustafsson and Torpman (2014); also Tarsney (2018a, 338 ff.).
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some intertheoretic comparisons hold. Or as in the social choice context, it sug-
gest that something has gone wrong if we deny their possibility altogether. Let’s
see where we get from here.
4.3 Constructivism
In principle, the prospect-explications, and the axiomatic approach of this book,
are compatible with different stories about the grounds of m-value facts. My over-
all argument doesn’t depend on the specific view I’ll now outline. But I think the
following story is plausible. If somenontrivialm-value facts hold, theymust either
bebrute fundamental facts, or theremust be amore fundamental kindof facts that
grounds them. Andm-value facts don’t seem to be brute. Plausibly, there are some
fundamental normative facts, such as that we’re all morally equal, or that pain is
bad. But facts about how you ought to evaluate your prospects under uncertainty
are highly complex. It seems implausible that they should be fundamental.97More
plausibly, there’s a more fundamental set of facts that grounds them. Or in short,
theMinimal Argument suggests that theremust be a class of facts that grounds in-
tertheoretic comparisons. Sowhat can this be, if intertheoretic comparisons aren’t
entirely subjective, and if there’s no structural normalisation principle, no inde-
pendent metaphysical fact, or no absolutist value facts that makes certain com-
parisons correct? Here’s the proposal I find most attractive.
The core idea
The key idea is that intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in epistemic norms.
There are epistemic norms that are plausible independently of the problem of in-
tertheoretic comparisons. We can understand them as holding prior to such com-
parisons, and grounding them in a constructivist manner.
To illustrate what I mean, let me give some examples of the kind of norms
I have in mind, and of how they can be constraining. One type of norm might
be synchronic norms concerning your credence distribution at any time. A good
candidate of this kind is
Simplicity: ceteris paribus, you should favour simpler credence distributions
over more complex ones.98
97 See Tarsney (2018a, 327) for a related thought.
98 I thank Christian Tarsney for suggesting this principle to me.
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It’s difficult to spell out precisely what ‘simple’ means. But we arguably have an
intuitive understanding of it. So suppose Simplicity holds. Then it constrains the
intertheoretic comparisons you can reasonably make. The credence distribution
on which the value of pleasure is equally great on the pleasure- and the plea-
sure/beauty-theory is arguably simpler than that on which their ratio is 113.27, or
anything other than 1. So if Simplicity is true, and if you have no reason to be-
lieve anything else, you should favour this simple comparison. More generally,
you should ceteris paribus believe that the values shared by overlapping theo-
ries are equally great on both. You should make m-value judgments that imply
intertheoretic comparisons of this form.
Other candidate norms are diachronic ones concerning the evolution of your
credences over time. Consider epistemic conservatism, the idea that you shouldn’t
change your beliefs in the absence of any reason to do so.99 An implication of this
idea for how to deal with new evidence might be put as
Conservatism: if you encounter new evidence, then of the possible changes to
your credences that accommodate this evidence you should ceteris paribus
favour less radical over more radical ones.
This norm too constrains your intertheoretic comparisons. Suppose you’ve so far
believed in the pleasure-theory, but now encounter some evidence for the value
of beauty. The least radical way to accommodate this evidence is to adopt some
positive credence in the value of beauty, but to leave your beliefs about pleasure
unchanged. Any comparison onwhich the value of pleasure is greater, or smaller,
on the pluralist theory than on the monist one would suggest youmay so far have
misjudged that value. It would mean you’d have to change your mind about the
valueof pleasure if you came to accept the valueof beautybesides it. But epistemic
conservatism says there’s a presumption in favour of not changing your mind, or
believing you were wrong, absent any positive grounds. So if Conservatism is cor-
rect, and if you have no positive countervailing reason, you should believe that
the value of pleasure is equally great on both theories. More generally, you should
ceteris paribus not change your beliefs about some given values in the face of ev-
idence for additional values besides them.
As a third candidate norm, consider
Coherence: ceteris paribus, you should favour more coherent credence distribu-
tions over less coherent ones,
99 See e. g. Chisholm (1980), Kvanvig (1989) or McCain (2008) for versions of this view.
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where coherence is understood roughly as the degree to which your beliefs are
mutually supportive. Such a norm can also constrain your intertheoretic com-
parisons. It can do so, for instance, if you have an error theory about why you
mighthavebeenmistakenabout value. Suppose again you’ve so far believed in the
pleasure-theory, but now encounter some evidence for the value of beauty. And
suppose you have a belief, conditional on the pluralist theory, about why you’ve
longmissed its truth. For example, you believe that if beauty also had value, you’d
simply have been insensitive to its particular worth. This explanation suggests
that even if the pluralist theory is true, you’ve never made any mistake with re-
spect to the value of pleasure. So it arguably coheres best with the intertheoretic
comparisons on which the value of pleasure is the same on both theories. Any
alternative credence distribution would suggest that you haven’t just overlooked
the value of beauty, but also misjudged the value of pleasure. And this wouldn’t
square well with your own simple error theory.
These norms are only examples. Roughly, they suggest that absent any expla-
nation, you shouldn’t assume that you’ve always systematically and radicallymis-
judged the magnitude of everyday paradigm values. And they imply you should
more readily assume you may have misjudged some values if you have an expla-
nation for why and how you may have done so, or if these values are less mun-
dane and pervasive. I take it that this is plausible. But Simplicity, Conservatism
and Coherence might be false,100 or not quite correct as I’ve stated them, or there
might be other and more important norms besides them. And there are of course
questions about how to best understand even these principles, and further work
to do to prove that they’ll successfully constrain our judgments.101 My aim is not
to argue for these precise norms. I’m happy if it’s plausible that some such epis-
100 For instance, Simplicity resembles commonprinciples of Objective Bayesianism, such as the
Principle of Indifference or the Principle of MaximumEntropy (see e. g. Keynes 1921, ch. 4; Jaynes
1957a, 1957b; Williamson 2010). These principles face well-known challenges (e. g., representa-
tion dependency; see e. g. von Kries 1886, or Keynes 1921, ch. 4). Simplicity might face similar
challenges. See e. g. Foley (1983), Christensen (1994) or Vahid (2004) for objections to epistemic
conservatism.
101 One question will be whether agents following these principles will converge on specific
judgments, rather than end up in an infinite process of ever-changing judgments, or oscillation
between different equilibria. The discussion here might benefit from the existing literature on
convergence in Bayesianism (see e. g. the theorem by Doob 1971). More generally, and as already
indicated in footnote 100, there’s a somewhat parallel debate about themost plausible principles
of Objective Bayesianism (see e. g. Williamson 2010). There’s also a debate about how to best
understand the method of reflective equilibrium (see e. g. Elgin 1996). Important progress on our
present questions might be made by building on these debates.
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temic norms hold that can successfully constrain the intertheoretic comparisons
or m-value judgments you can reasonably make.
If that’s so, we can invoke a form of constructivism to ground intertheoretic
comparisons, or judge some of your subjective beliefs about them as false. We can
understand truth about intertheoretic comparisons as the outcome of ideally rea-
sonable deliberation—in terms of principles like the above—about which of your
prospects are m-best in light of your axiological uncertainty. By comparison, con-
sider the view that truth in first-order moral theory is simply the result of an ideal
process of systematising our pre-theoretic moral beliefs.102 On this view, it’s not
that there’s some independent Platonic realm of moral facts, and that norms of
simplicity and coherence are best at guiding us towards it. Rather, the principles
are first, and ‘truth’ is simply the outcome of the principles. We can invoke a sim-
ilar kind of constructivism about intertheoretic comparisons. On this view, prin-
ciples like Simplicity, Conservatism and Coherence are not justified in virtue of
their guiding us towards an independent realm of m-value facts or intertheoretic
comparisons. Rather, they help constitute this realm. So this provides an answer
to why some m-value facts or intertheoretic comparisons hold. It’s not because of
mind-independent metaphysical facts about how theories compare, or how great
certain values would be if they existed. It’s simply because of facts about how to
respond reasonably to axiological evidence or have reasonable axiological beliefs.
Ultimately, wemight say, it’s because of facts about us—about why wemight have
been wrong about axiology, and by how much and in what way, and so on.
Applications, clarifications, and worries
The case of the pleasure- and the pleasure/beauty-theorieswas exceptionally sim-
ple. So let’s see how these epistemic principles could be applied in more com-
plex cases. Suppose you’ve long believed in the pleasure-theory. But you have
recently come to doubt it, and now slightly prefer the above-mentioned quasi-
deontological theory on which there’s value and disvalue only in the following or
contradicting of deontological reasons respectively. What intertheoretic compar-
isons (or m-value judgments) would it be most reasonable for you to make?
Simplicity might tell you to look at prospects or outcomes that both of these
theories deemgoodor bad. Thatmight be acts of beneficence, say,whichboth lead
to pleasure and to the following of somedeontological reason. So Simplicitymight
102 For classic (though more specific) versions of this view, see e. g. Rawls (1980), Korsgaard
(1996) or Scanlon (1998).
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favour a credence distribution on which the value of such acts of beneficence is
the same on both views.
But these values might be comparatively inconsequential within the quasi-
deontological theory. That theory might say it’s much worse to lie or steal or
break promises, say, than to omit acts of supererogatory beneficence. So this
simple comparison might imply that the relevant other values of this theory are
massively greater than the value of standard acts of beneficence on the pleasure-
theory. It thus constitutes a radical departure from your original beliefs. You’ve so
far believed that there are no such extra quasi-deontological values. But on this
comparison, theremight be extremely great values of this kind. So the comparison
suggests you might have misjudged massively the disvalues of promise-breaking,
stealing or lying. Conservatism might thus favour a credence distribution on
which the value of beneficence is greater on the pleasure-theory than on the
quasi-deontological axiology. Such a comparison suggests you might have mis-
judged the value of beneficence, as well as the other quasi-deontological values.
But it doesn’t imply that you might have been so horrendously wrong about the
latter. So the overall extent to which you represent yourself as possibly having
misjudged values might be smaller on this latter comparison than on the former.
And these implications of Conservatism might have to be balanced against those
of Simplicity.
But suppose you also have some pertinent non-normative beliefs. According
to standard deontology, it’s ceteris paribus more important not to harm people
than to positively benefit them. So on the quasi-deontological axiology we’re con-
sidering, the disvalue of harming someone is greater than the value of proportion-
ally benefiting them. And if this theory is true, there must arguably be some ex-
planation for why you always got this wrong, believing as you did in the pleasure-
theory. Suppose youhave abelief about that. Suppose youbelieve that conditional
on the quasi-deontological theory, you always mistook these quasi-deontological
values and disvalues for deontic constraints against harming that have nothing
to do with axiological values. This suggest you always greatly underestimated the
disvalue of harming. Thus Coherencemight favour intertheoretic comparisons on
which you always knew the value of beneficence—or on which your two theo-
ries agree on this—but on which it’s of comparatively great disvalue to harm if
the quasi-deontological theory is true. But you might have some other explana-
tion. Suppose you believe that conditional on the quasi-deontological theory, it
was because you never received much beneficence in your childhood that you
turned beneficence into a sort of idol. This suggest you always greatly overesti-
mated the value of beneficence. So in this case, Coherence might favour compar-
isons on which you always knew the disvalue of harming—or on which your two
theories agree on that—but on which it’s of comparatively little value to benefit if
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the quasi-deontological theory holds. And whatever explanation you prefer, the
implications of Coherence might again have to be balanced against those of Sim-
plicity and Conservatism.
All of this is only a rough sketch of how norms like Simplicity, Conservatism
and Coherence could operate in more complex cases. But it suffices to indicate
that applying these norms can be fruitful. In particular, they seem to give us more
resources to make intertheoretic comparisons than metaphysical accounts allow.
Ournormshavenon-trivial implications for the comparisonbetween thepleasure-
and the quasi-deontological theory in light of our prior beliefs, say, or our be-
liefs about our beliefs in the form of an error theory. These resources don’t seem
available for metaphysical accounts. Indeed, as I’ve suggested, it’s unclear what
a mind-independent basis for intertheoretic comparisons between such theories
could be. So there’s reason to be more optimistic, I think, that at least some in-
tertheoretic comparisons hold not only for ‘few and far between’ theories.
One feature of the above principles is worth noting. In light of Simplicity,
Conservatism and Coherence, the relevant m-value facts might be different from
person to person. Most notably, it depends on your priors which intertheoretic
comparisons effect the least radical changes in your credences. So in this sense,
if the above principles hold, there won’t be a universal truth of the form ‘the
value-difference between outcomes x and y, according to the pleasure-theory,
is greater than the value-difference between outcomes z and t, according to the
quasi-deontological theory’.Whether or not this statement is truewill be different
from person to person.
One might be worried about this, for at least three reasons. First, one might
think it implies that the truth of certain propositions—i. e., intertheoretic compa-
risons—can be relative to individuals. And one might find such alethic relativism
dubious. However, our constructivism doesn’t imply such relativism. Recall that
on the prospect-explication, the fact that certain intertheoretic comparisons hold
among your theories only means that certain prospects are m-better than others
in light of your uncertainty. So if different m-value facts hold for different peo-
ple who are uncertain about the same axiological orderings, we needn’t under-
stand this as meaning that one and the same proposition—about how two spe-
cific theories actually compare—is true for one person but false for another. We
can understand it as meaning that it’s reasonable for these people to believe in
different versions of these orderings. Talk of ‘different versions’ of the pleasure-
theory, say, doesn’t presuppose absolutism.We can assume (pace Ross 2006, 765)
that the versions differ in nothing ‘apart from issues raised by evaluative uncer-
tainty’. On this assumption, the only difference between the pleasure-theory1 and
the pleasure-theory2, say, concerns which prospects are m-better than which in
light of uncertainty about them. So their difference will only be apparent relative
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to somefixedversionof thepleasure/beauty-theory, say.And twopeoplewhohave
the same credences in the same orderings and for whom the same m-value facts
hold cannot be further distinguished—as they can on absolutism,where all of one
person’s theoriesmight be keyed up versions of the theories of the other. But all of
this seems plausible. Different m-value facts can be true relative to different peo-
ple, insofar as it may be reasonable for them to believe in what are, in this thin
sense, different versions of their theories. There’s nothing dubious or problem-
atic about that. Or at any rate, it certainly doesn’t imply alethic relativism.
By the same token, the constructivism we’re invoking is less radical than it
might sound. The epistemic norms ultimately determine what’s m-best for you
in light of your uncertainty, say, between the pleasure-theory and the quasi-
deontological view. And in this sense they determine how your axiologies com-
pare. But they needn’t imply a unique truth about this comparison. So again, we
might say they just determine what ‘versions’ of your theories you should have
credence in. And that’s to say, they function like we all think epistemic norms
function—determining what propositions or theories you should believe. When
they imply you should have credence, say, in versions of these theories on which
the value of beneficence is equally great on both, this isn’t because this value
really is equally great. And it doesn’t imply it is equally great in some Platonic
realm independent of axiologically uncertain agents. It simply means beliefs in
such versions is most reasonable in light of your evidence and priors.
Second, one might worry that such prior-dependency renders constructivism
overly subjectivist. Suppose you started with sufficiently crazy priors—e. g., cer-
tainty in the Nietzschean axiology on which it’s best if you do what you please.
Couldn’t this still mean that it will eventually be m-best if you do as you please?
And isn’t this still very unfortunate,meaning the correctness of yourm-value judg-
ments remains highly sensitive to your personal doxastic quirks?
There’s a number of points in reply to this. To begin with, the present theory
is nowhere nearly as subjectivist as the subjectivism considered in Section 4.1.
On that theory, there were no constraints whatsoever on your comparisons. This
meant that if you permissibly have some nonzero credence in the Nietzschean ax-
iology there are no grounds for criticising your coherent ‘judgment’ that it’s m-
best for you to do as you please. Indeed, it meant that this couldn’t even be re-
garded as a judgment. On constructivism, as far as I’ve said, there may be no con-
straints on your very first credence distribution among axiological orderings. But
there are always at least some constraints on your comparisons (e. g. Simplicity
and Coherence). And the more evidence you gather, the more such constraints
will apply to you (e. g. in light of Conservatism). So it’s not the case that any such
nonzero credence would allow you to make Nietzschean m-value judgments, let
alone that those wouldn’t even be judgments. Next, nothing about constructivism
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implies that there couldn’t also be constraints your very first credence distribu-
tion among axiological orderings. Indeed, perhaps Simplicity is such a constraint:
perhaps if you have no relevant evidence, it’s simpler to have equal credences
in both the pleasure- and the quasi-deontological theory. Or perhaps there are
other, more specific such principles.103 Now admittedly, such constraints may not
always uniquely determine reasonable prior credences. So there might always be
some discretion for subjectivity. But finally, that’s true on every standard theory of
rational degrees of belief. Even the most orthodox Objective Bayesians think that
there aren’t always uniquely determined rational prior probabilities.104 So it’s un-
clear why the degree of subjectivity that remains on constructivism should in any
way be implausible.
Third, onemightworry that our dependency onpriorsmakes interpersonal in-
tertheoretic comparisons impossible. Suppose Albert thinks it would be m-better
for us to sacrifice some equality to increase overall pleasure, while Lydia thinks
it would be m-better not to. Intuitively, in some such cases, there’s more at stake
in terms of (m-)value for one person than for the other. And the truth of such in-
terpersonal comparisons may be important in practice: we might need them, say,
to make reasonable decisions from the point of view of society, aggregating in-
dividuals’ m-value judgments. So there are analogous questions here as in the
case of intrapersonal intertheoretic comparisons, about what these interpersonal
comparisons of m-value mean, about which such comparisons hold, and what
grounds them. Structural, metaphysical and absolutist accounts won’t have any
problems here. Their principles will apply across individuals just as for a single
individual. But one might think the version of constructivism I’ve sketched faces
problems due to the prior- and person-relativism it implies.
However, I don’t think it does. The most natural approach for constructivism
is to take the perspective of society, or perhaps a neutral decision-maker, and ap-
ply principles like Simplicity and Coherence again. Suppose Albert is certain of
the pleasure-theory, while Lydia is certain of a pleasure/equality-theory onwhich
both pleasure and equality are intrinsically good. From the point of view of soci-
ety, the simplest assumption seems that they agree about the value of pleasure,
but disagree aboutwhether equality has value too. So this simplicitymight ground
the correct comparison between their judgments. Or suppose Albert believes in
the pleasure-theory, while Lydia believes in the quasi-deontological theory on
which there’s an extra gravity to unjust or discriminatory harms. There might be
some extra facts that help us make comparisons in light of Coherence. For in-
103 See footnote 100.
104 See Talbott (2016, sec. 4.2).
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stance, perhaps both have plenty of experience of innocent pleasures, but only
Lydia has first-hand experience of injustices. This might suggest that, conditional
on Lydia being right, Albert simply underestimated the disvalue of injustices due
to his lack of experience. And it might suggest that, conditional on Albert being
right, Lydia overestimated the disvalue of such injustices precisely because of her
personal involvement in them. In short, it might suggest that they agree about the
value of pleasure, but disagree about the disvalue of these inequalities. The more
general point is that there’s no principled reason why our or similar principles
couldn’t ground interpersonal comparisons too.
4.4 Conclusion: constructivism and EVM
If all I’ve said is correct, we’ve answered the three sceptical worries. The prospect-
explication explains what it is, or what it would be, for an intertheoretic compar-
ison to hold. For a certain such comparison to hold would just be for certain m-
value facts to be the case. This leaves open whether any such facts are the case,
or which of them are, and what grounds them. The Minimal Argument suggests
that some m-value facts must hold, and that there must be some further set of
facts that grounds them. But it still doesn’t tell us which m-value facts hold, or
in what they ground. Constructivism is at least one plausible story to fill this gap
for my overall argument. It suggests facts aboutm-value or intertheoretic compar-
isons are grounded constructively in epistemic norms. And so it’s these norms,
together perhaps with your priors, that determine which comparisons hold. In
other words, we can answer radical scepticism. It’s implausible that the m-value
facts must be radically incomplete, or the idea of EVM fundamentally flawed in
light of the problem of comparisons.
A follow-up question relevant for the framework of this book is whether given
constructivism (and given our axiologies are vNM-conformable) it’s plausible that
the m-value facts satisfy Continuity and Completeness. Take Continuity first. As
indicated in Section 3.2, m-value isn’t continuous if some axiologies compare in
a lexical way. So is it plausible, on constructivism, that some axiologies compare
lexically? It doesn’t seem so. Intuitively, credence distributions that don’t feature
lexical dominance seem simpler than credence distributions that do. And they’ll
cohere better with standard simple error theories. If you’ve so far believed in the
pleasure-theory, but now have evidence for the value of beauty, it seems plausible
that if beauty had value you’d simply have been insensitive to its worth. This ex-
planation suggests there’s nothing special about beauty or pleasure. Their being
valuable are equal axiological possibilities. The idea that one of them is poten-
tially infinitelymore or less important than the other would lack any explanation,
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or not cohere well with this error theory. Constructivism suggest that m-value sat-
isfies Continuity, or at least doesn’t violate it due to lexical intertheoretic compar-
isons.
So consider Completeness. As indicated, m-value isn’t complete if some ax-
iologies aren’t fully commensurable. So is it plausible, on constructivism, that
some axiologies are to some extent incommensurable? It seems so. Perhaps for
some axiologies and some belief-sets, it’s plausible that the axiologies compare
in a precise way. Perhaps it’s plausible that if you have no relevant error the-
ory, you should consider the value of pleasure to be precisely equally great on
the pleasure- and the pleasure/beauty-theories. But it seems implausible that no
matter what other beliefs you have, there’s a precise specific number n of hang-
nails, such that you should consider the disvalue of breaking aparticular promise,
according to the quasi-deontological theory, as equally great as the disvalue of
suffering n hangnails, according to the pleasure-theory. Among other things, any
precise number n—or any precise comparison—would seem to some extent arbi-
trary or inexplicable, and thus less fully coherent with the rest of your beliefs. It
can sometimes be most reasonable for you to assume that some axiologies com-
pare only roughly. Sometimes, you should consider the disvalue of breaking a
particular promise, according to the quasi-deontological theory, as being deter-
minately greater than k and determinately smaller than m hangnails, according
to the pleasure-theory, but not precisely equally as great as some number n be-
tween k andm. Or in other words, constructivism suggests them-value facts aren’t
radically incomplete, but may not be fully complete either.
I suggested that one reason to explore axiomatisations of EVM without the
Completeness condition is that many first-order axiologies aren’t complete. But
even if all axiologies under consideration are complete, at least under construc-
tivism, there’s another reason to do so. Under constructivism, plausibly, you may
reasonably have credence in axiologies that aren’t fully commensurable. And a
representation theorem without the Completeness axiom would allow our argu-
ment to cover such axiologies. As indicated, we’ll turn to that in Chapter 6.
5 The problem of probabilities
A second issue that the argument from the Basic Representation Theorem raised,
besides the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, was the question of how to ex-
plicate probabilities. In theBasic RepresentationTheorem, the concept of a proba-
bility distribution over axiologies figured as a primitive. The prospects over which
the m-value relation ranges were defined as leading to particular outcomes with
particular probabilities, while different axiologies have particular probabilities of
being true. So the concept of a probability distribution over axiologies appeared
as a primitive in the very definition of these prospects. That was useful to focus on
the other problems I’ve addressed. And it follows a trend in recent decision theory,
where some authors have advocated taking credences as a primitive.105 However,
at least in the theory of axiological uncertainty, this primitivism seems ultimately
unsatisfying. Suppose you say thehuman-welfare-theoryhas aprobability of 0.05.
Unless you give some account of what youmean by that, we arguably don’t under-
stand your assertion—or the difference between your statement and the claim that
the probability is 0.1, or 0.01. That’s particularly so because the notion of an axi-
ological probability distribution is highly complex. It’s triply quantitative: speci-
fying quantitative probabilities attached to intratheoretically cardinal axiologies
amongwhich cardinally significant comparisons hold. The last point is especially
important. It’s not enough to know what it is for a particular axiological ordering
to have considerable weight in your m-value facts, or even to be in some sense
three times as weighty as another ordering. We also need to know what it is for
such an axiology to have that weight in virtue of a high probability, but a rela-
tively deflated value function, rather than in virtue of an inflated value function,
but a relatively low probability. It’s not plausible that our intuitive understanding
of such a rich notion goes very far. So we need an explication of what wemean by
axiological probabilities. That’s the task of the present chapter.
The question of how to explicate probabilities is connected with a larger
question about how to understand EVM and its normativity, which I’ve briefly
indicated (on pages 23 and 60), but which requires further clarification. ‘Axio-
logical probabilities’ could mean two different things. It could mean subjective
probabilities—the actual credences you have in particular versions of axiological
orderings. Or it couldmean evidential probabilities—the credences your evidence
warrants in particular versions of axiological orderings. Accordingly, the notion
of ‘m-value’ and the core claim of EVM could be understoodmore, or less, subjec-
tively. On a more subjective interpretation of m-value, a prospect is m-better than
105 See e. g. Eriksson and Hájek (2007).
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another if it’s better in light of your subjective credences in particular versions of
axiological orderings—or in light of your credences in axiological orderings and
the intertheoretic comparisons you make between them. (Again, we can interpret
credences in axiological orderings plus specific comparisons between them sim-
ply as credences in specific versions of these orderings.) On this interpretation,
EVM figures as a rational coherence constraint on your m-value judgments—your
judgments about which prospects are m-better than which. It says that however
precisely you’re axiologically uncertain, you must assign certain probabilities to
your axiologies, compare them in a certain way, and evaluate prospects in terms
of their expectation relative to your credences and comparisons. If you do, your
m-value judgments are (subjectively) correct. I’ll call this Subjectivist EVM.
Let me clarify. I suggested in the last chapter (Section 4.1) that subjectivism
can’t be the whole story. Unless there’s some norms about which credences and
comparisons are more reasonable than which, as long as you satisfy our coher-
ence constraints, we’ll have no grounds at all to criticise yourm-value judgments.
This seems unduly permissive. Intuitively, m-value judgments on which it’s al-
ways m-best for you to act as an Übermensch and do what you please seem in
some sense worse than others (even if they satisfy our constraints). More funda-
mentally, unless there are such norms, we arguably can’t speak of ‘credences’ in
the first place. But constructivism provides a standard of reasonableness for cre-
dences and comparisons. In light of it, we can speak of credences, and criticise
some of them as epistemically flawed. So given constructivism, a focus on sub-
jective credences and comparisons seems viable. Subjectivist EVM doesn’t deny
that there are objective grounds for criticising your credences in particular ver-
sions of axiological orderings (even beyond coherence). Perhaps in light of Con-
servatism and Coherence, it’s inappropriate for you to believe in such amassively
inflated version of the Nietzschean axiology. Subjectivist EVM just isn’t interested
inwhether your credences and comparisons are reasonable in this sense. Instead,
it’s interested in whether you evaluate your prospects in a subjectively reason-
able manner, given your credences and comparisons. Wemight say it’s analogous
to a subjective version of decision theory. This theory doesn’t deny that there are
grounds for criticising your preferences and non-normative credences (even be-
yond coherence). It’s not thoroughly Humean. Perhaps believing that the world
will be destroyed in the coming ten years means a gross insensitivity to our evi-
dence. Perhaps preferring the destruction of the world to the scratching of your
finger means an overestimation of your itch. Subjective decision theory doesn’t
ask whether your beliefs and preferences are reasonable in this sense. It just asks
which prospects you should, subjectively, prefer to which given your credences
and preferences. What I’ll call Subjectivist EVM does the same. It’s interested in a
thoroughly subjective ‘ought’, not denying there’s a more objective one too. Thus
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it says that if you evaluate prospects in terms of their expectation relative to your
credences and comparisons, your m-value judgments are (subjectively) correct. If
we’re interested in such Subjectivist EVM, we need to know what it is for you to
have a certain subjective credence in a particular theory.
On amore objective interpretation of m-value, a prospect is m-better than an-
other if it’s better in light of the credences that your evidence warrants, and the
intertheoretic comparisons that are correct (in a constructivist manner, in light
of the relevant empistemic norms). On this interpretation, EVM figures as a more
substantive theory ofm-value. It says that axiologies have certain evidential prob-
abilities and compare in a certain way, and that a prospect is m-better than an-
other if and only if it has the greater expected moral value relative to these prob-
abilities and comparisons. So even if you evaluate prospects in terms of their ex-
pectation relative to your credences and comparisons, your m-value judgments
might be false. I’ll call this Objectivist EVM. It’s analogous to a thoroughly objec-
tive version of decision theory, which doesn’t just ask which prospects you should
prefer towhich given your credences and concerns—but alsowhich credences and
concerns you should have in the first place. If we’re interested in Objectivist EVM,
we need to know what it is for your evidence to warrant a certain credence in a
particular theory.
Both Subjectivist and Objectivist EVM are interesting. There are reasons to
explore the objectivist theory. It’s often more in line with our actual practice. Of-
ten when we reflect on what’s (m-)best in the face of arguments for competing
axiologies, we try to make judgments that are sensitive to our evidence and the
correct comparisons. We don’t try to make judgments that are sensitive to the cre-
dences and comparisonswe happen to find ourselves with. Metaphorically speak-
ing, our credences are transparent in our judgments: we don’t look at them, but
with them or through them in judging our options.106 Moreover, Objectivist EVM
is more thoroughly normative. If you satisfy Subjectivist EVM, but have wildly in-
appropriate axiological credences, your m-value judgments are still importantly
suboptimal. But there are reasons to explore the subjectivist theory too. Subjec-
tivist EVM doesn’t seem alien to our practice. We can certainly try to make judg-
ments that are sensitive to the credences and comparisons we happen to have,
or that we settled upon after first reflecting on our evidence. It’s not that we nec-
essarily try to reach objectivist verdicts. More positively, there’s a sense in which
Subjectivist EVM focuses most clearly on the normativity of the theory of axiolog-
ical uncertainty. Suppose youmaximise expected value relative to your credences
and comparisons, but have inappropriate credences. Then you aren’t making a
106 I thank Felix Koch for pointing this out to me.
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mistake about whether EVM, or My Favourite Theory, or somemeta-deontological
theory of axiological uncertainty is true, say. You’remaking an epistemicmistake.
In this sense, as long as you’re satisfying Subjectivist EVM, you’re not making a
mistake peculiar to the theory of axiological uncertainty. Finally, the notion of
a subjective probability or credence is arguably conceptually more fundamental
than that of an evidential probability or evidentially warranted credence. Only if
we know what it is to have certain credences can we know what it is for certain
credences to be warranted.
Fortunately, the two theories raise similar questions, and can be developed
in similar fashions. So our focus doesn’t matter very much. I’ll generally start by
elaborating on Subjectivist EVM, and then translatemy arguments intoObjectivist
EVM. In line with my approach so far, I’ll introduce an explication of axiologi-
cal probabilities on the basis of a representation theorem (Section 5.1). I’ll outline
how we can apply a theory based on this explication in our practical decision-
making (Section 5.2). And I’ll then defend the explication against objections. I
argue that representation theorems provide our best account of axiological prob-
abilities, and outline the implications of this claim for the normativity of EVM
(Section 5.3). Since all of this is controversial territory, I’ll end the chapter by in-
troducingWeighted Value Maximisation—a theory of axiological uncertainty that
eschews the notion of credences altogether (Section 5.4).
5.1 The Representation Theorem for Probabilities
There are various possible answers to our question about what you mean by say-
ing your credence in the human-welfare-theory is 0.05. But not all answers are
equally good. Consider the
Simple Explication: That your credence in Ti is pi means that when you con-
sider the set of possible axiologies, consider how confident you feel about
each axiology in light of the evidence for and against it, and try to associate a
nonnegative number to each of them, such that the numbers add up to 1 and
reflect your confidence, you associate with Ti the number pi.
Thismight explainwhat youmean by saying your credence in the human-welfare-
theory is 0.05. You might mean you distributed numbers to axiologies in accor-
dance with your feelings of confidence and the human-welfare-theory ended up
getting 0.05. However, this isn’t a very good explication. For one thing, the Simple
Explication doesn’t seem to pick out something we’d intuitively identify as your
degrees of belief. Suppose for some reason you associate the number zero to the
human-welfare-theory on introspection. If in your actions and attitudes, and in
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your judgments about which prospects are m-best, you give considerable weight
to that theory, then intuitively you do have credence in it. You simply misjudged
your confidence. We need to pick out something closer to our intuitive concept
of credences. For another thing, the Simple Explication doesn’t seem to pick out
something normatively very relevant. We can perform such an exercise of intro-
spection. But assigning numbers to axiologies will soon seem a rather arbitrary
stab in the dark. It would seem reckless to ground the most important decisions
in our life solely on this intuitive list of numbers. We need to pick out something
normatively more important.
A prominent candidate route is again via representation theorems. Let’s start
with somebackground.Oneof thefirst to explicate credenceswasBrunodeFinetti
(1980, 62). He suggested that your credence in a proposition p is the rate x for
which you’d be indifferent between receiving any sum of money S if p is true, and
receiving xS with certainty. So for you to have a credence of 0.25 that it will rain
today, say, is for you to be indifferent between receiving £1 if it rains and the cer-
tain gain of £0.25. The obvious problem with this is that it seems to misrepresent
your beliefs if money has diminishing marginal value for you. If you prefer a sure
gain of £1 million to the bet that gives you £2 millions if and only if some coin
lands tails, you needn’t think the coin isn’t fair. Youmight simply caremore about
the first than the second million.107 For this reason, the account given by Frank
Ramsey (1990) was more promising. Ramsey provided a simple theorem show-
ing that if your preferences satisfy certain conditions you can be represented as
maximising expectedutilitywith respect to relevantly unique probability andutil-
ity functions—which needn’t conform linearly to any other independently speci-
fiable quantity. According to Ramsey, this probability function can be interpreted
as representing your credences. Ramsey’s account was further refined by Leon-
dard Savage (1954), who provided a conceptually more sophisticated theorem.
The main tenet of all these explications is that to have a particular credence in
a proposition is to give that proposition a particular weight in your preferences
under uncertainty. Representation theorems show that if your preferences satisfy
certain conditions, you maximise expected utility with respect to certain utility
and probability functions. And according to the explications, we can then treat
the probability function as specifying your actual credences.
I think this idea is promising. However, if we’re to explain your axiological
credences, we can’t simply focus on your preferences. Perhaps you just don’t care
about moral value. Or perhaps you also care about many things besides it—your
107 See e. g. Eriksson and Hájek (2007) and Hájek (2019) for other famous objections against De
Finetti’s interpretation.
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self-interest, thewelfare of your family, deontological constraints, or whatever. So
you may give little weight in your preferences to the human-welfare-theory, say,
and still find it plausible as an axiology. We need to separate your axiological and
non-axiological concerns. We can do so by focusing on which prospects you find
m-better than which. In other words, instead of explicating credences in terms
of preferences, we can do so in terms of m-value judgments. Your credence pi in
an axiology Ti is the weight you give that axiology in your m-value judgments.
I’ll refer to this as the judgment-explication of axiological credences. So what I’ll
look for is a set of conditions C such that, if your m-value judgments satisfy C, you
maximise expected utility relative to a unique probability and a relevantly unique
utility function. And I’ll then assume that the probability function represents your
axiological credences. Again, I treat this as an explication. The claim isn’t that our
theoremwill identify the credences you really have. There’s no such thing. Rather,
the probabilities from this theorem pick out something close to our intuitive con-
cept of credences, and something normatively important. That will be my claim
in what follows.
Axiological Probabilities
So far, I’ve spoken rather impersonally about what ‘our axiologies’ and ‘the m-
value facts’ are. But according to Subjectivist EVM, you should evaluate your
prospects relative to your credences and values. So we now need to focus on the
axiologies you consider, and the m-value facts relative to the credences you have
in them.We need to reinterpret our formal framework slightly. To determine what
your axiologies are, I’ll assume youmake (considered) judgments about prospects
in O, of the form ‘according to axiology Ti, a is better than b’. I represent your
judgments of this kind by ‘your ⪰i’, to indicate that the set of these axiologies is
the set you are considering. From these judgments, we can read off what axiolog-
ical orderings you’re considering. For instance, if you judge that according to T1,
a prospect is better than another if and only if it expectably leads to more human
welfare, then, we’ll assume, by T1 you mean the human-welfare-theory.
However, we need to know not only what orderings, but also what versions
of these orderings you’re considering—or how you’re comparing your orderings
against each another. To that end, I’ll assume you make (considered) m-value
judgments about prospects inQ. We might think of these as counterfactual judg-
ments of the form ‘if the probability distribution over axiologieswas P, awould be
m-better than b’. I represent these judgments by ‘your ⪰m’, to indicate that these
are what you take to be the counterfactual m-value facts. From these judgments,
we can read offhowyou’re comparing your axiologies against each other. Suppose
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you consider the human-welfare-theory T1 and the non-human-animal-welfare-
theory T2. And you judge that if they had a probability of 1/3 and 2/3 respectively,
it would be equally m-bad to inflict a given amount of pain on a human or on a
non-human animal. Then, we’ll assume, you think the value of a given amount
of human welfare, according to T1, is twice as great as that of the same amount of
animal welfare, according to T2.
However,wenowalsoneed to knowwhat credence youhave in these theories.
To that end, we need a third set of prospects, beyondO andQ. More specifically,
we need a set K of probability distributions on X, in which the probability dis-
tribution over axiologies isn’t specified. Intuitively, a prospect in K may be, say,
that a person will suffer if and only if T1 is true, or that a person will suffer if
and only if T1 is true and a non-human animal if and only if T2 is true. I’ll use
cursive letters a, b, c... to refer to prospects in K. Formally, these prospects can
be represented as the set of theory-dependent probability distributions onX—i. e.,
K = {a : I ⇝ X → ℝ+ ℘ ∑x∈X a(i, x) = 1 ∀i ∈ I}. The second just-mentionedprospect,
say—onwhich a personwill suffer if and only ifT1 is true and anon-humananimal
if and only if T2 is true—will thus be represented as the function a inK that assigns
1 to the pair of T1 and the fact that the person suffers, 1 to the pair of T2 and the fact
that the non-human animal suffers, and 1 to the pairs of all other theories and the
fact that nothing happens. Note that in a prospect in K, the numbers assigned to
outcomes sum to 1 within each axiology, not across axiologies. So a prospect inK
doesn’t specify an underlying probability distribution over axiologies. I’ll assume
you also make (considered) m-value judgments about prospects in K. We might
think of these as non-counterfactual judgments of the form ‘a is m-better than b’,
relative to your credences. I represent these judgments by ‘your ⪰̃m,’ (or ‘your ≻̃m’
and ‘your ∼̃m’), to indicate that these are what you take to be them-value facts rel-
ative to your credences. So I use a tilde to distinguish them from your judgments
⪰m onQ.
If we know your judgments about Q, then from your judgments about K, we
can read off what credences you have in your axiologies. By considering your
counterfactual judgments (‘If the probability distribution over theories was P, a
would bem-better...’), we can detect your values. The function representing these
judgments is a pure reflection of values, since the probabilities are already given
in the prospects. And knowing your values, we can then detect your probability
distribution by considering your ordinary judgments (‘Actually, a is m-worse...’).
Suppose, as we assumed above, that in your m-value judgments about Q, you
judge that if T1 and T2 had a probability of 1/3 and 2/3 respectively, it would be
equally m-bad to inflict a given amount of pain on a human or on a non-human
animal. So you think the value of a given amount of human welfare, according to
T1, is twice as great as that of the same amount of animal welfare, according to T2.
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And suppose that in your m-value judgments aboutK, you judge that actually it’s
equally m-bad to inflict a given amount of pain on a human or twice that amount
on a non-human animal. Then, if T1 and T2 are the only axiologies you consider,
we’ll assume you actually have a credence of 1/2 in both of them.
That’s the rough idea. To sum up, we’ll need three kinds of judgments from
you in order to get a relevant expected utility representation: judgments about
which prospects are better than which according to your axiologies (represented
by your ⪰i onO), judgments about which prospectswould bem-better thanwhich
given that axiologies had certain probabilities (represented by your ⪰m onQ) and
judgments about which prospects are m-better than which relative to your cre-
dences (represented by your ⪰̃m on K).
Three notes about this framework are in order. First, the set Q still presup-
poses that we understand what it means that a particular axiology has a particu-
lar probability. One may worry that we don’t—indeed, that it’s precisely because
we don’t understand this that we needed a new framework, and that this frame-
work thus mustn’t feature our set Q. But I think we can answer this worry. What
I’d doubt is a pretheoretic understanding of quantitative subjective or evidential
probabilities. The relevantnotion inQ canbeunderstooddifferently. For example,
we might imagine that God determined the true axiology on the basis of a device
involving an unpredictable quantum mechanical phenomenon, and understand
the prospects in Q in terms of objective propensities of that device. We can as-
sume you satisfy Lewis’ (1980) Principal Principle, as part of our understanding
of subjective probabilities. And given this assumption, we can take your m-value
judgments about Q to be a pure reflection of your values. Judgments like ‘If the
probability distribution over theories was P, …’ could be understood as meaning:
‘SupposingGod’s device had propensities represented by P, …’. This adds another
complexity to my framework. But I think it’s only that: an extra complexity. The
presupposition ofQ doesn’t make our explications circular, incoherent, or overly
primitivist.
Second, note that the setsK andQ both specify an underlying probability dis-
tribution over outcomes (relative to each axiology). In this sense, I’m still taking
purely descriptive probabilities as given primitives. In principle, this is problem-
atic, for similar reasons as it was problematic to take axiological credences as a
primitive. However, my main concern is with axiological uncertainty. This prob-
lem is complicated enough. To keep it as simple as possible, I’ll assume purely
descriptive probabilities as primitives throughout.
Third, the set K includes all theory-dependent probability distributions over
outcomes. In particular, and as illustrated by the above example, it includes
prospects that lead to different (probability distributions over) outcomes, de-
pending onwhich axiology is true. That is, for some a inK, some x in X, and some
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Ti and Tj, a(i, x) ̸= a(j, x). As with the analogous prospects in Q, these prospects
won’t represent any natural, practical options. There’s no natural act which leads
to a non-human animal suffering if one theory is true, and a person suffering if
another theory is true. But as with the prospects in Q, such prospects seem con-
ceptually possible (see page 23). So I think it isn’t a problem for our framework
that K includes them. On the contrary, it would be a drawback if it didn’t. Apart
from this somewhat non-practical aspect, judgments about K are fairly natural.
Indeed, in some sense they’re more straightforward than judgments about Q.
They don’t require us to counterfactually imagine a specific probability distribu-
tion over axiologies. They just require us to judge how we’d evaluate prospects in
light of our actual uncertainty or evidence. So I take it it’s plausible to assume that
we can make considered m-value judgments aboutK (as well as aboutO andQ).
Given this framework, we can state our new theorem. It will again feature the
three conditions of the Basic Representation Theorem: that all your ⪰i and your⪰m are vNM-conformable, and that your ⪰m satisfies the Pareto Condition with
respect to your ⪰i. As we know from the Basic Representation Theorem, if your
judgments satisfy these conditions, there’s a function u : I ⇝X → ℝ, unique up to
positive affine transformation, such that for all a and b inQ, all a and b inO and
all i in I,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x), and (5.1)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x). (5.2)
We now need to relate this to your judgments about K. To that end, we need two
new conditions. The first is that your ⪰̃m on K also satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms. Define pa ⋇ (1 − p)b inK as the prospect that leads to a with
probability p, and to b with probability (1−p), hence (pa ⋇ (1−p)b)(i, x) = pa(i, x)⋇
(1 − p)b(i, x) for all (i, x) in I ⇝ X. For a reflexive binary relation ⪰̃ onK, our axioms
are
TransitivityK: for all a , b and c in K, if a ⪰̃ b and b ⪰̃ c, then a ⪰̃ c;
CompletenessK: for all a and b in K, a ⪰̃ b or b ⪰̃ a;
IndependenceK: for all a , b and c in K and p ∈]0, 1[, if a ≻̃ b, then pa ⋇ (1 −
p)c ≻̃ pb ⋇ (1 − p)c; and
ContinuityK: for all a , b and c inK, if a ≻̃ b and b ≻̃ c, then there exist p, q ∈]0, 1[,
such that pa ⋇ (1 − p)c ≻̃ b and b ≻̃ qa ⋇ (1 − q)c.
If a reflexive relation ⪰̃ on K satisfies these conditions, I’ll again say it’s ‘vNM-
conformable’. For two functions u : I ⇝ X → ℝ and v : I ⇝ X → ℝ, say that v
is a positive unit-comparable transformation of u if there are s and ti ∈ ℝ, s > 0,
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such that v(i, x) = su(i, x) ⋇ ti for all i in I and x in X. It can be shown108 that if⪰̃m is vNM-conformable, there’s a function v : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive
unit-comparable transformation, such that for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)v(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)v(i, x). (5.3)
However, this isn’t enough for our purposes. For all we know, vmight be a random
utility functionwithout any relation to your axiologies or yourm-value judgments
about Q. We need to ensure that the value functions v from (5.3) and u from (5.1)
and (5.2) are related to each other—or more precisely, that the function v can be
understood as a product of your values, as specified by u, and your credences, as
specified by a probability function P on I.
Soweneeda further substantive condition.Weneed to assume that⪰m and ⪰̃m
are value-consistent—so that the differences between them can be fully explained
by the underlying probabilities inQ. To state this condition, letQ+ ⊂ Q be the set
of prospects in Q on which all axiologies have a positive probability, i. e. Q+ =
{a ∈ Q ℘ ∑x∈X a(i, x) > 0 ∀i ∈ I}. Define a function L : Q+ → K; a 󳨃→ L(a), such
that for all i in I and x in X,
L(a)(i, x) = a(i, x)/∑
y∈X
a(i, y). (5.4)
Intuitively, L turns a prospect inQ+ into the corresponding prospect inK in which
the underlying probabilities have been scraped out. For some i in I and a and b
in K, say that a and b agree outside i if for all j in I with j ̸= i, and all x in X,
a(j, x) = b(j, x); and similarly for some a and b in Q. For some i in I and binary
relations ⪰ on Q and ⪰̃ on K, say that i is null if (i) for all a and b in K that agree
outside i, a ∼̃ b, and (ii) there exist a and b in Q that agree outside i such that
a ≻ b. Say that i is non-null if there are a and b in K that agree outside i such that
a ≻̃ b. Now for binary relations ⪰ onQ and ⪰̃ on K, define the
Consistency Axiom: For all i in I and all a and b inQ+, if a and b agree outside
i and L(a) ≻̃ L(b), then a ≻b. Moreover, if i is non-null, then for all a and b in
Q
+ that agree outside i, if a ≻b, then L(a) ≻̃ L(b).
This condition ensures that your judgments about K and Q, or the functions v
from (5.3) and u from (5.1) and (5.2), are appropriately related. As amore technical
assumption,we also need to assume that neither your axiologies nor yourm-value
judgments aboutK are uniform, or rank all prospects as equally (m-)good. So for
108 See Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 7).
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some binary relations ⪰i on O and ⪰̃ on K say that ⪰i is non-uniform if there are
a and b in O such that a ≻i b, and that ⪰̃ is non-uniform if there are a and b in K
such that a ≻̃ b. We can now state the
Representation Theorem for Probabilities: Suppose that all your ⪰i are vNM-
conformable and non-uniform. If your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m are vNM-conformable and
jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom, if your ⪰m satisfies the Pareto Condition with
respect to your⪰i, and your ⪰̃m is non-uniform, there’s a unique probability distribu-
tion P on I and a function u : I ⇝X → ℝ, unique up to positive affine transformation,
such that for all a and b in K, all a and b inQ, all a and b inO and all i in I,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)P(i)u(i, x), (5.5)
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x), and (5.6)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x), (5.7)
and such that if i is null, P(i) = 0, and if i is non-null, P(i) > 0.109
This is a purely mathematical theorem. It says that if your ⪰i, ⪰m and ⪰̃m satisfy
these conditions, there aremathematical functions that represent these relations.
To turn it into a philosophically significant result, we must again add the rel-
evant conceptual assumptions. So let me express more formally the judgment-
explication—or the idea that your credence in an axiology is the weight you give it
in your m-value judgments. To restate the prospect-explication of intra-theoretic
comparisons within the subjective framework we’re now assuming, for your bi-
nary relation ⪰i on O and a function u : X → ℝ, say that u represents your ⪰i
ordinally if for all a and b inO,





Furthermore, say that a function u : X → ℝ represents your ⪰i cardinally if for all
x, y, z and t in X and n ∈ ℝ, the value-difference between outcomes x and y is n
times as great as the value-difference between z and t, according to your Ti, if and
only if (u(x) − u(y))/(u(z) − u(t)) = n. The judgment-explication of intratheoretic
comparisons says that if there is a function u : X → ℝ, unique up to positive affine
transformation, which represents your ⪰i ordinally, then u represents your ⪰i car-
dinally. Now for binary relations ⪰m onQ and ⪰̃m onK, a probability distribution
109 See the appendix (Section A.2) for a proof.
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P on I and a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, say that (P, u) represents your ⪰m and ⪰̃m
ordinally if for all a and b inQ and all a and b in K,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x), and (5.9)
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)P(i)u(i, x). (5.10)
Furthermore, suppose that for someprobability distributionP on I and some func-
tion u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, the crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons be-
tween all outcomes and all theories are the same as the ratios among the util-
ity differences between these outcomes according to u, and that your credences
in any axiology Ti is P(i)—that is, for all x, y, z, t in X, all i, j, h, k in I and n ∈ ℝ,
the difference between the value of x, according to your Ti, and the value of y,
according to your Tj, is n times as great as the difference between the value of
z, according to your Th, and the value of t, according to your Tk, if and only if
(u(i, x) − u(j, y))/(u(h, z) − u(k, t)) = n, with pi = P(i), pj = P(j), ph = P(h) and
pk = P(k). I’ll then say that (P, u) represents your intertheoretic comparisons car-
dinally and your axiological probabilities quantitatively. The judgment-explication
of your intertheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities says that if there is
such a pair (P, u), with P being unique and u unique up to positive affine transfor-
mation, which represents your ⪰m and ⪰̃m ordinally, and if for all i in I, u(i, ⋅) rep-
resents your ⪰i cardinally, then (P, u) represents your intertheoretic comparisons
cardinally and your axiological probabilities quantitatively. So we can interpret
all utility functions u(i, ⋅) jointly as value functions Gi, and the probabilities P(i)
as your credences pi.
Given this explication, the following theorem holds:
Expected Value Theorem for Probabilities: Suppose that all your ⪰i are vNM-
conformable and non-uniform. If your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m are vNM-conformable and
jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom, if your ⪰m satisfies the Pareto Condition with
respect to your ⪰i and your ⪰̃m is non-uniform, then for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)piGi(x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)piGi(x).110 (5.11)
This is a non-mathematical result. But it’s still only a conditional. It says that if
your m-value judgments satisfy the relevant conditions, you’re as a matter of fact
110 See the appendix (Section A.2) for the derivation of this theorem from the Representation
Theorem for Probabilities and the judgment-explications.
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following (5.11)—and that is, EVM. Clearly, the converse is also true: if there exist
a probability distribution P, and functions Gi that represent your axiologies car-
dinally, and your judgments satisfy (5.11) (and its equivalent regarding Q) with
respect to them, then your judgments will satisfy the relevant conditions. So if
we’re interested in Subjectivist EVM, we can now turn this into an argument for
the normative truth of (5.11). Denote the conditions in the antecedent of this the-
orem (‘If your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m...’) by ‘C’. And say that you satisfy C, or that your
judgments are ‘C-conformable’, if your judgments satisfy these conditions. If all
your axiologies are vNM-conformable and non-uniform, we can then argue:
(R) your m-value judgments are (subjectively) correct if and only if you satisfy C;
(S) as a matter of logical equivalence, you satisfy C if and only if you follow Sub-
jectivist EVM; therefore
(T) your m-value judgments are (subjectively) correct if and only if you follow
Subjectivist EVM; Subjectivist EVM is true.
This is the main argument for a form of Subjectivist EVM.111
As mentioned, the Representation Theorem for Probabilities can be used to
ground Objectivist EVM too. To that end, we can interpret the relations ⪰i as de-
noting which prospects are better than which according to our axiologies—or as
inducing the axiological orderings under consideration.We can interpret the rela-
tion⪰m as denotingwhichprospectswould bem-better thanwhich for you, if axio-
logical orderings had certain antecedently specified probabilities—or as inducing
the intertheoretic comparisons that are reasonable for you tomake between these
orderings. And we can interpret the relation ⪰̃m as denoting which prospects are
m-better thanwhich, given your evidence—or as inducing the credences that your
evidencewarrants in the respective versions of our axiologies. The resulting argu-
ment would be similar to the argument outlined in Chapter 2: the m-value facts
satisfy C; if they satisfy C, Objectivist EVM is true; therefore Objectivist EVM is
true. For simplicity, I’ll continue to focus on the subjectivist version of the theo-
rem, the argument and EVM. But much of what I say appliesmutatis mutandis to
the objectivist version as well.
A brief note about the plausibility of the meta-axiological assumptions. Most
of the conditions of theRepresentationTheorem for Probabilities are familiar from
111 Note that this argument is only sound if you make subjective judgments, about which
prospects are m-better than which relative to your credences and the comparisons you make.
If you make objectivist judgments, about which prospects are m-better than which relative to the
credences your evidence warrants and the comparisons that are (constructively) correct, your
judgments may satisfy C and still be false—by embodying unwarranted credences or mistaken
comparisons.
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the Basic Representation Theorem. Somy discussion of these conditions in Chap-
ter 3 (and Chapter 6) clarifies how plausible they are as normative constraints on
your (m-)value judgments. The problem of incommensurabilities carries over to
the present context. Your ⪰i needn’t satisfy Completeness, because according to
some of your axiologies, some prospects might not be fully commensurable. And
in addition, your ⪰m and ⪰̃m needn’t satisfy Completeness, because some of your
axiologies may be less than fully commensurable to each other. However, in the
context of your ⪰̃m on K, there might be an additional reason for why your judg-
ments needn’t be complete. To assume that your ⪰̃m should satisfy Completeness
is to assume that your credences ought to be sharp, or representable by single real
numbers. If your credences can justifiably be ‘fuzzy’—or less than fully sharp—
your ⪰̃m needn’t be complete. And this is so even if all your axiologies are com-
plete and fully commensurable. There are strong arguments to the effect that your
non-normative credences needn’t be precise, and these plausibly carry over to ax-
iological credences.112 But since the problem of fuzzy credences is not specific to
axiological uncertainty, I’ll rule out fuzzy credences throughout this book. So this
is another important restriction of our arguments. It’s plausible that your axiolog-
ical credences can justifiably be fuzzy, but I’ll ignore this.
5.2 Applying Subjectivist EVM in practice
I’ll presently discuss objections to the argument just outlined. But first, it might
help to spell out how the theory of axiological uncertainty based on the Expected
Value Theorem for Probabilities and the judgment-explication of credences can
be applied in real-life cases. In principle, the theory is silent on this. EVM is a cri-
terion of m-betterness, not a procedure for how to arrive at m-value judgments in
practice. So in principle we might satisfy EVM by just following the advice of a
fortuneteller. But that seems unlikely. And taking our criterion of m-betterness as
a decision procedure often seems a good way of arriving at m-value judgments.
So let’s see how this could be done. As an example, suppose you consider becom-
ing a vegan. You believe that doing so would increase animal welfare by some
amount, but reduce humanwelfare by 60%of that amount (since it would require
resources you’re currently using to your and other people’s benefit). You’re certain
that welfare and only welfare has value, but uncertain about whether animal wel-
fare is equally as valuable as human welfare. And you want to know whether it’s
m-better for you to become a vegan. How do you answer this question?
112 See e. g. Joyce (2005; 2010); see e. g. Elga (2010) andWhite (2010) for arguments that subjec-
tive probabilities should be sharp.
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First, you need to determine what axiological orderings you’re uncertain
about. You need to determine your orderings ⪰i. To that end, you can consider
simple examples like the following:
Tab. 5.1: Example to illustrate axiological orderings.
a bq
p = 1 p = q p = (1 − q)
Bruin killed Maria killed status quo
If you choose prospect a, bear Bruin will be killed with certainty. If you choose
prospect bq, human Maria will be killed with probability q, and nothing will hap-
pen otherwise. Let’s assume that their death would be equally bad for Bruin and
Maria. Now if according to some axiology, a ∼i b1, the value of animal welfare is
equally as great as the value of human welfare according to this axiology. If ac-
cording to an axiology, a ∼j b0.5, the value of animal welfare is half as great as
the value of human welfare according to it. Suppose you think that these two and
only these two axiologies are plausible. Let’s call them welfare-theory (TW ), and
species-weighted-welfare-theory (TSWW ) respectively.
Next, you need to determine how your theories compare intertheoretically,
or in what relative versions of these orderings you have credence. To that end,
you have to consider your m-value judgments about Q. This will be easiest with
unnatural toy examples, like the following:
Tab. 5.2: Example to illustrate intertheoretic comparisons.
ax bx
TW TSWW TW TSWW
pW = x pSWW = (1 − x) pW = x pSWW = (1 − x)
Maria killed status quo status quo Maria killed
If you choose ax, Maria will be killed if TW is true, and nothing will happen if
TSWW is true. If you choose bx, Maria will be killed if TSWW is true, and nothing
will happen if TW is true. And these prospects are such that the probability of
TW and TSWW are x and (1 − x) respectively. So in judging that a2/3 ∼m b2/3, say,
you’d judge that killing Maria was twice as bad on TSWW as on TW . But suppose
you actually judge that a1/2 ∼m b1/2. This means you think ax and bx are equally
m-good if TW and TSWW are equiprobable, or that the value of human welfare is
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the same on both theories. Youmight think this, say, because you think this is the
simplest assumption, or the least radical way of reforming your credence in light
of the evidence you’ve just found for TW .
Finally, you need to determine what credence you have in these theories. To
that end, you have to consider your m-value judgments about K. This will again
be easiest with unnatural toy examples, like the following:
Tab. 5.3: Example to illustrate axiological credences.
a n bm
TW TSWW TW TSWW
n people killed status quo status quo m people killed
If you choose an then n people will be killed if TW is true, and nothing will hap-
pen if TSWW is true. If you choose bm then m people will be killed if TSWW is true,
and nothing will happen if TW is true. Their death would be equally bad for all of
these people. So in judging that a1 ∼̃m b1, say, you’d judge it equallym-good to risk
the death of a person conditional on TW as conditional on TSWW . And since we al-
ready know you find these deaths equally bad on either theory, this means you’d
assign both TW and TSWW the same probability. But suppose you actually judge
that a2 ∼̃m b1. This means you think it’s equally m-good to risk the death two peo-
ple conditional on TW as the death of one person conditional on TSWW . It means
that the credence you have in TW is half of that you have in TSWW .
So your judgments about these toy examples implywhat axiological orderings
you have credence in, how they compare, and how much credence you have in
them. You can now use these probabilities and values to determine whether it’s
m-better for you to turn vegan. We were assuming that according to your non-
normative beliefs, your becoming a vegan increases animal welfare (a-welfare) by
some amount w, but reduces human welfare (h-welfare) by 60% of that amount:
Tab. 5.4: Example to illustrate Subjectivist EVM.
Becoming a vegan Not becoming a vegan
TW TSWW TW TSWW
a-welfare +w, a-welfare +w,
h-welfare −0.6w h-welfare −0.6w status quo status quo
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We can assume (without loss of generality) that the value of the status quo is 0
on both theories, and that the disvalue of decreasing human welfare by w is −1.
Note that according to the theory you find more plausible (TSWW ), it’s better not






10 < 0. (5.12)
Nonetheless, it’s m-better for you to become a vegan. The expected value of be-












15 > 0. (5.13)
So relative to your credences, it’sm-better for you to become a vegan, even though
you think it’s more likely worse.
This is at least the beginning of the full story of how our theory can—in Sav-
age’s terms—help you to ‘police [your] own decisions for consistency and, when
possible, to make complicated decisions depend on simpler ones’ (1954, 20). Of
course, in practice, you might also have credence in other versions of these the-
ories which compare differently; or you might have credence in other species-
weighted-welfare-theories, which imply a different ordering; or you might have
still other views that affect this decision. Then the above calculations are only a
first approximation ofwhether it’sm-better for you to become a vegan. Your calcu-
lation will be more accurate the more of these alternatives you take into account.
Moreover, you might also have an intuition concerning the m-value of becoming
a vegan. If you intuitively judge itm-worse to turn vegan, your m-value judgments
can’t all be correct. So youneed to revise some of these judgments, until you attain
a reflective equilibrium in which they satisfy all of our constraints. As an aside,
note that the ability to construct unnatural prospects likeax,bx, an and bm is help-
ful in thinking about these questions. In this respect, as indicated on page 24, the
unnatural aspects of our framework are actually an advantage.
5.3 Objections and implications
The argument in Section 5.1 again suggested that representation theorems can
serve the two foundational purposes indicated in Section 1.2: clarify what EVM
means, and corroborate that it is true. But especially with respect to the notion of
credences, many philosophers are sceptical of the significance of representation
theorems for these purposes. Christopher Meacham and Jonathan Weisberg, for
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instance, claim that ‘representation theorems cannot serve either of these founda-
tional purposes’, and that, ‘we should [...] lay the foundations of decision theory
on firmer ground’ than that provided by such theorems (2011, 641). So it’s time
to address some objections. Most of these objections have been levelled against
preference-based representation theorems in decision theory. But they applymu-
tatis mutandis to Subjectivist EVM in the context of axiological uncertainty. And
I’ll only be concernedwith that. I’ll argue that the judgment-explication is the best
explication of axiological credences. But Iwon’t claim that preference-based theo-
rems can serve these purposes in decision theory or epistemologymore generally.
That’s another question.113
Relationship to the ordinary concept
A technical concept may diverge from the ordinary language notion in some re-
spects. It may be more precise, and may perhaps also shift the original meaning
slightly. However, if it’s to be an explication of that notion—rather than a stip-
ulative definition of a completely new term—it shouldn’t deviate too much from
the explicandum. Preference-based definitions of credences have been criticised
in this respect, and some worries carry over to our context. Here’s a first worry.
Intuitively, most of us have varying credences in axiologies: we find some axiolo-
gies quite plausible, others somewhat less, and still others highly unlikely. Yet we
generally don’t satisfy C. So we can rarely be ascribed credences as defined by our
explication. Thus our technical notion diverges from its explicandum.Amongoth-
ers, Meacham andWeisberg (2011) raised this objection against preference-based
definitions in decision theory.114 Referring to the technical notions of utilities and
degrees of belief as ‘utilities*’ and ‘degrees of belief*’, they say:
To make degrees of belief* and utilities* relevant to epistemology and normative decision
theory, these states must be linked to the states that are the topic of our normative theoriz-
ing in these domains. And since agents like us generally don’t have degrees of belief* and
utilities*, it’s hard to see how they’re relevant. (2011, 655)
The same worry appliesmutatis mutandis in our context.
113 In particular, I’ll ignore the debate about probabilism—the view that your credences should
satisfy the axioms of probability theory. According to the judgment-explication and my main ar-
gument, probabilism is true. But I don’t understand it as an argument for probabilism. I under-
stand it as an argument for how your credences and values should interact to determine your
m-value judgments.
114 Eriksson and Hájek (2007, 200 f.; 203 f.) and Zynda (2000, 62) make the same point.
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There are three replies to this objection. First, we must keep the purpose of
our explication in mind. Since you’ll rarely satisfy C, the specific explication I’ve
given may be relatively useless in descriptive or predictive accounts of your men-
tal states or behaviour. But Subjectivist EVM isn’t a descriptive or predictive ac-
count. It’s a normative account of what your m-value judgments should be, or of
when they’re correct. It says your m-value judgments are (subjectively) correct if
and only if you satisfy C in one way or another; and that if you do, you satisfy
EVM with respect to your credences. The fact that we can’t assign credences to
you on the basis of our explication if you fail to satisfy C is irrelevant for whether
this claim is convincing, or close enough to our ordinary concept of credences. All
that’s relevant is that our explication resembles our intuitive concept when you
satisfy C. AndMeacham andWeisberg’s argument does nothing to challenge that.
Against the specific normative interpretation of EVM I’ve adopted, their argument
is simply a red herring.
Second, we need to distinguish between the specific explication I’ve given
and the general idea behind it. The general idea of the judgment-explication is
simply that your credence in an axiology is the weight you give it in your m-value
judgments. And this idea isn’t limited to the ideal cases where you satisfy C, or
to the narrowly normative interpretation of EVM I’ve invoked. The Representa-
tion Theorem for Probabilities shows that if you satisfy C, there’s a unique weight
you give all your axiologies. But even when you don’t satisfy these conditions,
there might be facts about the weights you give your axiologies in your m-value
judgments. And through slightly broader interpretations of our general explica-
tive idea, and perhaps slightly more complex theorems, these facts might still al-
low credence-interpretations of you. For instance, suppose you don’t satisfy Com-
pleteness. Intuitively, this might mean you don’t assign unique probabilities to
your axiologies in the manner my explication presupposes, but have fuzzy cre-
dences in them.Andour general explicative idea could capture this. There are rep-
resentation theorems without the Completeness axiom, which in such cases can
represent you as assigning a range of weights to your axiologies. Thus we could
interpret you as assigning probability-ranges to them. Alternatively, suppose you
don’t satisfy C for the full range of axiologies T (and the corresponding setsK and
Q). You satisfy C only for the set T \ Ti (and the corresponding prospects). Intu-
itively, thismightmean you’ve decided how likely all other axiologies are, relative
to each other. But you haven’t yet made up your mind about what credence you
assign to Ti. Again, our general idea could capture this. We could use the Repre-
sentation Theorem for Probabilities, and my judgment-explication, as applied to
the set T \ Ti—and add the caveat that you haven’t yet fully made up your mind
regarding Ti. Or again, suppose you don’t satisfy C for the full set of outcomes X
(and the corresponding setsK andQ). You satisfy C only for the set X \ x (and the
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corresponding prospects). Intuitively, this might mean you’ve basically decided
how likely your axiologies are. But for some reason, you just get confused when
considering the outcome x. Again, our general idea could capture this. We could
use the Representation Theorem for Probabilities, and my judgment-explication,
as applied to the set X \x—and add the caveat that x seems to confuse you. Or per-
haps all these qualifications apply: you satisfy only Transitivity, Independence
and Continuity, with respect to a restricted set of axiologies, and a restricted set
of outcomes. Even then, there might be certain facts about the weights you give
your axiologies, which would allow certain claims about your credences in light
of our explication.
Third, wemust not be too lenient in assigning credences to people. The cases
I’ve just described are still to some extent ideal: they presuppose that you sat-
isfy Transitivity, Independence and Continuity with respect to some theories and
outcomes. Perhaps when people don’t even show any such traces of satisfying C,
there’s no way for our explication to assign credences to them. But this seems
intuitively plausible too. Intuitively, some people simply don’t allow any mean-
ingful assignments of degrees of belief. They’re just too incoherent. So arguably,
these remaining limitations even speak in favour of our explication. The core idea
of the judgment-explication can explain when credence-assignments intuitively
become impossible.
A more promising strategy might be to attack the core idea of the judgment-
explication directly, and question whether the explication is adequate when you
satisfy C. And this may be questioned. One pertinent worry is that our ordinary
notion of credences is much richer than the concept I’ve introduced. Among oth-
ers, David Christensen (2001) stressed this point in decision theory—suggesting
that ‘the preference-based definition leaves out important parts of our pretheo-
retic notion’ (2001, 361).115 For one thing, ‘a person’s beliefs [...] affect the way
she behaves in countless ways that have nothing directly to do with the decision
theorist’s paradigm of cost-benefit calculation’ (2001, 361). For another thing, de-
grees of belief not only help to explain behaviour, but also ‘other psychological
states and processes’ (2001, 361). Your self-deprecating beliefs may explain why
you’re performing poorly in a competition, or why you’re being sad or afraid, or
why you release stress hormones or are physically unhealthy. Beliefs are involved
in a plethora of explanatory connections, even when our preferences satisfy the
115 The samepoint is endorsed byEriksson andHájek (2007, 208).MeachamandWeisberg (2011,
646) also highlight the rich explanatory connections of beliefs (thoughnot as anobjection against
what they call the ‘Explicative View’, and what is basically the view I suggested); see also Hájek
(2008, 803 ff.).
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axioms. This being so, Christensen claimed, ‘the move of settling on just one of
these connections—even an important one—as definitional comes to look highly
suspicious’ (2001, 362). And this worry carries over to our context. Your axiolog-
ical beliefs arguably play a much richer role than just determining your m-value
judgments: theymay explain your behaviour, your immediate reactions, attitudes
and emotions and so on, even when you satisfy C.
This is a more pertinent worry. But again it can be answered. Christensen fo-
cused on Patrick Maher’s (1993) understanding of probabilities and utilities, ac-
cording to which ‘an attribution of probabilities and utilities is correct just in case
it’s part of an overall interpretation of the person’s preferences that makes suf-
ficiently good sense of them and better sense than any competing interpretation
does’ (1993, 9). Christensen objected:
a given interpretation of an agent’s degrees of belief might maximize expected-utility fit
with the agent’s preferences while a different interpretationmight fitmuch better with other
psychological-explanatory principles. In such cases of conflict [...] there’s no guarantee that
the best interpretationwill be the one onwhich the agent’s preferences accord perfectlywith
maximizing [expected utility]. (2001, 362)
But my understanding of the explication differs from Maher’s. I don’t offer it as
the best overall interpretation of an agent. On the contrary, at least if ‘best’ means
‘descriptively best’ as opposed to ‘best for our purposes’, I’d doubt there gener-
ally is a uniquely best interpretation. Suppose in my m-value judgments I give
muchmore weight to the welfare- than the human-welfare-theory. But inmy emo-
tional reactions, implicit attitudes, hormone levels and in my actual behaviour, I
give somewhat more weight to the human-welfare- than to the welfare-theory. In
which theory do I then have a higher degree of belief? Do my reactions and be-
haviour show that I don’t really have a higher credence in the welfare-theory? Or
do I act and react against my true credences, due to akrasia or biases or whatever?
Very plausibly, our intuitive concept of credence isn’t sharp enough to imply any-
thing definitive in all such cases. There is often no uniquely ‘best interpretation’.
There are several viable interpretations that don’t seem outright misleading, and
that might all pick out a theoretically useful phenomenon.116 All I claim is that
the judgment-explication is one of them. If you satisfy C, and thus give each ax-
iology a constant weight in your m-value judgments under uncertainty, it’s not
116 There’s a literature on whether, if you profess to believe that p but act contrary to that pro-
fessed belief, you truly believe that p (see e. g. Schwitzgebel 2010 for an overview, and a position
similar to the one expressed above). I’m not aware of a discussion of such cases with regards to
a graded notion of belief.
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determinately wrong or completely misleading to call the relevant weights your
‘credences’. And it picks out something that’s useful for our purposes.
Letme elaborate on the latter point.Why focus on yourm-value judgments, of
all possible connections, to explicate credences? There are at least two reasons.
First, we want to say you should satisfy EVM with respect to your ‘credences’.
So we need to pick out ‘credences’ that should be relevant in your decision-
making. But many aspects Christensen emphasises arguably shouldn’t be. Many
of us won’t have the moral emotions we judge to be fitting.117 Our implicit at-
titudes often contradict what we explicitly claim to believe and take to reflect
our evidence—and often in a sexist or racist manner.118 And presumably, many
of us fail to act in accordance with what we judge to be good.119 And this isn’t
surprising. Among other things, our judgments can adapt to new evidence very
quickly. Our behaviour, emotions and implicit attitudes are much more resistant
to such changes. But plausibly, when there’s a conflict between your considered
judgments and other aspects of your psychology, you shouldn’t satisfy EVM with
respect to the latter. You should satisfy EVM with respect to the ‘credences’ in-
duced by your judgments. Our explication picks out something relevant to what
you ought to do.
Second, our explication is very simple. In response to Christensen’s conflict
cases, we could provide an explication involving other aspects of our psychology.
For example, we could introduce conditions on attitudes, of the sort: ‘if you have
a favouring attitude for a over b, then for any c in K and any p ∈]0, 1[, you have a
favouring attitude for pa⋇(1−p)c over pb⋇(1−p)c’. These conditionsmay imply an
attitude-relative ‘credence’-function. Perhaps we could do the same for your be-
haviour, your hormone level, and so on. And we could then take a weighted aver-
age of these relativized ‘credence’-functions to get your overall credence-function.
Or we could assume bridging principles of the form ‘if you judge that a is m-better
than b, you have a favouring attitude for a over b’, guaranteeing that all these cre-
dence functions are the same. No one has done this, and it would involve serious
difficulties.120 But even if it were possible, the complexity of such an account of
117 See e. g. Greene et al. (2001, 2107) on people judging ‘in spite of their emotions’.
118 See e. g. Greenwald and Banaji (1995), Gaertner andMcLaughlin (1983) or Dovidio and Gaert-
ner (2000) for relatively early works; Strohminger et al. (2014) for a recent methodological survey
about implicitmoral attitudes.
119 See e. g. the findings of Schwitzgebel and Rust (2014) or Schwitzgebel (2014), suggesting that
more stringent moral views don’t imply more stringent moral behaviour.
120 For instance, different people seem to react differently to the belief that one prospect is m-
better than another; no such reaction might be a necessary condition for that belief, and the
choice of any one might be somewhat arbitrary.
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credences would be a major drawback. Our explication is much simpler. So the
judgment-explication may not provide the uniquely overall best interpretation of
you. There often won’t be any such interpretation. But our explication picks out a
feature of ‘beliefs’ that’s descriptively very salient, normatively relevant, and still
comparatively straightforward.
Here’s a third, related worry. One might worry, not that there are additional
connections between our credences and our psychology, but that sometimes the
presumed connection with our m-value judgments doesn’t exist. Lina Eriksson
and Alan Hájek (2007) have claimed this with respect to standard preference-
explications in decision theory:
Credences and preferences are certainly separable in thought, and sometimes in practice.
Imagine a Zen Buddhist monk who has credences but no preferences [i. e., ‘is indifferent
among all things’]. [...] If the monk is conceptually possible, then any account that concep-
tually ties credences to preferences is refuted. [...] Or consider a chronic apathetic who has
lost all his desires, but who has kept all his credences. To be sure, these characters are not
recognizably like us, although some of us may approximate them over certain domains, and
to the extent that we do, bets and preferences more generally ill-reflect our true credences.
(2007, 194)
Others have provided similar arguments.121 And a similar point seems to apply
in our context. Axiological credences and m-value judgments are ‘separable in
thought’, it seems, since we can imagine someone who has axiological beliefs but
doesn’t make any m-value judgments.
But what precisely is the argument here? On the face of it, first, mere ‘ap-
proximation’ of monk-like apathy doesn’t distort preference-based explications at
all. It will simply result in an attenuated utility function, and this seems precisely
appropriate. Second, the perfectly indifferent monk is such that our theorem just
doesn’t apply to them. The Expected Value Theorem for Probabilities presupposes
that you make (non-uniform) m-value judgments. Thus monk-cases can’t show
that the explication is flawed when it applies.122
But perhaps Eriksson and Hájek raise a deeper worry. As applied to our con-
text, their argument seems to be that themere possibility of axiological credences
121 See Christensen (2001, 363).
122 True, there’s arguably a difference between the monk and someone with, say, intransitive
preferences: the latter is (presumably) making some sort of mistake, whereas the monk perhaps
needn’t make anymistake. So themonk shows that the Representation Theorem for Probabilities
can’t ground a fully general normative theory. But I’ve already admitted that many constraints in
that theorem are too strong as normative constraints, and are only plausible given certain restric-
tions or simplifications (e. g., the assumption that all axiologies are non-uniform).
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and m-value judgments coming apart shows that any definition of the former in
terms of the latter must be flawed. If they can come apart, the thought seems to
go, any connection between them must be contingent and can’t be conceptual.
But that’s simply a non-sequitur. A condition may be sufficient but not necessary
for a concept to apply, and this may be a conceptual truth. It seems to be a con-
ceptual matter, say, that if you have the ability repeatedly to play the first prelude
from the Well-Tempered Clavier, then you know how to play it. And yet, you can
also know how to play it without having that ability, as when your arms are bro-
ken or all pianos have been destroyed. Our explication only says that if you satisfy
C, then as a matter of explication, you have the credences that make you satisfy
EVM. And this may be correct, or a legitimate explication, even if intuitively you
may have credences even if you don’t make m-value judgments.
Perhaps Eriksson and Hájek have inmind yet another argument: that we any-
way need an explication of the perfect monk’s credences; that that explication
can’t be preference-based; that it will apply to any other agent as well; and that
therefore the preference-explication is redundant. However, for reasons I’ve in-
dicated, it’s unclear whether we can give an adequate explication of someone’s
quantitative credences if they don’tmake anym-value judgments. So unless Eriks-
son and Hájek present a better or more general explication (which they don’t)
this argument doesn’t get off the ground. And more generally, perfectly indiffer-
ent monks are very rare, or indeed presumably inexistent. And so are people who
don’t make any m-value judgments. If we have an otherwise useful explication,
that’s silent on these highly exceptional cases, that seems like a limitation we can
live with.123
Normative relevance
Let’s turn to a different set of worries about the judgment-explication. These
worries concern the normative relevance of the resulting theory. They challenge
123 There are other objections against preference-based explications in decision theory; Eriks-
son and Hájek (2007) offer an overview. Another worry that carries over to our context is that
explicating credences in terms of preferences gets the order of explanation wrong (see Eriksson
and Hájek 2007, 207 f.). I’ve replied to the equivalent objection concerning value in Section 3.3. A
similar reply could be given concerning credences. As far as I see, the remaining objections don’t
apply to my explication of axiological credences. In particular, a prominent objection against ex-
plicating degrees of belief in terms of preferences is that this explication is overly ‘pragmatic’,
reducing a doxastic attitude (credence) to a conative one (preferences) (see Joyce 1999, 89 ff. or
Eriksson and Hájek 2007, 194). However, my explication explains a doxastic attitude (axiological
credences) in terms of another doxastic attitude (m-value judgments). So this objection doesn’t
apply.
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that Subjectivist EVM as understood by the judgment-explication can play the
normative role we want a theory of axiological uncertainty to play. A first such
worry is that Subjectivist EVM is normatively trivial. A theory of axiological un-
certainty should constrain your judgments about what’s m-best. But Subjectivist
EVM seems to take your m-value judgments as given to define your credences and
values. So it may seem that it will just guarantee that your m-value judgments are
correct, and thus can’t constrain or guide you at all.124
That’s a misunderstanding. Subjectivist EVM does put constraints on you.
These constraints are simply the axioms. In the version I’ve outlined, your m-
value judgments can’t be correct if you violate C. So youmay use these conditions
to guide your evaluation of prospects, or makemore complex evaluations depend
on simpler ones. What’s true is that—as far as the correctness of your m-value
judgments as subjective m-value judgments is concerned—these conditions are
all that Subjectivist EVM implies. And these conditions only rule out certain sets
of m-value judgments, but no individual judgment in itself: they’re mere coher-
ence constraints (as I’ve put it), rather than unconditional local constraints on
individual judgments themselves. Thus Subjectivist EVM reduces to a set of co-
herence constraints. This doesn’t mean that any C-conformable set of judgments
is as goodas any other in all respects. Some such judgmentswill reflect inadequate
credences, and thus be epistemically problematic, say. But on Subjectivist EVM,
your m-value judgments are correct as subjective m-value judgments relative to
your credences if and only if they’re C-conformable.
Here’s a second, related worry. Even if that’s not outright trivial, one might
still find it disappointing. Meacham and Weisberg do. They argue that the view
that you ought to maximise the expectation of utility* relative to your credences*
(in the technical senses of these terms) is ‘prescriptively useless’ (2011, 656) or ‘un-
interesting’ (2011, 642; 645; 655; 661): ‘Normative decision theory applies only to
agentswhohave degrees of belief and utilities. But agentswhohave degrees of be-
lief* and utilities* are automatically [...] expected utility maximizers with respect
to them.’ So, they suggested, ‘it will be true by definition that all agents subject to
the norms of decision theory satisfy them’. (2011, 653) The worry is that the norm
to maximise expected utility only applies to you if you have credences and utili-
ties; but that once you have credences* and utilities* you automaticallymaximise
124 Sepielli (2010, 169) raised this objection against preference-based explications in decision
theory: ‘The standard way of assigning credences and utilities in decision theory assigns them in
such a way that the agent’s preferences will necessarily come out as maximizing expected utility.
Since the going assumption in decision theory is that maximizing expected utility is necessarily
rational, this means that agents will necessarily have fully rational preferences.’ This is ‘highly
counterintuitive’ (2010, 168), he says.
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expected utility with respect to them. But that’s again just false. The coherence
conditions C of Subjectivist EVM don’t just apply to you once you have axiologi-
cal credences. They apply to you whenever. They say you always ought to make
m-value judgments that satisfy Completeness, Transitivity, Independence, and so
on. We might say Subjectivist EVM requires you, among else, to have axiological
credences.
Meacham and Weisberg consider this reply in a footnote. But all they say in
response is that
this proposal represents a substantive shift in the content of normative decision theory.
We’re no longer dealing with the same norms, and these replacements can’t do the same
work as the originals. For example, normative decision theory is supposed to say which of
an agent’s options she ought to take. But the injunction to have degrees of belief and utilities
will be silent on this, since every option will maximize expected utility relative to some pair
of probability and utility functions. (2011, 648, n.15)
This is merely to say that if we thought EVM could imply local constraints, Sub-
jectivist EVM constitutes a shift in our understanding. But it doesn’t show why
that should make it uninteresting, or why we thus have to ‘lay the foundations of
decision theory on firmer ground’ than that provided by representation theorems
(2011, 641).
In fact, the shift from an understanding of EVM on which it implies local to
one on which it implies coherence constraints is much less dramatic than it may
seem.On the one hand, at least on a reflective-equilibrium-type view in (meta-)ax-
iological epistemology, there’s anywayultimately just coherence constraints. Sup-
pose we can take axiological credences as primitives, and have some intuitive, in-
trospective sense of what our credences are. If the numbers you gathered through
introspection implym-value judgments youfindhighly implausible (giving far too
much weight to the average-welfare-theory, say) you shouldn’t stick slavishly to
these judgments. You should adjust your ‘credences’ until they cohere with a set
of m-value judgments you find plausible. Thus ultimately, our norms concerning
m-value judgments anyway reduce to coherence constraints. In Subjectivist EVM
this reduction is internal to the theory. But it’s not clear why that should be prob-
lematic.125 On the other hand, nothing in the judgment-explication implies that
you may not also, say, consult your feelings of confidence when determining a
set of m-value judgments. If you start with an intuitive list of numbers, and these
125 In fact, at least in the present case, I think it’s preferable to have the coherence constraints
built into the theory.Note that according toEVMasunderstood in termsof the Simple Explication,
your first (extremely implausible seeming) m-value judgments were true as subjective m-value
judgments. That seems to show that, in itself, this theory is of little normative significance.
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numbers lead you to a set of m-value judgments that satisfy our conditions and
that you find plausible, there’s nothing wrong with that. The reduction to coher-
ence constraints doesn’t prohibit the use of introspection or local constraints in
practice.
Here’s a thirdworry Subjectivist EVM invites. If it normatively boils down to C,
why should it even matter whether we interpret your m-value judgments this way
or another once you satisfy C? It nowseemsall thework is doneby the axioms, and
that the formula (5.11) for EVM has become entirely redundant. So why should we
even care about the EVM-representation? Why should we care about the relevant
theorem and the bulk of my argument in this chapter?
The reason is that wemay ultimately not just be interested in the truth of your
m-value judgments as subjective m-value judgments. As far as that is concerned,
the formula for EVM indeed doesn’t add an additional norm. But we may also be
interested in whether your m-value judgments reflect reasonable credences. And
the EVM-representation helps express the connection between the theory of axi-
ological uncertainty on the one hand, and axiological epistemology on the other.
Judging that it’s m-better to benefit people significantly more than non-human
animals, say, seems epistemically unreasonable. But it’s not perspicuous from the
axioms alone how we can capture this in a unified way. Representation theorems
show that if your judgments satisfy C, you attach a constant weight to each axi-
ology. So they allow us to say, not just that this or that m-value judgment is un-
reasonable, but that you’re giving too much weight to speciesism. And if we can
interpret these weights as credences, that’s a congenial way to link the norms of
the theory of axiological uncertainty to epistemology. It does justice to the intu-
itive idea that some axiologies are more plausible or likely true than others, and
that these likelihoods are relevant in determiningm-value. And it allows us to say
that the normative relationship between our evidence and theseweights is one be-
tween evidence and a doxastic state, whichmay providemore unity to our overall
picture of what an epistemic norm is, or what norms there exist.126
There’s a fourth, more specific worry about employing coherence constraints
on your m-value judgments. We all have some pretheoretic preferences, and can
thus use coherence constraints to determine what further preferences we ought
to have in cases where we haven’t yet formed any. So coherence constraints might
be good and well in standard decision theory. But one might worry that we can’t
make any m-value judgments without prior theoretic guidance. Indeed this, one
126 Representation theorems can also serve a practical purpose. Instead of working with the
axioms alone, it’s often easier to derive your probabilities and values from simple cases, and
then apply the formula for EVM for more complex ones. That’s what I did in Section 5.2.
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might say, is why we need a theory of axiological uncertainty in the first place.
Hence such a theory must be able to constrain us without assuming that wemake
prior m-value judgments, on pain of presupposing that we know already what it
was supposed to tell us. This was argued by Brian Hedden, who reports to have
‘few if any brute intuitions’ (2016, 114) concerning which prospects are m-better
than which, and suspects that this is true for most people.127
This is a more pertinent worry. But I’m much less pessimistic than Hedden
about our ability to makem-value judgments. Axiological uncertainty raises diffi-
cult philosophical questions and presents intricate formal problems. But in an im-
portant sense, it’s also a fairly straightforward phenomenon. It can be explained
to non-specialists in a couple of sentences. And it doesn’t seem to engender any-
thing like intellectual paralysis as far as m-value judgments go. I suspect most
people would say they aren’t entirely certain about the value of equality or de-
served punishment or the creation of an extra person. But I also suspect that,
when pressed to judge in light of this uncertainty, most people would consider
it m-better to bring about an equal distribution of some amount of welfare rather
than a grossly unequal distribution of a marginally greater amount of it; or m-
better to punish the guilty rather than an innocent person for some moral wrong,
even if this involves somewhat greater costs for society; but perhaps m-worse to
create a person and thereby greatly harm an existing one rather than to leave the
population as it is. Or perhaps they’d judge differently. But I’d be surprised if peo-
ple were entirely clueless about which of such prospects arem-better. If anything,
a sense of cluelessness seems to be post-theoretic, issuing perhaps from one’s
view about the problem of intertheoretic comparisons or one’s metaethical as-
sumptions.
Now of course, there will be many cases where we lack a firm intuition. We
won’t haveafirm intuitionaboutpreciselywhich increase inoverallwelfaremakes
an unfair distribution equally as m-good as a fair one. But this needn’t indicate a
defect. Recall what I said in the last chapter. Plausibly, your m-value judgments
needn’t satisfy Completeness: there often aren’t any positive facts about which
127 This worry is analogous to one about Harsanyi’s theorem. Standardly, the theory of ‘social
preferences’ is supposed to take individual preferences as inputs and tell you which of your
prospects is socially best. But Harsanyi’s theorem starts with social and individual preferences,
and then tells you that if they satisfy certain axioms, you can pick utility functions that represent
themand relate in a certainway. Again, Harsanyi’s axiomsmightwell help you derive some social
preferences if you know some such preferences to start from. But you might worry that you don’t
have brute intuitions about what’s socially best and thus can’t know any such preferences—in
particular, not unless you’re antecedently told how to make interpersonal comparisons of wel-
fare (see Hedden 2016, 114).
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prospects are m-better than which, since our axiologies aren’t fully commensu-
rable. And if this is so, our lack of firm intuitions needn’t indicate that there are
factswe’re not grasping, and that our intuitions are poor. Itmay indicate that there
aren’t any facts, and that our intuitions are a good guide to that. The absence of a
firm intuition might be the intuition of the absence of a fact.
Even if this is granted, and the practical usefulness of our theory accepted,
there might be a fifth and final worry. One might object that a reduction to coher-
ence constraints just makes EVM too permissive—that it’s simply wrong that any
judgments satisfying C are correct.
But there’s an answer to this too, and it’s perhaps a general answer to all re-
maining worries concerning the normativity of Subjectivist EVM. Recall that ac-
cording to Subjectivist EVM, such judgments are only correct as subjective m-
value judgments. They might of course still reflect unreasonable credence distri-
butions over axiological orderings, or implicate credences in versions of these or-
derings, or intertheoretic comparisons, that violate our prior constructivist norms.
In otherwords, your judgmentsmight still be false by the lights ofObjectivist EVM.
Subjectivist EVM only says they’re correct by subjectivist standards. And any the-
ory of subjective m-value is necessarily rather permissive. On any such theory,
your m-best prospect depends on your credences. Hence no such theory will im-
ply a local m-value judgment unless something about your credences is known.
And it will render correct whatever judgments are implied by your credences. The
difference is merely that on Subjectivist EVM, your credences are determined by
your m-value judgments, rather than your brute introspection, say. But as I’ve ar-
gued, that doesn’t seem problematic.
I’ve granted that there are reasons for thinking objectivem-value is ultimately
more important normatively speaking, or more more naturally the object of our
judgments. But that doesn’t threaten Subjectivist EVM as a theory about subjec-
tive m-value. And more importantly, it doesn’t threaten the general approach of
this book or this chapter. If you think objective m-value is more important, you
can understand the Expected Value Theorem for Probabilities, and the argument
it grounds, in objectivist terms—as indicated on page 94. It’s not true that any
judgments about objective m-value satisfying C will be correct. You might make
C-conformable judgments that imply unwarranted credences. So Objectivist EVM
doesn’t boil down to coherence constraints. And any remainingworries onemight
have about such constraints might be answerable by focusing on it, rather than
its subjectivist cousin.
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Letme conclude. In this chapter, I’ve examined the question of how to understand
axiological credences. I argued that we shouldn’t take such credences as primi-
tives, and introduced the judgment-explication to explain them. According to this
explication, your credence in an axiology is the weight you give this axiology in
your m-value judgments. After providing the formal background for this explica-
tion, I argued that it’s adequately related to our intuitive concept and picks out
something normatively relevant—or doesn’t trivialise EVM, make it uninteresting
or redundant. This suggests an explication of credences in terms of representation
theorems on your m-value judgments is the best explication we can get.
More fundamentally, I’ve argued that it’s preferable to interpret the weights
that axiological orderingshave indeterminingm-value as being composedof their
value function on the one hand, and their probability on the other. If we canmake
this distinction, we can capture the idea that some axiologies aremore likely than
others, and that these likelihoods are relevant in determining m-value. And we
can thus express the intuitive connection between the theory of axiological uncer-
tainty and axiological epistemology. However, I’ve admitted that in light of the im-
port of the axioms, the distinctionmight be somewhat less relevant than it first ap-
peared. So it might be worth indicating how the alternative view, which eschews
the distinction between probabilities and values altogether, can be axiomatised
in our framework. We can do that with a simple analogue of the Expected Value
Theorem, concerningK instead ofQ. Define for each i in I a function Ki : K → O;
a 󳨃→ Ki(a), such that for all x in X,
Ki(a)(x) = a(i, x). (5.14)
The mapping Ki thus formally turns a prospect a in K into the prospect that a
represents, given Ti. Now for a set of binary relations {⪰i ℘ i ∈ I} onO and a binary
relation ⪰̃ on K, define the
Pareto Condition for K: If for some a and b inK, Ki(a) ∼i Ki(b) for all i in I, then
a ∼̃ b; and if Ki(a) ⪰i Ki(b) for all i in I, and Kj(a) ≻j Kj(b) for some j in I, then
a ≻̃ b.
That your ⪰̃m should satisfy this condition is only plausible if you don’t rule out
the truth of any axiologyunder consideration completely. If there’s someTj, which
you believe with certainty is false, the second clause of the condition is implau-
sible with regards to that theory. So to ground an argument on this condition, we
need to restrict the set of theories under consideration to those you don’t rule out
completely. The simplest way to do so is to restrict the theories to those for which
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your ⪰̃m does, as a matter of fact, satisfy the Pareto Condition forK. In any case,
the following theorem holds:
Weighted Value Theorem: Suppose that all your⪰i are vNM-conformable, and that
your ⪰̃m satisfies the Pareto Condition for K with respect to them. If your ⪰̃m is
vNM-conformable, there’s a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive unit-
comparable transformation, that represents each axiology cardinally, and is such
that for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x).128 (5.15)
In other words, if your m-value judgments satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms and the Pareto Condition for K, then to each axiology you’re attaching a
constantweight in the form of a utility function. This doesn’t establish that we can
treat such a function u(i, ⋅) as a product piGi of your credence in, and the value
function of, theory Ti. So (5.15) expresses Weighted Value Maximisation, rather
than EVM. This is a genuine theory of axiological uncertainty. To my knowledge,
no one has defended that theory so far. If we can establish EVM, EVM is preferable
to Weighted Value Maximisation. But Weighted Value Maximisation is a relevant
alternative.
128 See the appendix (Section A.2) for a proof.
6 The problem of incommensurabilities
The third issue that the argument from the Basic Representation Theorem raised,
besides the problem of intertheoretic comparisons and that of probabilities, was
the problem of incommensurabilities. By assuming Completeness, the arguments
so far rule out any incommensurabilities, and thus suffer from two major restric-
tions. As indicated in Chapter 3, many plausible axiologies allow for incommen-
surabilities at the level of first-order value, and are thus themselves incomplete.
And as substantiated in Chapter 4, even if there’s no fundamental problem with
intertheoretic comparisons or the idea of EVM, plausibly, some axiologies aren’t
fully commensurable with each other, and thus induce an incomplete m-value
relation. A theorem presupposing Completeness can’t allow for such incommen-
surabilities. So it’s time to introduce a representation theorem that doesn’t pre-
suppose this axiom. I’ll do that in the present chapter (Section 6.1). The emerging
theorem will be the most encompassing result of this book.
Having dropped Completeness, we’ll be in a better position to assess whether
representation theorems can ground EVM as a general theory of moral—rather
than just axiological—uncertainty. So to round offmy exploration of the axiomatic
approach, I’ll identify the most promising strategies to extend my arguments be-
yond axiology, and themost serious difficulties these strategies face (Section 6.2).
I’ll end the chapter with a conclusion, summarising the main positive and nega-
tive upshots of the book, and indicating possible directions for further research
(Section 6.3).
6.1 Axiomatising incomplete m-value relations
To explicate and defend a form of EVM covering incommensurabilities, I’ll again
first state a relevant theorem in terms of mathematical functions, and then inter-
pret it in a philosophically significant manner. And I’ll again start with a theorem
that assumes probabilities as given, before extending it to allow for an explication
of them.
The Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness
Consider the relation ⪰m onQ. To allow for incompleteness, we’ll need a slightly
different set of axioms. Let a(i,x) be the prospect that certainly leads to (i, x):
a(i,x)(i, x) = 1. For a reflexive binary relation ⪰ onQ, define
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TransitivityQ: for all a, b and c inQ, if a ⪰ b and b ⪰ c, then a ⪰ c;
Mixture-IndependenceQ: for all a and b inQ, a ⪰ b if and only if pa⋇(1−p)c ⪰
pb ⋇ (1 − p)c for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c inQ;
Sequence-ContinuityQ: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such that
an ⪰ bn for all n, then lim(an) ⪰ lim(bn);
Existence of Best andWorstQ: there are (i, x) and (i, x) in (I ⇝ X) such that for
all (i, x) in (I ⇝ X), a(i,x) ⪰ a(i,x), and a(i,x) ⪰ a(i,x); and
Non-TrivialityQ: a(i,x) ≻ a(i,x) (i. e., not a(i,x) ⪰ a(i,x)).
If a reflexive relation ⪰ on Q satisfies these axioms, I’ll say it is ‘N-conformable’
(since my results are based on Nau 2006). Note that Existence of Best and Worst
implies that ⪰ can’t be totally incomplete. But apart from this, these conditions
don’t assume that ⪰ is complete. Now instead of defining a uniqueness criterion
for our utility functions—which is somewhat more complicated if we’re dealing
with incomplete relations129—we’ll simply introduce a normalisation for these
functions, and then focus on normalised functions only. So define a normalised
set of utility functions
U* = {u : I ⇝ X → ℝ ℘ u(i, x) = 0; 0 ≤ u(i, x) ≤ 1 ∀(i, x) ∈ (I ,X);
u(i, x) = 1}. (6.1)
Call a collection of preferences {an ⪰ bn} a basis for ⪰ under an axiom system if
every preference a ⪰ b can be deduced from {an ⪰ bn} by application of these
axioms. Finally, for simplicity, for some function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, define
Uu(a) = ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x). (6.2)
It can be shown130 that if ⪰m is N-conformable, there exists a nonempty closed
convex set U ⊂ U* of functions, such that for all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (6.3)
In particular, if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under these axioms, then U is the set
of u inU* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. (6.3) is a representation in terms of a set of
utility functions. This straightforwardly allows for incompleteness in ⪰m: neither
129 See Nau (2006) for a fully spelt out uniqueness criterion.
130 See the appendix (Section A.3; ‘The Representation Theorem for Incompleteness’) for a
proof.
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a ⪰m b nor b ⪰m a are true if there are u and v in W with Uu(a) > Uu(b) and
Uv(b) > Uv(a).
We again need to ensure that the relevant utility functions u in U* are appro-
priately related to our axiologies, by assuming that our axiologies satisfy certain
conditions, and that ⪰m is related to them via a Pareto condition. For a reflexive
binary relation ⪰ onO, define
TransitivityO: for all a, b and c inO, if a ⪰ b and b ⪰ c, then a ⪰ c;
Mixture-IndependenceO: for all a and b inO, a ⪰ b if and only if pa⋇ (1−p)c ⪰
pb ⋇ (1 − p)c for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c inO; and
Sequence-ContinuityO: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such that
an ⪰ bn for all n, then lim(an) ⪰ lim(bn).
If a reflexive relation ⪰ onO satisfies these conditions, I’ll say it’sN*-conformable.
For a set of binary relations {⪰i ℘ i ∈ I} on O and a binary relation ⪰ on Q, define
the
Strong Pareto Condition: For any probability distribution P on I, and for all a
and b inQP, if Hi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all i in I with P(i) > 0, then a ∼ b; if Hi(a) ⪰i
Hi(b) for all i in I with P(i) > 0 and Hj(a) ≻j Hj(b) for some j in I with P(j) > 0,
then a ≻ b; and if for some j in I with P(j) > 0, Hi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all i in I with
i ̸= j and P(i) > 0, then a ⪰ b only if Hj(a) ⪰j Hj(b).
The third clause of this condition guarantees that the value functions in our rep-
resentation will not represent sharpenings of our axiologies.
Now the following theorem holds:
Representation Theorem for Incompleteness: Suppose that all our ⪰i are N*-con-
formable. If ⪰m is N-conformable and satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with re-
spect to our ⪰i, there’s a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of functions, such that
for all a and b inQ, all a and b inO and all i in I,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , and (6.4)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (6.5)
In particular, if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under these axioms, then U is the set of
u in U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}.131
131 See the appendix (Section A.3) for a proof.
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To turn this into a non-mathematical theorem, we again need prospect-explica-
tions of intra- and intertheoretic comparisons. These will have to be slightly dif-
ferent from the ones we’ve got so far. If wewant to represent an axiology onwhich
outcomes are less than fully commensurable, we can’t interpret it as implying de-
terminate value-difference ratios of the form ‘the value-difference between x and
y is n times as great as the value-difference between z and t’. Similarly, if we want
to represent two axiologies that aren’t fully commensurable, we can’t interpret
them as implying determinate intertheoretic value-difference ratios of the form
‘the value-difference between x and y, according to Ti, is n times as great as the
value-difference between z and t, according to Tj’. Instead, as far as intratheoretic
comparisons are concerned we’re interested in rough cardinal intratheoretic value
comparisons, or facts of the form
(U) according to Ti, the value-difference between x and y is at least (or at most) n
times as great as the value-difference between z and t.
As far as intertheoretic comparisons are concerned, we’re interested in rough car-
dinal intertheoretic value comparisons, or facts of the form
(V) the value-difference between x and y, according to Ti, is at least (or at most)
n times as great as the value-difference between z and t, according to Tj.
Again, our theorem guarantees that we can explicate level-comparisons too. That
is, we can actually explicate rough crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic value com-
parisons, or facts of the form
(W) the difference between the value of x, according to Ti, and the value of y, ac-
cording to Tj, is at least (or at most) n times as great as the difference between
the value of z, according to Th, and the value of t, according to Tk .
To state our explications, let U be a nonempty closed convex set of utility func-
tions u : I ⇝ X → ℝ. Suppose that for some axiology Ti, and for all a and b inO,
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (6.6)
I’ll then say thatU represents Ti ordinally. And I’ll use equivalent, self-explanatory
definitions for the claims that some nonempty closed convex set U of utility func-
tions represents them-value relation⪰m ordinally, or (below) that somepair (U ,P)
represents your ⪰m and ⪰̃m ordinally. Now suppose that for some nonempty
closed convex set U of real-valued functions on I ⇝ X, and some axiology Ti, the
rough cardinal intratheoretic comparisons between outcomes, according to Ti,
are true if and only if they are true for all functions u(i, ⋅) with u in U—that is,
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for all x, y, z, t in X (with ax ⪰i ay and az ⪰i at), and n ∈ ℝ, the value-difference
between x and y is at least n times as great as the value-difference between z
and t, according to Ti, if and only if (u(i, x) − u(i, y))/(u(i, z) − u(i, t)) ≥ n for all
u in U . I’ll then say that U represents Ti cardinally. The prospect-explication of
rough intratheoretic comparisons says that if there’s a nonempty closed convex
set U ⊂ U* of utility functions, which represents an axiology ordinally, then it
also represents it cardinally. Similarly, suppose that for some nonempty closed
convex set U of real-valued functions on I ⇝ X, the rough crosscutting cardinal
intertheoretic comparisons are true, according to our theories, if and only if they
are true for all functions u in U—that is, for all x, y, z, t in X, all i, j, h, k in I (with
a(i,x) ⪰m a(j,y) and a(h,z) ⪰m a(k,t)) and n ∈ ℝ, the difference between the value of
x, according to Ti, and the value of y, according to Tj, is at least n times as great as
the difference between the value of z, according to Th, and the value of t, accord-
ing to Tk, if and only if (u(i, x) − u(j, y))/(u(h, z) − u(k, t)) ≥ n for all u in U . I’ll then
say that U jointly represents all axiologies cardinally. The prospect-explication of
rough intertheoretic comparisons says that if there’s a nonempty closed convex
set U ⊂ U* of theory-dependent utility functions, which represents the m-value
relation ordinally, and represents each axiology cardinally, then it jointly repre-
sents all axiologies cardinally. If that’s so, we can assume, say, that our theories
are represented by the set of value functions G = {G : I ⇝ X → ℝ ℘ G = u, u ∈ U},
and accordingly, that each theory Ti is represented by the set of value functions
Gi = {Gi : X → ℝ ℘ Gi = G(i, ⋅),G ∈ G}.
Given these explications, the following theorem holds:
Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness: Suppose that all our ⪰i are N*-con-
formable. If ⪰m is N-conformable and satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with re-
spect to our ⪰i, then for all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)Gi(x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)Gi(x) ∀G ∈ G.132 (6.7)
Existence of Best and Worst implies that our axiologies can’t be fully incompara-
ble. Sequence-Continuity implies they can’t compare in a lexical way. But I take
it that such theories are extreme and comparatively very implausible. So this is a
much less severe restriction than that imposed by Completeness. What’s impor-
tant is that (6.7) allows for both (non-radical) intra- and intertheoretic incompara-
bility. If a theory Ti features some intratheoretic incomparability, then some two
functions in Gi aren’t positive affine transformations of each other. If no axiology
132 See the appendix (Section A.3) for the derivation of this theorem from the Representation
Theorem for Incompleteness and the prospect-explications.
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under consideration features intratheoretic incomparability, then for all i in I, all
functions in Gi are positive affine transformations of each other. There may then
still be intertheoretic incomparability. In that case, for at least some theory Ti, not
all functions in Gi are the same. Some of them are nontrivial positive affine trans-
formations of each other.
The Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities
Let’s now make first steps towards axiomatising incomplete m-value relations
without given probabilities. To that end, we’ll have to consider the relation ⪰̃m
on K again. And we must define our new axioms for this relation. Let ax be the
prospect that for all i in I certainly leads to x: ax(i, x) = 1 for all i. For a reflexive
binary relation ⪰̃ on K, define
TransitivityK: for all a, b and c in K, if a ⪰̃ b and b ⪰̃ c, then a ⪰̃ c;
Mixture-IndependenceK: for all a and b in K, a ⪰̃ b if and only if pa ⋇ (1 −
p)c ⪰̃ pb ⋇ (1 − p)c for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c in K;
Sequence-ContinuityK: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such that
an ⪰̃ bn for all n, then lim(an) ⪰̃ lim(bn);
Existence of Best andWorstK: there are x and x in X such that for all x in X,
ax ⪰̃ ax, and ax ⪰̃ ax; and
Non-TrivialityK: ax ≻̃ ax (i. e., not ax ⪰̃ ax).
If a reflexive relation ⪰̃ on K satisfies these axioms, I’ll again say it’s N-con-
formable. The incompleteness of ⪰̃m on K raises a further complexity, noted on
page 95. There are two reasons for why the m-value relation relative to your cre-
dences may be incomplete. You may have credence in theories that give rise to
incommensurability; or youmayhave fuzzy credences. Asmentioned, for simplic-
ity I’ll ignore the latter case, and assume that the incompleteness of your m-value
judgments is entirely due to incommensurability in your values.
To model this, say that a probability distribution P on I is positive if P(i) > 0
for all i in I. For binary relations ⪰ onQ and ⪰̃ on K, define the
Reduction Axiom: There’s a positive probability distribution P on I such that for
all a and b inQP, a ⪰ b if and only if L(a) ⪰̃ L(b).
If your preferences onK satisfy the ReductionAxiom, they’re exactly equal to your
preferences on prospects conditional on the probability distribution P. I’m not
aware that this axiom has been used in the literature for reducing incomplete-
ness in preferences to incompleteness in values. Similar axioms have been used,
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but the ones I know of all depend on the assumption of state-independent prefer-
ences.133 It’s undoubtedly very strong. It not only rules out fuzzy credences, but
also basically gives us the required probabilities. But at least as a first step towards
bringing together axiomatisations without Completeness and axiomatisations for
state-dependent utilities, it’s interesting to see what this axiom implies.
Say that ⪰i is strictly non-uniform if there are xi, x̃i, ̃
xi and xi in X such that




x ≻i ax. Given this definition, we can state the
Representation Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities: Suppose that all
your ⪰i are N*-conformable and strictly non-uniform. If your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m are N-
conformable and jointly satisfy the Reduction Axiom for some positive probability
distribution P on I, and if your ⪰m satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with respect
to your ⪰i, there’s a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of functions such that for
all a and b in K, all a and b inQ, all a and b inO and all i in I,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , (6.8)
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , and (6.9)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (6.10)
In particular, if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under these axioms, then U is the set of
u ∈ U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. And there’s no other probability distribution
Q ̸= P for which this is true.134
To turn this into a philosophically significant result, we can expand the judgment-
explication from Chapter 5. Suppose that for some probability distribution P on
I and some nonempty closed convex set U of real-valued functions on I ⇝ X, the
rough crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons are true, according to your
theories, if and only if they are true for all functions u in U, and that your cre-
dence in any axiology Ti is P(i)—that is, for all x, y, z, t in X, all i, j, h, k in I (with
a(i,x) ⪰m a(j,y) and a(h,z) ⪰m a(k,t)) and n ∈ ℝ, the difference between the value of
x, according to Ti, and the value of y, according to Tj, is at least n times as great
as the difference between the value of z, according to Th, and the value of t, ac-
cording to Tk, if and only if (u(i, x) − u(j, y))/(u(h, z) − u(k, t)) ≥ n for all u in U,
with pi = P(i), pj = P(j), ph = P(h) and pk = P(k). I’ll then say that (U ,P) repre-
sents your intertheoretic comparisons cardinally and your axiological probabilities
133 See e. g. the ‘Reduction Axiom’ in Ok et al. (2012).
134 See the appendix (Section A.3) for a proof.
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quantitatively. The judgment-explication of your rough intertheoretic comparisons
and axiological probabilities says that if there’s a unique pair (U ⊂ U*, P), which
represents your ⪰m and ⪰̃m ordinally, and if U represents each of your axiologies
cardinally, then (U ,P) represents your intertheoretic comparisons cardinally and
your axiological probabilities quantitatively. Hence if that’s so, we can assume
that P(i) represents your credence pi in the theory represented by the functions
Gi = {Gi : X → ℝ ℘ Gi = G(i, ⋅),G ∈ G}.
Given this explication, the following theorem holds:
Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities: Suppose that all
your ⪰i are N*-conformable and strictly non-uniform. If your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m are N-
conformable and jointly satisfy the Reduction Axiom for some positive probability
distribution P on I, and if your ⪰m satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with respect
to your ⪰i, then for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)piGi(x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)piGi(x) ∀G ∈ G.135 (6.11)
This is the most encompassing theorem of this book. Again, it doesn’t allow us to
represent fully incomparable theories, or theories that compare in a lexical way.
And it doesn’t allow for fuzzy credences. Moreover, that your ⪰m and ⪰̃m should
satisfy the Reduction Axiom is only plausible if you assign nonzero credence to
all axiologies under consideration. So to ground a normative argument on this
theorem, we’d have to restrict the set of axiologies under consideration accord-
ingly. But these seem relatively minor restrictions. Given these restrictions, and
in light of our account of intertheoretic comparisons, the remaining axioms seem
plausible. So we’ve now overcome all the major problems that affected the argu-
ment from the Basic Representation Theorem. We have an axiomatic foundation
for EVM that doesn’t suffer from any fundamental problem of intertheoretic com-
parisons, doesn’t take axiological probabilities as primitives, and doesn’t rule out
either intra- or intertheoretic incommensurabilities.
6.2 General moral uncertainty
We’re now in a position to explore a final question the axiomatic approach raises.
Can the argument I’ve given ground a general theory of normative rather than
135 See the appendix (Section A.3) for the derivation of this theorem from the Representation
Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities and the judgment-explications.
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merely axiological uncertainty? That’s the question of this section. Or more pre-
cisely, for simplicity, I’ll ask whether our argument can ground a general theory
of moral uncertainty. I’ll set aside other forms of normative uncertainty such as
uncertainty about prudence or rationality. I won’t introduce new labels. So in this
section, when I speak of ‘EVM’, I don’t mean the theory of axiological uncertainty
I’ve so far discussed. I mean the more general idea that under moral uncertainty,
you ought to maximise the expectation of a quantity that represents the moral
worth, or choiceworthiness, or the amount of moral reasons, assigned to options
by moral theories. For this idea to make sense, EVM mustn’t range over better-
ness-relations only. There must be a more general relation between options that
all moral theories induce. I’ll take ‘moral preferability’ to be such a relation. So
in this section, by ‘T1’, ‘T2’, ‘T3’, … I’ll mean theories about moral preferability.
And by ‘a ⪰i b’, ‘a ≻i b’ and ‘a ∼i b’ I’ll mean, respectively, that a is morally
weakly preferable to, or strictly preferable to, or equally as preferable as b, ac-
cording to Ti.136
The application of EVM to moral theories raises various questions.137 In what
follows, I’ll focus on one issue only: on whether moral theories generally satisfy
the axioms of decision theory. If they don’t, this raises our two familiar problems
for EVM. First, it’s unclear how to explicate cardinal intra- and intertheoretic com-
parisons for such theories—or how to even understand EVM. Second, it’s implau-
sible that the m-value facts satisfy these axioms if they range over such theories—
or that EVM is true. These problems (or at least the first one) are sometimes ac-
knowledged. But my sense is that their urgency is underestimated. In response
to the question of how to represent moral theories by value functions, Jacob Ross
says:
[F]or any theory that tells us what to do in [...] cases of uncertainty and that satisfies certain
minimal coherence conditions, we can construct a value function that indicates not just the
ordinal values of one’s options, but also ratios among the value intervals between them.
(2006a, 25; see 2006b, 754 f.)
136 In applying EVM to moral uncertainty, some authors have taken moral theories to imply
‘moral choice-worthiness’ relations (see MacAskill 2014), or moral ‘value’ relations (where that
is somehow understood more broadly than axiological value; see Sepielli 2010 or Ross 2006b).
However, both ‘more choice-worthy than’ and ‘more valuable than’ are, as a matter of meaning,
transitive. So these interpretations threaten to rule out intransitive theories from the outset.
137 One important problem is supererogation, for which most standard deontological theories
allow. According to these theories, there are options a and b such that a ismorally preferable to b,
but it’s not the case that you ought to choose a. This raises the problem of howmoral preferability
and the moral ‘ought’ are weighed under uncertainty. See e. g. Sepielli (2010, ch. 6) or Tarsney
(2019b) for a discussion.
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This suggests that any ‘minimally coherent’ theorywill be representable byavalue
function.138 But that’s anything but clear. To begin with, a theory can only be rep-
resented by ‘a’ (single) value function if it satisfies Completeness. But incomplete-
ness abounds among deontological theories, just as among axiologies. There are
many plausible pluralist views, say, on which what’s morally preferable depends
on a range of factors—special obligations, rights, impersonal goodness, and so on.
On many such views, there aren’t determinate facts about how these considera-
tions weigh against each other in cases of conflict.139 These theories are incom-
plete. Now as the theorems from the last section show, EVM doesn’t presuppose
Completeness, or representability by a single value function. That’s one reason
why these theorems were crucial to even begin examining how far EVM can cover
moral uncertainty. But similar problems arise for Transitivity, Continuity and In-
dependence.
Transitivity
Start with Transitivity. There are manymoral theories that prima facie violate this
axiom. Consider a person-affecting view of population ethics according to which,
if you have a choice between bringing about two worlds, it’s preferable to bring
about the world in which the total wellbeing of all the people existing in both
worlds is greater, and if this total wellbeing is equal in both worlds, the worlds
are equally preferable.140 Suppose we have some cardinal concept of wellbeing,
and consider the following five worlds—where the first number refers to Therese’s
and the second number to Philine’s level of wellbeing, and ‘Ω’ indicates that the
person doesn’t exist in that world:
a: (2,Ω), b: (1, 3), c: (Ω, 2), d: (3, 1), and e: (2,Ω).
According to the person-affecting view, a ≻ b, b ≻ c, c ≻ d and d ≻ e. Since a and
e seem to be the same options, our view is prima facie intransitive.141
138 Sepielli (2010, ch. 5) also suggests the samemethod for cardinalisation. However, he doesn’t
even mention that a theory has to satisfy certain conditions for this method to be applicable.
MacAskill (2014) also suggests the same method, and does mention that moral theories have to
satisfy certain axioms for that method to work, but doesn’t discuss whether they generally do.
139 Such a pluralist theory, explicitly implying incompleteness, is defended in Nagel (1979).
Views that allow for moral dilemmas are also plausibly construed as incomplete. See e. g.
Richardson (1994, 115 ff.).
140 For a defence of such a view, see e. g. Roberts (2003).
141 I thank John Broome for this example. Note that for simplicity, in this section, I’ll consider
a transitivity-condition on the non-reflexive relation ≻ rather than the reflexive relation ⪰. As is
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The intransitivity arises because according to our view, whether the wellbe-
ing of a person in a world matters depends on whether she exists in the world
we compare it with. More generally, the view features ‘alternative-dependency’: it
says that themoral worth of an option depends on its alternative. This easily leads
to such intransitivities. And unfortunately, as Tim Willenken (2012) has shown,
common sense morality is full of alternative-dependency. Consider, for example,
the following common sense principles:
Numbers: If facedwith a pairwise choice between saving a lesser number of peo-
ple from some harm and a greater number of people from that same harm, it’s
morally preferable to save the greater number.
Dominance: If faced with a pairwise choice between two options a and b, where
each individual is at least as well off and someone is much better off if you
choose a rather than b, it’s morally preferable to choose a.
No Pushing: If faced with a pairwise choice between pushing one person off a
bridge to his death in order to block a trolley and letting several other people
get killed by that trolley, it’s morally preferable to let the greater number get
killed.
AsWillenken has shown, these three principles generate a prima facie deontic cy-
cle.142 And such examples could bemultipliedwith ease. Common sensemorality
is full of alternative-dependency, and thus full of prima facie intransitivities.
However, the case isn’t as simple. These examples raise the question of how
options, or outcomes, should be individuated. Suppose a theory implies that a ≻
b, b ≻ c, and c ≻ a, on grounds of alternative-dependency. One might say it treats
a-when-b-was-the-alternative (ab) as different from a-when-c-was-the-alternative
(ac). After all, it takes the relevant alternatives to matter. For instance, one might
say that our person-affecting theory treats (2,Ω)(3,1) as distinct from (2,Ω)(1,3). If
we bring about (2,Ω) by rejecting (3, 1), we’ve made Therese worse off than she
could have been. But there’s no one for whom that’s true if we bring about (2,Ω)
by rejecting (1, 3). And since our theory is particularly concernedwith suchharms,
this more fine-grained description is a better specification of (what matters in) an
outcome for our theory. In individuating outcomes coarsely, we ignore features of
theworld that according to our viewmattermorally. Now if we do individuate out-
comes according to their alternatives, alternative-dependency no longer grounds
easily verified, the condition on ⪰ implies that on ≻. Suppose a ≻ b and b ≻ c. Then by the
transitivity of ⪰, a ⪰ c. Moreover, if c ⪰ a were to hold, by the transitivity of ⪰, c ⪰ b would
hold—which contradicts b ≻ c. So c ⪰ a cannot hold, and we have a ≻ c.
142 See Willenken (2012, 546) for an example.
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intransitivity. The claims ab ≻ ba, bc ≻ cb, and ca ≻ ac are perfectly consistent
with Transitivity. So there’s a general strategy by which we can render theories
that seem to violate this axiom consistent with it.
There’s a downside to this strategy. Many theories that are complete under
a coarse-grained individuation of outcomes will become very incomplete under
such a fine-grained one. Take the person-affecting view again. If we individuate
outcomes only by the people who exist in them and their level of wellbeing, the
theory tells us for any two outcomes which of them is preferable. That isn’t so
if we individuate outcomes more finely. The theory doesn’t imply any ordering
of the worlds (2,Ω)(3,1) and (1, 3)(2,Ω). Therese could have been better off in both
(2,Ω)(3,1) and (1, 3)(2,Ω). But are these worlds equally preferable because the harm
is the same (1 unit of wellbeing); or is (2,Ω)(3,1) preferable because in this world
Therese is better off than in (1, 3)(2,Ω)? The theory is silent on this. It’s not defined
to order these two outcomes. And there’s no reason why it should be. It’s logi-
cally impossible for you to face a choice between (2,Ω)(3,1) and (1, 3)(2,Ω). In such
a choice, you could either choose (1, 3) by rejecting world (2,Ω), or choose (2,Ω)
by rejecting the altogether different world (3, 1). But you can’t possibly have these
two options. It’s an impractical comparison. Individuation of outcomes in terms
of their alternatives always leads to impractical comparisons. But deontic moral
theories are designed to guide your decision-making. And they can do this per-
fectly well while being silent on impractical comparisons. So as they stand, they
generally won’t give advice about such comparisons.
There’s an important structural difference here between axiologies and de-
ontic moral theories. An axiology is a claim about which worlds are better than
which, or about which properties contribute to the value of worlds. But actual
worlds are infinitely fine-grained, or characterised by an infinite number of prop-
erties. And for each of these properties, an axiology should say whether it con-
tributes to value or not. An axiology is fragmentary, not fully specified or well-
defined, if it’s silent on how fine-grained outcomes or prospects are ordered. This
isn’t to say that an axiologymust be ‘complete’ inmy technical sense—that it must
imply that any two options are comparable. But it must imply for any two out-
comes or prospects that they’re equally good, or that one is better, or that they’re
incomparable. If it’s simply silent on the comparison, then to at least one of them
it hasn’t assigned any (precise or rough) value, which by its nature it should. A
fully specified axiology may feature the verdict of an absence (of precise value-
comparisons); but it can’t feature the absence of any verdict.
So axiologies must imply a verdict on impractical comparisons. Modal prop-
erties, such as what could have been the case instead of a world, are properties
of worlds just like the number of people or the amount of welfare they contain.
So an axiology is fragmentary if it doesn’t specify whether such modal properties
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contribute to value or not. Whether we can face a choice between two worlds is ir-
relevant from an axiological point of view. Indeed, our framework featured other
impractical comparisons, like comparisons between prospects with different un-
derlying probability distributions over axiologies. This wasn’t a principled prob-
lem. In contrast, deontic moral theories (especially deontological ones143) aren’t
in the business of saying which properties contribute to value. They’re designed
to guide your decision-making. So by their standard,whetherwe can face a choice
between two worlds is pivotal. There’s nothing fragmentary or underspecified if a
deontic moral theory is silent on impractical comparisons.
What does that mean for present purposes? Fortunately, from the point of
viewof Completeness andTransitivity, I think this difference doesn’tmattermuch.
There are representation theorems that allow for incompleteness, and if the other
conditions of these theorems could be satisfied even under a fine-grained indi-
viduation of outcomes, these theorems would serve their purpose. If for some two
options a and b, a deontic theory neither implies that a ⪰ bnor that b ⪰ a, nothing
in the theorems requires that this must be because of an explicit verdict of incom-
parability. So for the purposes of representation, we could treat the absence of a
verdict like the verdict of an absence. We’d blur this distinction on a formal level.
But we could bear it in mind, and no great harm would be done. So given that we
have theorems allowing for incompleteness, the incompleteness emerging from
reindividuation wouldn’t in itself present a problem. Let’s thus turn to Continuity
and Independence.
Continuity
Questions of continuity are less often discussed in deontological ethics. But as
with Transitivity, many standard deontological theories prima facie violate this
axiom. That’s because, prima facie, many deontological constraints are best cap-
tured by probability-thresholds. Consider the violation of rights. According to
common sense deontology, you can respect a person’s rights even if you take some
143 There’s a question about whether deontic consequentialist theories imply verdicts concern-
ing impractical comparisons. One might say they’re also just designed to guide your decision-
making, and since you can’t face impractical comparisons, they won’t imply any verdict about
them either. However, there’s a straightforward sense in which a deontic consequentialist theory
can be extended or interpreted to imply such verdicts: we can interpret it as saying an option is
‘weakly morally preferable’ to another if and only if the prospect it represents is at least as good.
Interpreted thus, it will inherit all the richness of its underlying axiology. So when I speak of the
problems of deontic moral theories, I generally have in mind deontological theories especially.
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risk of killing her for the sake of a minor pleasure—driving past her at sufficient
distance on your way to a restaurant, say. But you violate her rights if you take
a considerable risk of killing her for that pleasure. Yet whether you violate her
rights isn’t a matter of degree: you either violate them or you don’t. So when does
the constraint that you ought to respect people’s rights apply? It seems congenial
to deontology to accept a probability threshold.144 But such thresholds lead to
incontinuity. Suppose you violate someone’s rights if you take more than a 1%
risk of killing her for the sake of a minor pleasure. Suppose there’s thus a con-
straint against taking such a risk, but not against taking a risk of 1% or less. And
suppose not violating anyone’s rights is always preferable to violating someone’s,
and that if you don’t violate anyone’s rights, risking fewer deaths is preferable to
risking more. Now consider
f killing Juliette with 100% probability;
g killing Lenardo and Valerine with 1% probability; and
h killing Juliette with 1% probability.
Our view implies that h ≻ g and g ≻ f . But there’s no probability p ∈]0, 1[ such
that pf ⋇ (1 − p)h ≻ g. For any p > 0, pf ⋇ (1 − p)h involves a risk of more than 1%
of killing Juliette, and thus violates her rights. So g will be preferable to it.
Again, it’s easy to find other examples where such thresholds seem conge-
nial to deontology. Consider whether it’s permissible to kill one person to save ten
others. On common sense deontology, this depends on whether that person for-
feited her right not to be killed—by intending to kill the ten, say. Yet you don’t need
absolute certainty that she forfeited her right, or else the permission would be ir-
relevant in practice. You only need it to be clear ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. What
does that mean? A natural interpretation is again that there’s a threshold, such
that you can permissibly kill someone for the sake of saving ten others if and only
if the probability of her innocence isn’t more than this threshold. Suppose this
threshold is 3%. And suppose not killing anyone impermissibly is always prefer-
able to killing someone impermissibly, and that permissibly killing fewer people
is preferable to permissibly killing more. Consider
i killing William, where William has a 10% probability of being innocent;
j killing Margaret and Clara, where Margaret and Clara both have a 3% proba-
bility of being innocent; and
k killing William, where William has a 3% probability of being innocent.
144 For further reflections on deontological approaches to uncertainty, see e. g. Jackson and
Smith (2006), Tenenbaum (2017), Lazar (2018) or Tarsney (2018b).
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Our view says that k ≻ j and j ≻ i. But there’s no probability p ∈]0, 1[ such that
pi ⋇ (1 − p)k ≻ j. For any p > 0, pi ⋇ (1 − p)k involves killing someone who has
a probability of more than 3% of being innocent, and is thus impermissible. So j
will be preferable to it.145
More examples could easily be given—concerning cases where it’s unclear
whether you have a promissory obligation to someone, are using them as a mere
means, are violating their autonomy, and so on. Prima facie, many standard de-
ontological theories violate Continuity. Is there a strategy to resist this? Reindi-
viduating outcomes might again be natural. Consider our first example. Option
f was to kill Juliette with certainty, option h to kill her with a 1% chance. Sup-
pose you chose h, and it resulted in Juliette’s death. For our theory there will have
been a categorical difference between your action and the action of choosing f
and Juliette’s certain demise. You didn’t violate her rights. So we might say our
theory treats the resulting deaths as distinct—implying that Juliette is suffering
mere injury as an outcome of h, but injury and insult (i. e. rights-violation) after f .
More generally, probability threshold-views seem to posit a categorical difference
between an outcome that had more and one that had less than this probability of
coming about, however similar they otherwise are.
Yet, natural as sucha reindividuationmaybe, it doesn’t helpmakeourdeontic
theories continuous. Once we’ve distinguished the outcome ‘Juliette is dead, and
suffered the insult of a rights-violation’ (of f ) from ‘Juliette is dead, but suffered
no insult’ (of h), we’ll again face impracticalities. Consider the option ‘pf ⋇ (1 −
p)h’, with p ∈]0, 1[. One possible outcome of this option is that Juliette suffered
an insult, and another is that she suffered none. But on common sense views of
rights, rights violations are determined ex ante, rather than ex post through brute
moral luck. So you can’t face such a prospect in practice. Whatever you do, you’ll
either violate her rights or you won’t, for all possible outcomes of your choice. So
you can’t face a prospect like ‘pf ⋇ (1 − p)h’. This option not only contributes to
impractical comparisonswith others, as in the caseswe’ve encountered above. It’s
an impractical option, all in itself. Deontic theories (especially deontological ones)
generally won’t imply verdicts concerning such options. There’s no reason why
they should. So they generally won’t imply any verdicts of the form ‘pf ⋇ (1−p)h ≻
g’, or ‘g ≻ pf ⋇ (1 − p)h’. But such verdicts are precisely what Continuity would
require. So reindividuating outcomes won’t help with this axiom.
The difference between Continuity and Transitivity is this. In either case, the
pertinent reindividuation will lead to impracticalities, and thus to widespread
145 This example is taken from Jackson and Smith (2006); the threshold view is accepted by
Aboodi et al. (2008).
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incompleteness. This is a problem with Continuity. Continuity features what we
might call a ‘conditional minimal completeness constraint’. It requires that, if a
theory implies that a ≻ b and b ≻ c, it must also make some third judgment in-
volving pa⋇ (1−p)c (viz., that pa⋇ (1−p)c ≻ b for some p ∈]0, 1[)—or can’t be fully
incomplete with respect to this latter option. Now even under a fine-grained indi-
viduation of outcomes via their probabilities, there’ll be many (standard, practi-
cal) options for which deontic moral theories imply the first two judgments, and
thus satisfy the antecedent of the conditional completeness constraint. So then
Continuity will require at least minimal completeness with respect to pa⋇ (1−p)c,
which the theories will fail to deliver. Transitivity also features a conditional min-
imal completeness constraint. It requires that if a theory implies that a ≻ b and
b ≻ c, it must also make some third judgment involving a and c (viz., that a ≻ c).
However, under a fine-grained individuation of outcomes via their alternatives,
there won’t be any options for which our theories imply the first two judgments,
and thus satisfy the antecedent of the conditional constraint. They might imply
that ab ≻ ba and bc ≻ cb. But this doesn’t force them to any third judgment. They
would be so forced if they implied that ab ≻ ba and ba ≻ cb. But this they won’t
imply. So even if theories fail to deliver judgments like ab ≻ cb, that’s no problem,
since Transitivity won’t require them to.
Again, I take it, there’s an important difference here between axiologies and
deonticmoral theories. Axiologies aren’t designed to guide your decision-making.
So there doesn’t seem to be a principled reason why they shouldn’t imply verdicts
concerning impractical options, or deliver the minimal completeness that Conti-
nuity requires. Our framework featured other impractical options, like prospects
in which it depends on the correct axiology whether you’ll kill a non-human an-
imal. So as indicated in Section 3.2, I take it the strategy of reindividuating out-
comes canmore successfully be applied in the case of axiologies—e. g., axiologies
that treat rights infringements as a bad thing. It can help us render axiologies that
prima facie violate Continuity consistent with it. It just cannot help with deontic
views.
Is there another strategy to resist prima facie violations of Continuity? One
might think there is. Intuitively, discontinuities arise through thresholds, or sud-
den leaps in the graph that designates our options’ worth. So perhaps we could
assume that the relevant deontological worth-functions have continuous drops
instead of discontinuous leaps. Rather than saying that a risk of 1% marks a cut-
off point for the violation of rights, say, we could say it marks a point where our
options’ worth decreases drastically but continuously—as in the following illus-
tration:
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Fig. 6.1: Graphs to illustrate continuous drop (left) versus discontinuous leap (right).
Indeed, one might think that’s a more charitable interpretation of deontological
views, as thresholds seem mysterious or arbitrary.
But this strategy isn’t fully satisfying either, at least with standard deonto-
logical theories like the ones we’ve been considering. Such views operate with
all-or-nothing concepts. There’s an important qualitative difference in whether or
not you violate rights, say. Your actions are generally permissible as long as you
don’t, and impermissible as soon as you do. And you can’t violate rights a little
bit. Of course, not all rights violations are equally grievous, as there are more and
less weighty rights. But even the less important rights will either be violated or
not, and that will be a qualitative difference. All-or-nothing concepts are at the
heart of deontology, and in the face of uncertainty, it seems they’ll have to be cap-
tured by thresholds. If we reinterpret such views as continuous, we may produce
extensionally similar analogues of them. And working with these analogues may
be the best we can do. But it doesn’t present a fully satisfying theoretical solution
to the problem of discontinuous theories. Moreover, as we’ll presently see, even
if we render our views continuous, this won’t help make them satisfy Indepen-
dence. So even if we accept this strategy in the face of Continuity, it won’t solve
the general problem we’re concerned with.
There’s a final strategy one could propose. It’s also a possible strategy con-
cerning Independence. So let me discuss it in that context, and turn to this final
axiom now.
Independence
If what I’ve said is correct, the case of Independence is even more problematic.
As with the other axioms, many standard moral theories prima facie violate it.
Consider fairness. According to a common sense idea, a distribution of a good is
fair if and only if people’s claims to this good are satisfied in proportion to their
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strength. If a good can’t be divided, it’s fairest to put on a lottery, inwhich people’s
chances of receiving this good are proportional to the strength of their claims.146
And a distribution or lottery is less fair the further away it is from (expected) pro-
portionate satisfaction of claims. Now suppose Care and Helen both have a claim
to some indivisible good G, but Care’s is twice as strong as Helen’s. Consider the
options
l Care gets G; and
m Helen gets G.
On the present theory, l ≻ m, since l comes closer to a distribution in which their
claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength. However, suppose you have a
biased coin that lands tails 2/3 of the time, and you can choose among the lotteries
n Care gets G no matter how the coin lands; and
o Helen gets G if the coin lands heads, and Care if it lands tails.
Given that G is indivisible, o is the fairest option available. So we have o ≻ n.
However, since n seems equivalent to 1/3l ⋇ 2/3l, and o equivalent to 1/3m ⋇ 2/3l,
this theory seems to violate Independence.147
Again, it’s clear why it does. According to this theory, what matters about an
outcome is not only what actually happens in it, but also what could have hap-
pened, andwith what probability, instead of it. So we can’t evaluate the outcomes
of our actions independently of one another. For the same reason, the above view
of rights will also violate Independence. On this view, again, you violate some-
one’s rights if you take a risk of more than 1% of killing her for the sake of aminor
pleasure, but not if the risk is 1% or less. Consider our options
f killing Juliette with 100% probability;
g killing Lenardo and Valerine with 1% probability; and
h killing Juliette with 1% probability.
The theory implies that h ≻ g. But for p = 0.99, it implies that pg ⋇ (1 − p)f ≻
ph ⋇ (1 − p)f—since the latter but not the former option violates someone’s rights.
And something similar will hold for many related views. Prima facie, violations of
Independence are again very common in standard deontology.
Unfortunately, however, neither of the two strategies we encountered with
Transitivity and Continuity works with Independence. First, the problem with
reindividuating outcomes via the probability with which they came about is
146 For a defence of such a view, see e. g. Broome (1990).
147 See Diamond (1967) for a similar example.
6.2 General moral uncertainty | 131
exactly the same as with Continuity. Independence also features a conditional
minimal completeness constraint. It requires that, if a theory implies that a ≻ b, it
must also make verdicts involving some compound option pa ⋇ (1 − p)c (viz., that
pa⋇ (1− p)c ≻ pb⋇ (1− p)c for all c). And even under a fine-grained individuation
of outcomes via their probabilities, there’ll be many standard, practical options
for which deontic moral theories imply the first judgment, and thus satisfy the
antecedent of the conditional completeness constraint. So then Independence
will require minimal completeness with respect to pa ⋇ (1 − p)c. But this will be
an impractical option. This won’t be a problem for axiologies. So as indicated in
Section 3.2, I take it the strategy of reindividuating outcomes can help us render
axiologies that prima facie violate Independence consistent with it. But theories
designed to guide actionwill remain silent on such impractical options, andwon’t
deliver the relevant minimal completeness.
Second, violations of Independence don’t depend on probability-thresholds.
Even if we interpret our theories in terms of continuous drops rather than discon-
tinuous leaps, it remains true thatwhatmatters according to them is not onlywhat
actually happened, but alsowhat could have happened instead. This very general
fact causes violations of Independence, and we don’t avoid it by making our the-
ories continuous. Consider our view of rights-violations again. Suppose themoral
worth of options decreases drastically but continuously when we take a risk of
more than 1% of killing someone. Then adding an additional risk of killing Juli-
ette will decrease the worth of ‘killing Lenardo and Valerine with 1% probability’
less than it will decrease the worth of ‘killing Juliette with 1% probability’. And
this will lead to violations of Independence. So even if we grant that this strategy
allows us to satisfy Continuity, it doesn’t help with Independence. Whatever we
think about interpreting deontological views as continuous, doing so doesn’t help
with the general problem we’re concerned with.
As indicated, there’s a final move in response to violations of Independence,
which could also be made with respect to Continuity. It builds on reindividuating
outcomes. I’ve shown that reindividuating outcomes will render our theories too
incomplete even to satisfy the axioms of Continuity and Independence. This is
because reindividuating outcomes will produce impractical options, and our the-
ories aren’t designed to order such options. So what we could do is this. We could
extend our theories andmake them imply verdicts on impractical options; andwe
could do that in ways that accord with the relevant Continuity and Independence
constraints. As far as I see, that would be possible. And as first-order judgments
of moral preferability go, it wouldn’t alter these views in any practically relevant
manner. We’d keep all their verdicts on practically possible options and compar-
isons, and only extend them with respect to options and comparisons you can’t
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face in practice. So one might argue that such extensions would be innocuous,
and not distort our views in any problematic respect.
However, there are problems with this move too. For one thing, by so extend-
ing our views, we’d turn them into different theories—indeed, theories of a dif-
ferent kind. Again, deontic moral theories have a specific nature, and that’s fun-
damentally different from that of axiologies. From an axiological point of view,
it’s irrelevant whether options can figure in practical choice. So there’s something
fragmentary about an axiology that implies no verdict on impractical options. But
deontic moral theories are just designed to guide choice. By a deontic standard,
there’s nothing fragmentary about silence on impracticalities. In fact, at leastwith
the deontological theories we’ve been considering, there will often be no basis
within these views on which they could imply verdicts on impractical compar-
isons or options. Hence by making our moral theories order impractical options,
we wouldn’t somehow finish them, complement them where otherwise they’d be
fragmentary. We’d change their very nature. We’d basically turn them into axiolo-
gies, without any basis for doing so implied by the theories themselves.
Moreover, even though our extensions would have no practical implications
as far as first-order judgments of moral preferability are concerned, they would
have practical implications under uncertainty. Consider again the options of
killing Juliette with 100% probability (f ), killing Lenardo and Valerine with 1%
probability (g), and killing Juliette with 1% probability (h). And suppose we
reindividuate outcomes and supplement our theories with verdicts such that, for
some p and q ∈]0, 1[, pf ⋇ (1−p)h ≻ g and g ≻ qf ⋇ (1−q)h. The precise verdicts will
determine where on the value scale between f and h the value of g lies. And that
in turn will determine how important it is to choose g rather than f , according to
our theory. Andwhile thismay be irrelevant if we’re certain of this theory and face
a choice between f and g, it’s not irrelevant if we have to weigh it against a theory
according to which f is morally preferable to g. So there’d be no basis within the
deontological views to make these extensions, and yet they’d have significant
implications under uncertainty. Thus even if these extensions are the best we can
work with in practice, they don’t present a fully convincing theoretical solution to
our problem. In providing a theory of uncertainty about these extended cousins
of our deontological views, we’re not giving a theory of uncertainty about these
deontological views.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a great number of standard deontic views don’t satisfy our axioms,
and there’s no altogether convincing way in which we can interpret them as do-
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ing so. This casts doubt onwhether the argument I’ve been developing can readily
ground a general theory of moral uncertainty. A fortiori, it casts doubt on whether
our argument can readily ground an evenmore general theory of normative uncer-
tainty. Also, I’ve now addressed only one problem with understanding EVM as a
general theory of moral or normative uncertainty. There remain other problems—
for instance, the question of how to accommodate supererogation.148 Even disre-
garding the question I’ve discussed, these other problems would still need to be
solved.
Let me turn back to axiologies again. I’ve considered whether the strategy of
reindividuating outcomes can render theories that prima facie violate Continu-
ity and Independence consistent with these axioms. I’ve pointed out a problem
with this strategy when applied to deontic views: once we individuate outcomes
finely, many standard deontic theories will be too incomplete to satisfy Continu-
ity and Independence, since they’re designed to guide your decision-making. But
I’ve suggested this isn’t a problem when we apply the strategy to axiologies: ax-
iologies aren’t designed to guide your decision-making. Does this mean we can
always apply this strategy to axiologies? In other words, does it mean we can see
all possible axiologies as satisfying Independence and Continuity, provided we
individuate outcomes properly?
It doesn’t. Importantly, the strategy only works for axiologies on which the
relevant fine-grained features of outcomes—such as facts about what could have
happened, or about the probability with which something happened—are indeed
good- or bad-making features of outcomes.149 I take it that on the most natural
axiological versions of the deontic views we’ve considered, this is the case. For
instance, I take it the most natural rights- or fairness-sensitive axiologies say that
the fact that someone’s rights have been violated (e. g., that Juliette hadmore than
a 1%chance of being killed) or that some state of affairs came about unfairly (e. g.,
that Helen had a disproportionately low chance of getting some good) are bad-
making features of outcomes. They say that how good some state of affairs is de-
pends among else on its modal properties. So they say the relevant fine-grained
features of outcomes do indeed matter axiologically.
In principle, however, this needn’t be. There are axiologies that violate Con-
tinuity and Independence, but not because they consider such features as good-
or bad-making properties of outcomes. Consider Continuity. Take an axiology on
which the value ofwellbeing lexically dominates that of beauty—in that aprospect
is better than another whenever it expectably leads to more wellbeing, but ceteris
148 See footnote 137.
149 For similar considerations, see e. g. Broome (1991, 103 f.).
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paribus better if it expectably leads to more beauty. This welfare/beauty-theory
doesn’t satisfy Continuity. But the reason for this isn’t that on this axiology, some
extra modal feature of an outcome makes an axiological difference. The theory
doesn’t, for example, treat an instance of beauty as more or less valuable depend-
ing on whether some wellbeing could have materialised instead of it. It just treats
wellbeing as lexically better. Or at least, that’s the most natural version or inter-
pretation of this view. So as far as I see, the strategy of reindividuating outcomes
couldn’t successfully be applied to it. Or consider Independence. Take an axiol-
ogy on which fairness is purely a consideration at the level of prospects. On this
axiology, ceteris paribus, one prospect is better than another if on that prospect
people’s chances of receiving some good are proportional to the strength of their
claims. But an unfair causal history isn’t a bad-making feature of an outcome.
So on this axiology, ex ante it’s best to give people fair chances. But ex post the
chances that people have had are irrelevant, and it’s only the actual distribution
of goods that matters. This too is a possible theory. And as far as I see, the strat-
egy of reindividuating outcomes couldn’t successfully be applied to it. So I think
we can’t understand all possible axiologies as satisfying Continuity and Indepen-
dence. Or again, our argument cannot ground a fully general theory of axiological
uncertainty. It can only ground a theory of uncertainty about those axiologies that
are, or can successfully be seen as being, N*-conformable.
However, in contrast to the case of deontic view, my sense is that most stan-
dard axiologies satisfy our conditions, and that the axiologies we ultimately
strictly exclude are comparatively rare and implausible. Take the two axiolo-
gies I’ve just mentioned. Presumably, we should have some nonzero credence in
them. But they certainly don’t seem very plausible. On the contrary, the extreme
kind of lexical priority contended by the former, and the distinction between ex
ante and ex post considerations assumed by the latter,make them rather dubious.
More generally, at the level of axiologies, Continuity and Independence do seem
to express compelling thoughts. Thus while its restrictions are non-trivial, I think
our theory is still an interestingly general theory of axiological uncertainty. That’s
part of why, in this book, I’ve focused on the narrower problem of axiological,
rather than the general problem of moral or normative uncertainty.
6.3 Conclusion
In this book, I’ve explored an axiomatic approach to the problem of axiological
uncertainty, and to the idea of Expected Value Maximisation in particular. I first
introduced a basic representation theorem (Chapter 2), and argued that—modulo
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the fundamental metaphysical problem of intertheoretic comparisons, the pre-
supposition of axiological probabilities as primitives, and the existence of intra-
and intertheoretic incommensurabilities—this theorem canhelp answer the ques-
tion ofmeaning and the question of truth about EVM (Chapter 3). I then addressed
these restrictions one by one. I argued that epistemic norms can provide a con-
structivist ground for intertheoretic comparisons (Chapter 4). I furnished the over-
all theory with an account of axiological credences, and thus paved the way for
applying it in real life (Chapter 5). And I extended the theorem to cover axiologies
that involve intra- or give rise to intertheoretic incommensurabilities (Chapter 6).
Naturally, there remainmany problems for further research. On the one hand,
there are further philosophical questions. For instance, in discussing the axioms,
I’ve often restrictedmyself to comparing their plausibility in our contextwith their
status in other contexts. Tomake amore complete case for EVM, itwould beneces-
sary to saymore in their defence. Similarly, it would be interesting to explore con-
structivism about intertheoretic comparisons in more depth, and spell out some
plausible actual implications of it. And most urgently perhaps, this last chapter
raised problems for the theory ofmoral uncertainty, and it would be important to
make progress on these. On the other hand, there remain many open technical
problems. It may be worthwhile to seek theorems for incomplete orderings that
yield unique separations of subjective probabilities and state-dependent utilities
and don’t rely on the strong Reduction Axiom. It ultimately seems important to
explore results for state-dependent utilities that allow for incomparability in val-
ues as well as fuzzy credences. And since there are infinitely many axiologies, it
would certainly be desirable to extend the results of this book to a framework that
allows for an infinite state-space.
As usual inmoral philosophy, I can’t be certain that my arguments are sound.
But I hope this book has at least shed a new light on some difficulties in the theory
of normative or evaluative uncertainty and on a possible path to a solution. In
particular, I hope I’ve shown that Expected Value Maximisation is neither self-
explanatorily clear nor trivially true, but that the axiomatic approach provides a
promising strategy to explicate and ground it. And I hope this has some value.

A Appendix
In this appendix, I’ll provide the proofs of the theorems in the foregoing chapters.
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 2
The Basic Representation Theorem
As indicated in footnotes 38 and 40, Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 8) and Karni
(1985, 14) prove that if your ⪰m and all your ⪰i are vNM-conformable, there’s a
function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive affine transformation, such that for
all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x), (A.1)
and for each i in I, there’s a function ui, unique up to positive affine transforma-
tion, such that for all a and b inO,





It remains to show that if your ⪰m satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to
your ⪰i, then for each i in I, u(i, ⋅) is a positive affine transformation of ui, or also
represents the relation ⪰i in the sense of (A.2). So for some theory Ti, consider
the set of prospects in Q in which the probability of Ti is 1, Qip=1 = {a ∈ Q ℘
∑x∈X a(i, x) = 1}. This set is isomorphic toO. So for any a inO, we have a prospect
H−1i (a) inQip=1, withH−1i (a)(i, x) = a(x) for all x. The Pareto Condition implies that
for all a and b inO,
a ⪰i b iff H−1i (a) ⪰m H−1i (b). (A.3)
From (A.1), we know that for all such H−1i (a) and H−1i (b) inQip=1,
H−1i (a) ⪰m H−1i (b) iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x). (A.4)
So u(i, ⋅) constitutes a utility function on X that represents Ti in the sense of (A.2).
Open Access. © 2021 Stefan Riedener, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
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The Expected Value Theorem
The derivation of the Expected Value Theorem from the Basic Representation The-
orem and the prospect-explications is straightforward. The Basic Representation
Theorem implies that if your⪰m and all your⪰i are vNM-conformable, and your⪰m
satisfies the Pareto Conditionwith respect to your ⪰i, there’s a function u : I ⇝X →ℝ, unique up to positive affine transformation, that represents your ⪰m ordinally,
and is such that for each i, u(i, ⋅) represents ⪰i ordinally. Since any other func-
tion that represents ⪰i ordinally must be a positive affine transformation of u(i, ⋅)
(see footnote 40), by the prospect-explication of intratheoretic comparisons, each
u(i, ⋅) thus represents ⪰i cardinally. So u represents each axiology cardinally. By
the prospect-explication of intertheoretic comparisons, it thus jointly represents
all axiologies cardinally.
A.2 Proofs for Chapter 5
The Representation Theorem for Probabilities
Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 9; also 2016) prove that if your ⪰m and your ⪰̃m are
vNM-conformable and jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom, and if your ⪰̃m is
non-uniform, there’s a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ and a probability distribution P
on I such that for all a and b in K and all a and b inQ,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)P(i)u(i, x), and (A.5)
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (A.6)
Moreover, u is unique up to positive affine transformation; if i is null, P(i) = 0,
and if i is non-null, P(i) > 0; and if for all i in I there are a and b in Q that agree
outside i such that a ≻m b, then P is unique. By the same reasoning as in the proof
of the Basic Representation Theorem, if your ⪰i are vNM-conformable and your
⪰m satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to your ⪰i, then for each i in I, u(i, ⋅)
also represents the relation ⪰i in the sense of (A.2). It remains to show that the
uniqueness condition of P is satisfied. We’ve assumed that all your ⪰i are non-
uniform, or that for each i in I there areai andbi inO such thatai ≻i bi. So consider
ai and bi in the set Qip=1 (from the proof of the Basic Representation Theorem),
with ai(i, x) = ai(x) and bi(i, x) = bi(x) for all x in X. ai and bi agree outside i, and
by the Pareto Condition, we have ai ≻m bi. So P is unique.
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The Expected Value Theorem for Probabilities
The derivation of the Expected Value Theorem for Probabilities from the Repre-
sentation Theorem for Probabilities and the judgment-explications is parallel to
that of the Expected Value Theorem from the Basic Representation Theorem.
The Weighted Value Theorem
Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 7) prove that if your ⪰̃m is vNM-conformable, there’s
a function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, unique up to positive unit-comparable transformation,
such that for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (A.7)
We also know (see footnote 40) that if all your ⪰i are vNM-conformable, then for
each i in I, there’s a function ui, unique up to positive affine transformation, such
that for all a and b inO,





It remains to show that if your ⪰̃m satisfies the Pareto Condition forKwith respect
to your ⪰i, then for each i in I, u(i, ⋅) represents ⪰i cardinally. So for some theory Ti
and some outcome y, consider the set of prospects in K that if Ti is false lead to y
with probability 1, Kiy = {a ∈ K ℘ a(j, y) = 1 ∀j ̸= i}. This set is isomorphic to O. So
for any a in O, we have a prospect K−1i (a) in Kiy, with K−1i (a)(i, x) = a(x) for all x.
Since all ⪰i are reflexive and complete, the Pareto Condition forK implies that for
all a and b inO,
a ⪰i b iff K−1i (a) ⪰m K−1i (b). (A.9)
From (A.7), we know that for all such K−1i (a) and K−1i (b) in Kiy,
K−1i (a) ⪰m K−1i (b) iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x). (A.10)
So u(i, ⋅) constitutes a utility function on X that represents Ti in the sense of (A.2).
By the prospect-explication of intratheoretic comparisons, it thus represents ⪰i
cardinally.
140 | A Appendix
A.3 Proofs for Chapter 6
The Representation Theorem for Incompleteness
As a first lemma, we prove that if ⪰m is N-conformable, there exists a nonempty
closed convex set U ⊂ U* of functions, such that for all a and b inQ,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , (A.11)
where if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under these axioms, U is the set of u in U*
satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. Suppose that a reflexive binary relation ⪰̃ on K is N-
conformable for some x and x. We can then define a normalised set of functions
W* = {w : I ⇝ X → ℝ ℘ w(i, x) = 0 ∀i ∈ I ; 0 ≤∑
i∈I
w(i, x) ≤ 1
∀x ∈ X;∑
i∈I
w(i, x) = 1}. (A.12)
Nau (2006, Theorem 2) proves that if a reflexive binary relation ⪰̃ on K is N-
conformable, there’s a nonempty closed convex set W ⊂ W* of functions, such
that for all a and b in K,
a ⪰̃ b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)w(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)w(i, x) ∀w ∈ W . (A.13)
And in particular, if {an ⪰̃ bn} is a basis for ⪰̃ under these axioms, then W is the
set of w ∈ W* satisfying {Uw(an) ≥ Uw(bn)}. Note that this holds for any finite
sets of states and outcomes. So let I′ be the singleton {k}, let X′ be a set of ℘X℘ ⋅ ℘I℘
outcomes, and define K′ = {a : I′ ⇝ X′ → ℝ⋇ ℘ ∑x∈X′ a(k, x) = 1}. According to
Nau’s result, if a reflexive relation ⪰̃ on K′ is N-conformable, there’s a nonempty
closed convex setW ⊂ W* of functions representing it in the sense of (A.13). Since
K
′ is isomorphic to Q (and to each a(i,x) in Q there corresponds an ax in K′), this
implies our representation of ⪰m.
Let’s spell this out in detail. To see the bijection betweenQ and K′, label the
outcomes in X by X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, and the outcomes in X′ by:
X′ = {x11, x12, . . . , x1k ,
x21, x22, . . . , x2k ,
. . . ,
xn1, xn2, . . . , xnk}
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For all a inQ and a in K′, we have
∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x) = ∑
i∈I′ ,x∈X′
a(i, x) = ∑
x∈X′
a(k, x) = 1. (A.14)
So with each a in Q we can associate an a in K′ such that a(k, xij) = a(i, xj), and
vice versa. That is, there’s a bijectionM : K′ → Q,
M : a 󳨃→ M(a), M(a)(i, xj) = a(k, xij), with
M−1 : a 󳨃→ M−1(a), M−1(a)(k, xij) = a(i, xj). (A.15)
For some best and worst outcomes x and x in X′, we can define
W ′* = {w : I′ ⇝ X′ → ℝ ℘ w(k, x) = 0; 0 ≤ w(k, x) ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ X;
w(k, x) = 1}. (A.16)
Now define a binary relation ⪰̃ on K′ such that a ⪰̃ b if and only ifM(a) ⪰m M(b).
Then if ⪰m is N-conformable (for (i, x) = (m, xn) and (i, x) = (p, xq)), ⪰̃ is N-
conformable (for x = xmn and x = xpq). By Nau’s result, there’s thus a nonempty
closed convex setW ⊂ W ′* of functions, such that for all a and b in K′,
a ⪰̃ b iff ∑
x∈X′
a(k, x)w(k, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X′
b(k, x)w(k, x) ∀w ∈ W . (A.17)
For any w ∈ W , define a corresponding function u : I ⇝ X → ℝ, such that u(i, xj) =
w(k, xij), and letU be the set of all suchu. SinceW is nonempty, closed and convex,
andW ⊂ W ′*,U is nonempty, closed and convex, andU ⊂ U*. Also, for any a and
b inQ, we have






M−1(b)(k, x)w(k, x) ∀w ∈ W
iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (A.18)
And if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under our axioms, then {M−1(an) ⪰̃ M−1(bn)} is
a basis for ⪰̃. So by Nau’s result,W is the set ofw inW* satisfying {Uw(M−1(an)) ≥
Uw(M−1(bn))}. So U is the set of u in U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. This proves
our lemma.
It remains to show that if all our ⪰i are N*-conformable, and if ⪰m satisfies
the Strong Pareto Condition with respect to our ⪰i, then for each i in I, the set
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Ui = {u(i, ⋅) ℘ u ∈ U} represents ⪰i in the sense of (6.5). This follows by a reasoning
parallel to that in the proof of the Basic Representation Theorem, in light of the
bijection H betweenO andQip=1 = {a ∈ Q ℘ ∑x∈X a(i, x) = 1}.
The Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness
The derivation of the Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness from the Rep-
resentation Theorem for Incompleteness and the prospect-explications is parallel
to that of the Expected Value Theorem from the Basic Representation Theorem.
The Representation Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities
From the Representation Theorem for Incompleteness we know that if all your
⪰i are N*-conformable and strictly non-uniform, and if your ⪰m is N-conformable
and satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with respect to your ⪰i, there’s a non-
empty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of functions, such that for all a and b inQ, all a
and b inO and all i in I,
a ⪰m b iff ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , and (A.19)
a ⪰i b iff ∑
x∈X
a(x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
x∈X
b(x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U , (A.20)
where if {an ⪰m bn} is a basis for ⪰m under these axioms, then U is the set of u in
U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. We first prove that if your ⪰̃m is N-conformable
and satisfies the Reduction Axiom for some positive probability distribution P on
I together with your ⪰m, P and U represent your ⪰̃m in the sense of (6.8). To see
this, define a function NP : K → QP ; a 󳨃→ NP(a), such that for all i in I and x in X,
NP(a)(i, x) = P(i)a(i, x). (A.21)
Since a = L(NP(a)), (A.19) and the Reduction Axiom imply that for all a and b in
K,






NP(b)(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U






b(i, x)P(i)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (A.22)
It remains to show that there’s no other probability distribution Q ̸= P that rep-
resents your ⪰̃m in the sense of (6.8). By way of negation, suppose there is such a
probability distribution Q. We define lotteries inQP and K that lead to contradic-
tion. Since Q ̸= P, there must be h and k in I with P(h) > Q(h) and P(k) < Q(k).
Since each i is strictly non-uniform, for each i, there are xi, x̃i, ̃xi, xi in X such thata(i,xi) ≻m a(i,x̃i) ≻m a(i, ̃xi) ≻m a(i,xi). Now for any r ∈ [0, 1], define ar and br inQP by
ar(h, xh) = r ⋅ P(h), br(k, xk) = r ⋅ P(k),
ar(h, xh) = (1 − r) ⋅ P(h), br(k, xk) = (1 − r) ⋅ P(k),
ar(k, xk) = P(k), br(h, xh) = P(h),
and assume that ar and br agree outside h and k (i. e. that ar(i, x) = br(i, x) for all
x in X and i in I ∖ {h, k}). Similarly, define ar and br in K by
ar(h, xh) = r, br(k, xk) = r,
ar(h, xh) = (1 − r), br(k, xk) = (1 − r),
ar(k, xk) = 1, br(h, xh) = 1,
and assume that ar and br agree outside h and k. Since ar = L(ar), and br = L(br),
the Reduction Axiom implies that ar ⪰m br if and only if ar ⪰̃m br for any r ∈ [0, 1].
So if Q represents your ⪰̃m, then for any r ∈ [0, 1],
∑
i∈I ,x∈X
ar(i, x)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
br(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U iff
∑
i∈I ,x∈X
ar(i, x)Q(i)u(i, x) ≥ ∑
i∈I ,x∈X
br(i, x)Q(i)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U . (A.23)
The left-hand side of the biconditional (A.23) is equivalent to
rP(h)u(h, xh) ⋇ (1 − r)P(h)u(h, xh) ⋇ P(k)u(k, xk)
≥ rP(k)u(k, xk) ⋇ (1 − r)P(k)u(k, xk) ⋇ P(h)u(h, xh) ∀u ∈ U , (A.24)
or
rP(h)(u(h, xh) − u(h, xh))
≥ (1 − r)P(k)(u(k, xk) − u(k, xk)) ∀u ∈ U . (A.25)
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Similarly, the right-hand side of (A.23) is equivalent to
rQ(h)(u(h, xh) − u(h, xh))≥ (1 − r)Q(k)(u(k, xk) − u(k, xk)) ∀u ∈ U . (A.26)
Now, define ̃r = inf{r ∈ [0, 1] ℘ (A.25) holds}. Such an infimum must exist, since
the set {r ∈ [0, 1] ℘ (A.25) holds} is nonempty and bounded. Suppose ̃r = 0. Then
{a1/n} and {b1/n} would be two sequences with a1/n ⪰ b1/n for all n ∈ ℕ; hence
Sequence-Continuity would imply that a0 ⪰ b0, which (given that P is positive)
contradicts our assumptions about xk and xk . So ̃r > 0. Similarly, suppose ̃r = 1.
Then
sup{u(k, xk) − u(k, xk)u(h, xh) − u(h, xh) ℘ u ∈ U} = ∞. (A.27)
Since U ∈ U*, 1 ≥ u(k, xk) − u(k, xk) for all u in U . Hence
inf{u(h, xh) − u(h, xh) ℘ u ∈ U} = 0, (A.28)
which contradicts our assumptions about xh and xh. So 1 > ̃r. Moreover, given
Sequence-Continuity, we have a ̃r ⪰m b ̃r . However, since P(h) > Q(h) and P(k) <
Q(k), (A.26) can’t hold for r = ̃r. So Q can’t represent your ⪰̃m.150
The Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities
The derivation of the Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabil-
ities from the Representation Theorem for Incompleteness and Probabilities and
the judgment-explications is parallel to that of the Expected Value Theorem from
the Basic Representation Theorem.
150 A similar proof is given by Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 12 f.) for the uniqueness of a proba-
bility distribution in a theorem featuring simple utility functions rather than sets.
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